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ABSTRACT
Ginther, Morgan Louise. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2011. From
the Closed Society to the Realization of Freedom: The Mississippi Delegation Debate at
the 1964 Democratic National Convention. Major Professor: Sandra J. Sarkela, Ph.D.
In late August of 1964, two-days prior to the opening ceremonies of the
Democratic National Convention, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP)
members were poised to challenge the seating of the regular, all-white Mississippi
Democratic Party delegation in dramatic fashion on national television. While both sides
believed that they would win the challenge, neither side could have foreseen the
complicated twists and turns this debate would take. Thus, the purpose of this
dissertation is to analyze the arguments of the Mississippi delegation debate at the 1964
Democratic National Convention in order to more fully understand the rhetorical
situation.
Using Lloyd Bitzer’s definition, this dissertation analyzed the arguments of the
Mississippi delegation debate first by situating those arguments within the rhetorical
context, then by assessing the debate discourse through a close reading of the text.
Additionally, this study employed oral history techniques to thicken the historical
descriptions of the rhetorical situation and to enhance the meaning inferred from a close
reading of the arguments.
What emerged from this historical moment was an interesting rhetorical situation.
From the perspective of the MFDP, there was a rhetorical exigency that needed to be
addressed through the discourse of the delegation debate. While their arguments were
persuasive in changing the attitudes of the credentials committee members, their
discourse was ultimately rendered ineffectual because of the institutional constraints they
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faced. Although members of the MFDP may have struggled to understand this point at
the national convention, the regulars understood it well. As a result, the regulars focused
their testimony on the realities of the current power relationships within the National
Democratic Party. In the end, they were effective because they were able to remind their
audience what was at stake. Therefore, this dissertation argued that key terms were used
in this debate not only to promote democratic values, but also to guide the decision of the
credentials committee by re-appropriating our understanding of representation from a
moral, political perspective (held by the MFDP) to a legal, technical perspective (held by
the regulars).
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Chapter One
Introduction: The 1964 Mississippi Delegation Debate
In late August of 1964, a group of local black and sympathetic white
Mississippians as well as civil rights activists and volunteers converged in Atlantic City,
New Jersey at the Democratic National Convention. Known as the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party (MFDP), these members were poised to challenge the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party in dramatic fashion on national television. Although, some
MFDP members were optimistic that they would unseat the regulars, most believed that
they needed to have a strong showing at the hearing in order to gain enough momentum
to broker a compromise that would force the credentials committee to seat both
delegations. Even though most members of the MFDP were realistic about their chances,
they could not have foreseen the complicated twists and turns that this debate would take
nor the lengths to which those in power would go to maintain their status and control.
Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the arguments of the Mississippi
delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic National Convention in order to more fully
understand the rhetorical situation.
Complicating this rhetorical situation is the fact that while members of the MFDP
went into the hearing cautiously optimistic, they left the hearing believing that they had
won the debate. In For Freedom’s Sake: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer, Chana Lee
appraised the MFDP challenge by explaining that
after [Mrs. Hamer’s] testimony, the atmosphere among the Freedom Democratic
Party members was ‘jubilant,’ according to Arthur Waskow, another MFDP
supporter. Later, in a written account of the convention experience, Waskow
noted, ‘Fannie Lou Hamer was agreed to have been its star.’ Returning to the
Gem Motel, the MFDP delegation was in fact upbeat in mood. The challengers’
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case appeared ‘very, very strong’ to them and to a significant number of delegates
from other states (89-90).
Moreover, Eric Burner in And Gently He Shall Lead Them: Robert Parris Moses and
Civil Rights in Mississippi claimed that the President called a live press conference
during Mrs. Hamer’s testimony,
to deflect attention from some of the most gripping words ever uttered at a
national political convention. He then proceeded to talk about his dog to a group
of governors visiting Washington. His attempt to change the subject failed
dismally. Mrs. Hamer’s speech was rebroadcast during prime time that night.
The President was informed that 416 telegrams had been received on that day in
support of the MFDP—and one in support of the regular Mississippi delegates.
Soon after, twelve members of the credentials committee announced they would
support the MFDP challenge (175).
Sharing her personal experience of the MFDP challenge, Freedom Summer volunteer,
Sally Belfrage stated,
Aaron Henry announced that the FDP had been assured of the support of twelve
members of the credentials committee, one more than we needed: in the audience
there was a brief sensation of hope. Everything suddenly looked possible, and
when Henry said, ‘We can sit at home in Mississippi and watch things from the
balcony, but we will not accept that here!’ it sounded beyond oratory like a battle
cry (238).
Describing the MFDP challenge yet another way, Elizabeth Martínez stated in Letters
From Mississippi: Reports from Civil Rights Volunteers and Poetry of the 1964 Freedom
Summer that “it justified all the dreams of developing indigenous leadership in black
Mississippi” (254). Finally, Kay Mills in This Little Light of Mine: The Life of Fannie
Lou Hamer argued that “Joe Rauh and Aaron Henry, Ed King and Fannie Lou Hamer,
held the moral high ground that day” (123).
As these quotes explain, members of the MFDP were hopeful following the
credentials committee hearing. They felt that they had won the debate on both logical
and emotional grounds. Their arguments, they believed were clear and straightforward.
2

Joseph Rauh, Jr. and his legal team had prepared the MFDP witnesses well and had
provided the necessary documentation to show that the MFDP, from its inception in April
of 1964, had followed the national party protocol to the letter. At the same time, they
also knew that their arguments made logical sense. Members of the MFDP, on the advice
of their legal counsel, had focused their testimony around selected claims about violence,
participation, loyalty, and support. Those claims were then supported by each witness
whose evidence varied based on his or her own experience (some personal, some
political) that, in turn, led the committee to the necessary conclusion that: the MFDP
should be seated. Pushing their pleas to another level, members of the MFDP believed
that the testimony of Dr. Aaron Henry, Reverend Edwin King, Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer,
and Mrs. Rita Schwerner had provided the important and necessary emotional tension to
win the seating. The stories of these witnesses captured for the credentials committee the
brutality and violence they had experienced within the state of Mississippi as a result of
their civil rights activities that was not only emotional, but also compelling. As Chana
Lee noted in For Freedom’s Sake: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer,
the main feature of the day’s testimony was Hamer’s emotional recounting of the
Winona jail beating. Walter Tillow described her presentation as the “clincher”:
“She spoke of her experiences, especially in Winona when she got beat up…Half
the committee being women, she had a tremendous impact. [Many] of women
were crying after she finished” (89).
Furthermore, the MFDP members believed that they had reason to be optimistic when
Chairman Lawrence had “in a surprise move, postponed a decision on the Mississippi
challenge until Sunday, hoping to work out a formula ‘to avoid a bruising floor battle in
front of the television cameras” (Dittmer 288). As telegrams supporting the MFDP
seating “began flooding the convention immediately after Mrs. Hamer’s testimony, and

3

they continued to pour in throughout the night,” members of the MFDP believed that they
“had won the first round” (Dittmer 288). This optimism, however, was short lived
because as Kay Mills noted in This Little Light of Mine: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer,
the decision to seat the MFDP would not be made on emotional grounds (123).
Statement of the Rhetorical Problem
What emerges from this historical moment is an interesting rhetorical situation.
From the perspective of the MFDP, there was a rhetorical exigency that needed to be
addressed through the delegation debate discourse. While the MFDP witnesses changed
the attitudes of the credentials committee members through their discourse, ultimately
their discourse was rendered ineffectual because of the institutional constraints of the
present system. Although members of the MFDP may have struggled to understand this
distinction between changing attitudes and making structural changes, the regulars
understood this point well. Focusing their testimony on the realities of the current power
relationships in the National Democratic Party, in the end, the regulars were effective
because they were able to remind the credentials committee what was at stake.
To better understand this unique rhetorical situation, this study examines the
arguments of the Mississippi delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention. This document was recorded by the Press Stenotypist Association in
Washington, D.C. However, it is preserved at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential
Library in Austin, Texas, and the copyright belongs to the National Democratic Party.
The transcript is 251-pages long and contains four delegation debates including
Mississippi, Oregon, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Although the transcript
contains the entire hearing, the Mississippi delegation challenge spans 105-pages.
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The debate began with the MFDP presenting the affirmative case. Mr. Joseph
Rauh, Jr. started with the MFDP’s opening remarks. Following those opening remarks,
eight witnesses testified on behalf of the MFDP including Dr. Aaron Henry, Reverend
Edwin King, Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer, Mrs. Rita Schwerner-Bender, Reverend James C.
Moore who read Reverend Robert Spike’s testimony, Mr. James Farmer, Dr. Roy
Wilkins, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. At the conclusion of the MFDP testimony, the
regulars presented the negative case. E.K. Collins, state senator and Democratic National
Committeeman of the state of Mississippi spoke first. Following Mr. Collins’s
testimony, Ruble Griffin, the Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi also testified. At
the conclusion of the negative case, Mr. Rauh responded to the accusations forwarded by
the regulars during his rebuttal testimony. Following Mr. Rauh’s rebuttal, Mr. Collins
finished the debate by offering his closing statement on behalf of the regulars.
In sum, the MFDP members believed that they had moral righteousness on their
side, and they reasoned that “when confronted with the indisputable evidence of the state
delegation’s lawbreaking and political betrayal…[that] the convention delegates, party
officials, and indeed the nation at large would have no choice but to support the
challengers” (Asch 211). While all of this may have been true, the task of connecting the
arguments in favor of seating the MFDP within the larger arguments of the civil rights
movement was not met.

This was, in part, because the civil rights movement struggled

to create a united overarching argument and, in part, because of the varied organizational
and tactical strategies that were employed by the different civil rights organizations. On
the other hand, the position the regular Democratic Party in Mississippi took was a well-
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defined and stable argument that had not only been forwarded by the regulars, but by
several other southern delegations.
Therefore, in order to more fully understand the rhetorical situation, this study
examines the arguments of the Mississippi delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic
National Convention. Through a close reading of the affirmative and negative cases as
well as the rebuttal testimony, I argue that key terms are used in this debate not only to
promote democratic values, but also to guide the decision of the credentials committee by
re-appropriating our understanding of representation from a moral, political perspective
(the MFDP) to a legal, technical perspective (the regulars). Before defining how this
debate was shaped, I intend to explain why I have focused on this topic and how the
historical and rhetorical aspects of this study work together in this discursive moment.
Finally, I will discuss my rhetorical approach to studying this debate and outline the
material to be covered in each subsequent chapter.
Review of the Literature
Sustained interest in the United States civil rights movement has generated a
tremendous amount of scholarship. Primarily focused in three dominant perspectives—
the historical, the sociological, and the rhetorical—the scholarship in these areas has
shaped this body of knowledge in significant ways. While much has been written, there
are still aspects of the movement that have not been adequately studied. In particular, the
1964 Mississippi delegation debate, while highlighted in previous scholarship, has
remained a significant yet under-researched aspect of the civil rights movement.
Therefore, I begin by describing the three dominant perspectives, and then explain how
my study fits within the existing scholarship.
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From a historical perspective, most scholarship is descriptive. As Charles M.
Payne suggested in I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the
Mississippi Freedom Struggle historians have attempted “to dismantle the mainstream
narrative, assertion by assertion” that stated that “‘one day, a nice old lady, Rosa Parks,
sat down on a bus and got arrested. The next day, Martin Luther King, Jr. stood up, and
the Montgomery bus boycott followed. And sometime later, King deliver his famous ‘I
have a Dream’ speech and segregation was over’” (xiv). Building upon the descriptive
nature of movement scholarship, Kathryn Nasstrom, a civil rights historian, claimed that
the historiography of the civil rights movement has developed in three overlapping
stages.
Nasstrom argued that the first stage glorified the history of the movement.
Scholarship conducted during this stage primarily focused on the memoirs of participants
and the celebration of movement activities. Reflecting this stage of scholarship is a
variety of biographies and autobiographies that describe the transformation of ideas
within individuals as they confronted the realities of racism and violence in the South. In
general, these stories reflect mostly positive aspects of the United States civil rights
movement. 1
While the first stage celebrated movement leaders and activities, the second stage
examined movement activities in local contexts. These local studies not only described
the participation of locals in the movement, but this scholarship also examined how
1

Scholarship reflecting this stage includes Freedom Summer (1965) by Sally Belfrage, And Gently He
Shall Lead Them: Robert Parris Moses and Civil Rights in Mississippi (1994) by Eric R. Burner, This
Little Light of Mine: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer (1993) by Kay Mills, For Freedom’s Sake: The Life
of Fannie Lou Hamer (1999) by Chana Kai Lee, Aaron Henry: The Fire Ever Burning (2000) by Aaron
Henry with Constance Curry, and The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr. (1998) edited by
Clayborne Carson.
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federal policies were adapted in local settings. Filling in some of the gaps left by the first
stage of scholarship, this stage thickened the historical narrative that was previously
written by providing more detailed narratives of movement activities within the context
of local communities. 2
While the second stage thickened the historical narrative of movement activities
by focusing on local stories, Nasstrom claimed that the third stage, which has primarily
developed over the past seven years, has shifted to larger movement issues. Broadening
the definition of movement activities, this scholarship has incorporated additional stories
into the historical narrative through the publication of primary texts such as journals,
letters, and speeches. In addition to broadening the definition of movement activities,
scholarship in this stage has also attempted to address more fully the dialectical nature of
the movement by assessing the successes and failures of particular movement activities. 3
Building upon the descriptive work of historians, sociologists understand the
United States civil rights movement within the context of social movement theory. As
2

Scholarship reflecting this stage includes Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi
(1995) by John Dittmer, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (1995) by Clayborne
Carson, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle
(2007) by Charles M. Payne, Freedom Summer (1988) by Doug McAdam, The Summer That Didn’t End:
The Story of the Mississippi Civil Rights Project of 1964 (1992) by Len Holts, Mississippi Freedom
Summer (2004) by John F. McClymer, and Divine Agitators: The Delta Ministry and Civil Rights in
Mississippi (2004) by Mark Newman.
3

Scholarship reflecting this stage includes Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi after
1965 (1990) by Frank R. Parker, The Legacy of Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Boundaries of Law, Politics,
and Religion (2002) by Lewis V. Baldwin, et al., Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical
Democratic Vision (2003) by Barbara Ransby, Letters from Mississippi: Reports from Civil Rights
Volunteers and Poetry of the 1964 Freedom Summer (2007) edited by Elizabeth Martínez, First Class
Citizenship: The Civil Rights Letters of Jackie Robinson (2007) edited by Michael G. Long, Many Minds,
One Heart: SNCC’s Dream for a New America (2007) by Wesley C. Hogan, The Senator and the
Sharecropper: The Freedom Struggles of James O. Eastland and Fannie Lou Hamer (2008) by Chris
Myers Asch, On the Road to Freedom: A Guided Tour of the Civil Rights Trail (2008) by Charles E. Cobb,
Jr., Yes We Did? From King’s Dream to Obama’s Promise (2009) by Cynthia Griggs Fleming, Women
and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1965 (2009) edited by Davis W. Houck and David E. Dixon, and The
Speeches of Fannie Lou Hamer: To Tell It Like It Is (2011) edited by Maegan Parker Brooks and Davis W.
Houck.

8

scholarship from this perspective has emerged, scholars have tended to focus on the
creation and evaluation of social movement theories within the localized context of this
movement (McAdam 1). While some scholars have focused on specific events and
participants, most scholarship attempts to understand the broader implications of this
particular social movement on society.
Just as the work of historians falls into three main stages, the work of sociologists
functioned in a similar fashion. Early work uses the classical model to address issues of
collective behavior and the role individual participants played in the broader movement
goals. Doug McAdam argued in Political Process and the Development of Black
Insurgency, 1930-1970 that “social movements are seen as collective attempts to manage
or resolve the psychological tensions produced by system strain” (16). To understand the
inception of the civil rights movement, scholars from this perspective attempt to
understand the “boiling points” that initiate action. Following this work, sociologists
shifted their attention to the resource mobilization model focusing on the “political and
organizational determinants of movement development” (McAdam 1). Frances Fox
Piven and Richard A. Cloward argued in Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed,
How They Fail that the organizational tactics of the civil rights movement were vital to
the disruption of caste domination and the system of power that influenced political and
economic modernization in the South (182-3). More recently, scholarship from this
perspective has attempted to bridge the gap between sociology and political science by
using an indigenous orientation to study the relationship between political activity and
power. Here, we find scholarship addressing the emergence of mass protest within
society and the organizing efforts of activists within local communities (Morris xii).
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Francesca Polletta argued in Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American
Social Movements that “the point of involving people in decision making was to train
them to mobilize against existing political structures” (56).
While the historical perspective is highly descriptive and the sociological
perspective focuses on theoretical models of understanding, the rhetorical perspective
explores the art of persuasion. Central to this work is an appreciation of “the significant
tactical orchestration of symbolism, argument, time, audience, and performance” (Morris
& Browne 1). Focusing on issues of “mobilization, collective action, cycles of protest,
framing, and identity,” rhetorical scholars have attempted to understand the varied
aspects of the persuasive appeals function within discourse (Morris & Browne 1).
To comprehend these persuasive endeavors, rhetorical scholars have focused their
work on the theoretical and practical aspects of the United States civil rights movement.
Early scholarship investigated the rhetorical patterns of social movements and the legal
and ethic dimensions of specific movement events. Leland M. Griffin argued in “The
Rhetoric of Historical Movements” that the goal of the student of rhetorical social
movements is “to discover, in a wide sense of the term, the rhetorical pattern inherent in
the movement selected for investigation” (13). While Franklyn S. Hariman argued in
“The Rhetoric of the Streets: Some Legal and Ethical Considerations” that the rhetorical
criticism of social movements should include aspects of legality including issues such as
freedom of speech (15-6).
Following these early studies, scholarship has varied greatly from the study of
confrontation and dissent to the study of the symbolic use of language. Robert L. Scott
and Donald K. Smith argued in “The Rhetoric of Confrontation” that “whether they
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experience deprivation as poverty, or lack of political power, or disaffection from
traditional values, the ‘have not’ leaders and theorists challenge existing institutions”
(29). Ralph R. Smith and Russel R. Windes argued in “The Innovational Movement: A
Rhetorical Theory” that “the primary task of the critic of rhetorical movements…is to
analyze discourse generated in the conflict between a movement’s advocates and the
defenders of the established order” (83).
Broadening the scope of research further, scholars have attempted to move
beyond arguments of definition and orientation and towards the situational demands of
particular movement events. David Zarefsky argued in “A Skeptical View of Movement
Studies” that the reason to study the rhetoric of social movements is not to identify a
distinct class of rhetoric, but to enhance our understanding of historical events (132).
Stephen E. Lucas argued in “Coming to Terms with Movement Studies” that “situational
studies also deal with movement, for rhetorical situations are dynamic configurations of
thought and action that are constantly in motion as they come into being, evolve, mature,
pass out of being, and give rise to other situations” (135).
In sum, civil rights movement scholarship has primarily developed from three
perspectives—the historical, the sociological, and the rhetorical. Historical scholarship
has developed in three stages and has been primarily descriptive. First, this scholarship
described the historical narrative of the movement through the memoirs of participants
that celebrated movement activities. Next, this scholarship focused on local studies
articulating how federal policies and movement goals were enacted in local contexts.
Finally, in more recent historical scholarship, researchers have focused on the dialectical
nature of movement activities to more accurately assess the successes and failures of
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particular movement activities. Adding to this perspective, the sociological perspective
has provided a variety of theoretical frameworks for understanding movement activities
including the classical model, resource mobilization model, and an indigenous orientation
model among others. In addition to these models, sociologists have studied both the
individual and collective behavior of movement participants by examining organizational
structures and tactics as well as the relationship between power and political activity.
Finally, the rhetorical perspective has enhanced the work of historians and sociologists.
Early rhetorical work focused on linguistic and structural patterns within social
movement discourse as well as the legal and ethical dimensions of specific movement
activities. More recent scholarship has attempted to understand the symbolic use of
language and the situational demands of specific movement events.
Rationale of Study
Although these perspectives have provided a large body of scholarship, there is
still much work to be done. This study, building upon the historical, sociological, and
rhetorical scholarship, will highlight a significant yet under-researched area of the civil
rights movement: the Mississippi delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention. In one sense, this study is particularly interesting to me because the full text
of the Mississippi delegation debate is not readily available. Even though Fannie Lou
Hamer’s testimony is easily accessible online (at www.americanrhetoric.com), the rest of
the debate is not. This study, then, becomes an opportunity to recover an overlooked text
that gives voice to those who might otherwise remain silent. Bridging the varied
perspectives in order to transform the way we think about this debate from a historical
event into a rhetorical phenomenon, my study hopes to shift the emphasis “from
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providing a documentary history of major political and historical events to surveying the
full range of symbolic strategies employed by highly diverse speakers” (Kohrs Campbell
214).
In addition to giving voice to participants through the recovery of the delegation
debate text, this study is amenable for rhetorical inquiry. The Mississippi delegation
debate was not just a clash of particular interests and social classes, but it was also a clash
of arguments that sought to persuade the credentials committee to take action. As such, I
argue that the Mississippi delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic National Convention
cannot be solely studied by historians or sociologists, but it must also be studied by
rhetoricians to understand the full range of strategies employed by those who testified as
well as the outcome of the hearing.
Approach of the Study
Originally when this project began, my intention was to study each witness’s
testimony as a separate but related text to understand the arguments forwarded by each
side in the 1964 Mississippi delegation debate. However, my approach to this project
changed after a conversation with Rita Schwerner-Bender who told me that the entire
MFDP testimony was orchestrated by Joseph Rauh, Jr. and his legal team (SchwernerBender, Interview). For me, this information helped me to come to a new understanding
of what the text actually was and how I might approach it in this study. Adding to this
shifting perception, Dr. Martin Medhurst and Dr. Herbert Simons in the 2010 Research
Network at the Rhetoric Society of America conference further helped me to define my
approach to this study by helping me to understand that the choices I would make in
terms of how I understood what the text was and in turn how I represented that
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understanding to the reader would place value in particular aspects of the debate
discourse. In particular, they cautioned me against reading and analyzing the testimony
of each witness one after the next because that organization would suggest to the reader
that the order that the testimony was delivered in at the hearing was the most important
feature of the debate. Having already asserted in our discussion that I did not believe that
to be true, Dr. Medhurst and Dr. Simons helped me to see this debate in another way that
was issue-centered.
Using this understanding as a launching point, I began by situating the debate
within the particular rhetorical situation. Lloyd Bitzer claimed in his article “The
Rhetorical Situation” that there are three aspects to the rhetorical situation. The first
aspect is an exigence “an imperfection marked by urgency [that it is at once] a defect, an
obstacle, [or] something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be”
(221). While Bitzer argued that an exigence is an urgency marked by a pressing issue, he
was also clear that this pressing issue must be a problem that needs to be resolved by the
assistance of discourse (221). This insistence on the role of discourse within the exigence
stipulates the second aspect of the rhetorical situation for Bitzer. That is, a need for a
rhetorical audience that “consists only of those persons who are capable of being
influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change” (221). Finally, according to
Bitzer, every rhetorical situation must contain “a set of constraints made up of persons,
events, objects, and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the power
to constrain the decision and action needed to modify the exigence” (222).
Adding to the understanding of the situation, this study also employed oral history
interviewing techniques to more fully develop the context of the Mississippi delegation
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debate to better understand the rhetorical situation. Valerie Yow argued that oral history
interviews can be used to obtain a total picture of the debate by seeking the viewpoints of
the nonelite to create meaning (11). Moreover, Bret Eynon claimed that “the complexity
of movement history [can be] lost” when scholars forget to view human experience as
dynamic (561-2). Oral history is particularly suited to bring additional voices and
experiences into the narrative that adds depth to the existing content of scholarship.
Additionally, Yow claimed that “oral history testimony is the kind of information that
makes other public documents understandable” (11). Echoing her words, Eynon stated
that by “examining oral memoirs together with individual and organizational
documentary records, scholars are giving voice to the tumultuous diversity that gave
movements of the sixties their vitality” (565).
From the perspective of the MFDP, the delegation debate discourse was
addressing a rhetorical exigency. While the witnesses for the MFDP were able to change
the attitudes of the credentials committee members through their testimony, their
discourse was ultimately rendered ineffectual because they could not effect structural
change to the present system. The more the testimony of the MFDP challenged the
institutional constraints, the more the system pushed back. Although, the MFDP
members may not have understood this point, the regulars did. As they responded to the
rhetorical situation, they used this knowledge to remind the credentials committee
members of the reality of the current power relationships in the National Democratic
Party.
To understand how these power structures influenced the arguments of the
Mississippi delegation debate, this study examined the institutional and situational
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constraints of the present system. Maurice Charland argued that rhetoric could facilitate
our understanding of these power structures by helping us to see how power can be
mobilized “through discursive and non-discursive acts that win concessions from the
powerful” (469). Here, rhetoric becomes a means to not only understanding what power
is and the extent to which structures of power maintain their dominance, but also how
rhetoric can be transformative as people push against those structures by “effectively
challeng[ing] and reconstruct[ing] hegemony” (Charland 469).
Having situated the Mississippi delegation debate within the particular rhetorical
situation, this study then assesses the discourse of the debate through a close reading of
the text. According to Michael Leff, a close reading of the text occurs when we see
discourse as
persuasive in two senses, since it has both an intentional and extensional
dimension. The intentional dimension has to do with the purpose of the rhetor as
he or she composes a discourse designed to persuade an audience. The
extensional dimension has to do with persuasive effect, the actual impact of
discourse on an audience (223).
Moreover, Leff argued that the intentional dimension “stresses the artistic integrity of
discourse,” while the extensional dimension “stresses social impact” (223). Defined in
this way, a close reading of the text helps to stabilize the discourse “as a field of
rhetorical action through a calculus that subsumes its extensional thrust within its
intentional dynamics” (Leff 226). To this end, this study begins by closely reading the
testimony of each witness and analyzing the arguments of each position. Following the
analysis of the arguments, this study then attempts to resituate the rhetorical situation to
better understand how the Mississippi delegation debate discourse functioned at the 1964
Democratic National Convention. Ultimately, this study concludes that even though
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there are instances when discourse and debate are not enough to effect change, in the case
of the MFDP challenge, this debate is not the end but the beginning.
Preview of the Chapters
Chapter Two: Setting the Stage for the 1964 Mississippi Delegation Debate
Chapter two begins by describing the context from President Lyndon Baines
Johnson’s perspective and the larger implications for the National Democratic Party.
Following this description, chapter two explains the context in Mississippi that included
the increased intensity of movement activities as well as the segregationists’ response to
these activities. Highlighting the perspectives of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party and the regular Mississippi Democratic Party, chapter two then describes the
context as both parties prepare for the 1964 Democratic National Convention. Finally,
chapter two concludes by situating the historical context within the rhetorical dimensions
of the Mississippi delegation debate.
Chapter Three: The Affirmative Case: The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
Testimony
Chapter three provides a detailed description and analysis of the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party testimony. Situating the MFDP testimony within the context,
chapter three then describes each of the eight witnesses who spoke on behalf of the
MFDP and briefly highlights the testimony of each witness. Systematically tracing the
arguments of each witness within his or her testimony, chapter three then provides an
analysis of the MFDP’s argument presented to the credentials committee. Using a
problem-solution structure, chapter three shows how the witnesses of the MFDP
contributed to the overarching arguments of the affirmative position. By first articulating
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the problems they faced in Mississippi using the key terms of violence and (lack of)
representation, then by solving those problems using the key terms of loyalty, support,
and participation. Finally, chapter three concludes by arguing that while the testimony
offered by the MFDP was persuasive, it remained ineffectual because it could not effect
structural change within the power relationships of the National Democratic Party.
Chapter Four: Responding to the Affirmative Case: The Regular Mississippi
Democratic Party Testimony and the Rebuttal Testimony
Chapter four provides a detailed description and analysis of the response
testimony of the Mississippi delegation debate. The first part of this chapter examines
the testimony offered by the regular Mississippi Democratic Party. The second part of
this chapter examines the rebuttal testimony offered by Joseph Rauh, Jr. on behalf of the
MFDP and E.K. Collins on behalf of the regulars.
Part one of chapter four begins by reminding us of the context in which the
regulars spoke. Following this description, part one of this chapter analyzes the
testimony offered by the regulars to show how key terms guided their testimony to
suggest that history and past precedent should be grounds for their seating at the 1964
Democratic National Convention. Part one of chapter four concludes by arguing that
while the testimony offered by the regulars was not persuasive, it was effective because it
reminded the credentials committee of the power relationships within the National
Democratic Party.
Part two of chapter four begins by explaining the context of the rebuttal
testimony. Following this description, part two of chapter four summarizes the MFDP’s
position in order to analyze the arguments forwarded by Mr. Rauh in response to the
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testimony offered by the regulars. Then, part two of chapter four summarizes the
regulars’ position in order to analyze the closing statement offered by Mr. Collins that
concludes the delegation debate. Part two of chapter four concludes by summarizing the
context of the Mississippi delegation debate at the conclusion of the testimony offered by
both sides.
Chapter Five: Drawing Conclusions about the 1964 Mississippi Delegation Debate
Chapter five provides an evaluation of the Mississippi delegation debate analysis
offered in chapters two, three, and four. Attempting to reset the debate within the context
of the historical movement, chapter five resituates the debate not only within the
immediate context, but also within the larger trajectory of civil rights movement
activities. Ultimately, chapter five argues that key terms are used in this debate not only
to promote democratic values, but also to guide behavior by re-appropriating our
understanding of representation from a moral, political perspective (the MFDP) to a legal,
technical perspective (the regulars). Moreover, this chapter claims that the Mississippi
delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic National Convention became a turning in the
U.S. civil rights movement. After losing the delegation challenge, members of the
MFDP returned to Mississippi disappointed and disillusioned (Mills 132-3). Responding
to these feelings some members (like Mrs. Hamer) recommitted themselves to grassroots
efforts in the local context. Others left the movement angry, and yet others (such as
Stokely Carmichael) became far more radical. So it seems that the Mississippi delegation
debate at the 1964 Democratic National Convention influenced the trajectory of the larger
movement in significant ways.
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Chapter Two
Setting the Stage for the 1964 Mississippi Delegation Debate
Walter Mondale reflecting on the 1964 Democratic National Convention called
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) challenge “one of the pivotal events
in the civil rights struggle” (2). Aaron Henry reflecting on the nature of the MFDP
argued that he believed going into the Atlantic City convention that the MFDP could be
a real political party—a party of inclusion for labor organizations and liberal
whites, as well as for much of the black population…[where] each individual
could continue civil rights activity under the banner of SNCC or the NAACP—or
whatever group they chose—and at the same time have an interest in a unified
MFDP. This [he reflected following the convention] didn’t work (198).
Finally, Kay Mills argued in her biography on Fannie Lou Hamer that “the Mississippi
challenge had wide impact, positive and negative. It ultimately opened the state party to
black participation and encouraged a different breed of white politician to seek office”
(132). Linking the MFDP challenge to the struggle for civil rights, Mills claimed that
“there had been civil rights debates at national conventions before, but this one reached
directly into American homes because of the emerging power of television” (132).
To fully comprehend these very different assessments of the MFDP challenge, we
need to begin with an understanding of this rhetorical moment not in our own
contemporary context, but historically, through the lens of that time. While this may
seem like an uncomplicated move, it is more complex than one might expect. This is in
part because the context is bounded by each individual’s experience and in part because
each individual’s experience both shapes and is shaped by the institutions of power
during that time period. As such, the context appears less linear and instead resembles a
more dynamic intertwining of individual experiences within a larger narrative of the
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rhetorical event. To reflect these varied dimensions of the rhetorical event, this chapter
first describes the context from President Lyndon Baines Johnson’s perspective and the
larger implications for the National Democratic Party. Secondly, this chapter describes
the context in Mississippi that included the increased intensity of movement activities as
well as the segregationists’ response to those activities. Thirdly, this chapter highlights
the perspectives of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) and the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party as they prepared for the 1964 Democratic National
Convention. Finally, this chapter concludes by situating this historical context within the
rhetorical dimensions of the Mississippi delegation debate.
Controlling the Situation from Behind the Scenes: The Role of President Lyndon
Baines Johnson
Lyndon Johnson came into the United States presidency during tragic and
uncertain times. He faced a nation that was mourning the loss of assassinated President
John F. Kennedy, a growing fear that communism was spreading, an escalating situation
with North Vietnam that seemed headed for war, and an increasingly violent situation of
racism and discrimination that was erupting throughout the southern region of the United
States. During these difficult times, Johnson called on his friends for help and grew ever
distrusting of those outside his inner circle.
Although Johnson’s distrust at times seemed to drive his decision making,
President Johnson was also a smart politician who knew the ways of Washington well. It
is because of this understanding that he knew that his first years as president were not
entirely his own. Attempting to strike a careful balance between his own political
ambitions and President Kennedy’s vision for America, Johnson realized that this balance
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was the key to gaining the American people’s trust that in turn might re-unite the country.
Unfortunately, for Johnson, this also meant that he would need to live in Kennedy’s
shadow at least for the time being.
As such, Johnson’s transition into the presidency was particularly challenging for
him and his staff because of a variety of circumstances that surrounded the assassination
of President Kennedy. While some Americans wondered if Lyndon Johnson had had a
role in the assassination of President Kennedy, since the assassination had occurred in
Dallas, Texas (Johnson’s home state). Others questioned Johnson’s motives because he
insisted on being sworn into the office of the presidency immediately and requested the
presence of First Lady, Jacqueline Kennedy as well. The LBJ tapes would later reveal
that Johnson did this because he was concerned that President Kennedy’s assassination
was a communist attack and he worried that if the country appeared weak, other
communist strikes might follow (vol. 1).
Even so, these circumstances also led to new opportunities. Previously Lyndon
Johnson had represented the state of Texas first as a U.S. representative from 1937 to
1949, then as a U.S. senator from 1949 to 1961. During those times, Johnson understood
that to get reelected, he needed to serve his constituency by supporting issues that were
important to them. Then, in 1961 after campaigning for the presidency and losing the
Democratic nomination to John F. Kennedy, Johnson agreed to join him as his runningmate. Serving as Vice President from 1961 until Kennedy’s assassination in 1963,
Johnson was no longer constrained by his Texas constituency and their views, but he
remained bound to the vision and goals of President Kennedy. During those times,
Johnson understood his role as vice president and did what he could to both influence and
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support Kennedy’s vision for America. These circumstances, however, changed the day
that Johnson became president and for the first time in his political career, he recognized
that these new circumstances created new opportunities that gave him more power, but
also made him responsible to a much larger constituency, the American people.
These new circumstances afforded Johnson certain luxuries, but they also created
new issues and dilemmas for the President. First and foremost, Lyndon Johnson was a
southern Democrat and he was friends with other southern Democrats many of whom
were members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. While these
connections had helped him his entire political career, they had also made him aware of
the power southerners held in Congress. Since congressional committee assignments and
chairmanships were largely based on seniority, southern congressman derived their
power from the consistency with which their constituencies reelected them by
comparison to their northern counterparts. Thus, southern Democrats held powerful
positions on many of the most influential congressional committees. As such, Johnson
knew from past experience that some of the stances he would take as president would
challenge and maybe even anger his friends in Congress. But he hoped (at least for the
time being) to avoid any major fights or disruptions and he looked for opportunities to
make small changes and compromises that might appease those who were dissatisfied
with the federal government’s lack of action on civil rights issues.
However, this hope was short lived. As the reports from the South continued to
come in, Johnson realized that the civil rights issue would not go away. Forced to break
from his southern friends and colleagues in Congress, Johnson knew that the southern
Democrats would view this as an assault on the southern establishment. Furthermore,
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Johnson was painfully aware that this move would likely impact the National Democratic
Party for years to come (Mondale, Interview). On the other hand, President Johnson also
understood that the personal and professional consequences he might face paled in
comparison to consequences the nation might experience if the issues of discrimination
and violence were ignored. As Walter Mondale recalled,
the issue of civil rights during that time period was an issue that could have
destroyed our nation…it forced us to look at and think about how our government
could, as Fannie Lou Hamer would point out, function as a true democracy
(Interview).
Faced with the dilemma of losing southern Democrats to the National Republican Party
or the possibility of losing the nation over the issue of civil rights, Johnson responded by
pursuing comprehensive civil rights legislation that would end legal discrimination in
America.
Although segregationists disapproved of this legislation and did what they could
to block it, President Johnson did what he did best and used a combination of
intelligence, southern charm, and political pressure to secure the votes necessary to pass
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which he signed into law on July 2. While Johnson was
pleased to sign this legislation into law, he also realized the political impact this action
could have for years to come as he told his staff that day “‘I think we just gave the South
to the Republicans for your lifetime and mine’” (Perlstein 365). Some of his staff even
wondered at the time, if this move “could conceivably lose Johnson the election
altogether” (Perlstein 365). With all this behind them and the Democratic National
Convention approaching, Johnson believed that he had done more for civil rights than
any other American president, and he hoped that this issue could be left alone at least
until his election was complete. This, however, would not be the case and soon Johnson
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would find himself in another civil rights battle only this one was at the national
convention and it was far more personal.
The Long Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi during the Summer of 1964
While President Johnson had been busy solidifying his role as President of the
United States, civil rights activities within the state of Mississippi were gaining
momentum. Realizing that the struggle for civil rights would not come easily, members
of the various civil rights groups working in Mississippi recognized that to be successful,
they needed to continue to apply political pressure and maintain national media attention
on their state. Since members of these groups believed that they could accomplish more
together than apart, they created a coalition that would focus their collective efforts on
particular issues and activities.
Banning together under the umbrella of the Council of Federated Organizations
(COFO), this association was created in the early 1960s to bring together various civil
rights groups working within the state of Mississippi on common movement goals.
Comprised of several civil rights groups, the Council of Federated Organizations
included the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress on
Racial Equality (CORE), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) as well as
various smaller groups in Mississippi. By the late spring of 1963, they were already
working together to plan the largest civil rights initiative in the state to that date (Holt
31). Called the “Summer Project” or “Freedom Summer,” this collaborative effort began
centered on voter registration drives in Mississippi. Believing that local blacks needed to
become a part of the political process to influence change, these voter registration drives
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focused on canvassing local neighborhoods, explaining the registration process, and
providing assistance and transportation to those who attempted to register (McAdams
77). While voter registration remained “the cornerstone of the Summer Project,” COFO
workers also saw a need for community programs and education (McAdams 77). As
such, the second aspect of the Summer Project became the creation and implementation
of Freedom Schools across the state to meet the educational and social needs of students
and other community members. Although these two goals were ambitious for the
Summer Project, COFO workers who had already experienced the force and power of the
political structures within the state, also realized that to create meaningful change, they
would need to do more, they would need to change the state’s political system. This
would occur through the creation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP),
a political organization that was originally conceived of as a political entity that would
work within the already existing state Democratic Party.
Finalizing the scope of the Summer Project (and these initiatives) in a meeting in
November of 1963 in Greenville, Mississippi, the discussion became heated when COFO
members argued about whether or not white volunteers should be used. Threatening to
destroy the Summer Project before it ever began, emotions rose as members talked about
the value and liability of using white volunteers as well as the danger of bringing whites
into the hostile and volatile environment in Mississippi. Some COFO members recalled
the help white, college student volunteers had provided in canvassing neighborhoods
during Freedom Vote, a mock election in 1963 in Mississippi that was created to show
the nation: (1) the disparity between white and black registered voters in the state and (2)
the desire of local blacks to vote when given the opportunity to do so. While others
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remembered the focused attention they (and not locals) had received from the media.
Believing that the attention white volunteers had received during Freedom Vote was in
contradiction to the mission of their organization and the Summer Project, they claimed
that their focus needed to remain centered on empowering blacks by “organizing local
communities and developing indigenous black leadership” (Dittmer 209).
On the second day of those meetings, Bob Moses, the project director arrived in
Greenville. Realizing quickly that this issue had the potential to destroy the Project,
Moses—in an uncharacteristic move—took over the discussion. Articulating a position
that simultaneously showed concern and understanding, Moses pushed COFO members
towards the necessary conclusion that the refusal to seek participation of white volunteers
would: (1) limit the scope and depth of Freedom Summer and (2) reinforce the very
problem of racism that they were trying to eliminate in Mississippi (Burner 130-1).
With that issue decided, the planning continued over the next few months. By the
month of June in 1964, COFO members with the support of the National Council of
Churches were prepared to train volunteers in two week-long orientation sessions at the
Western College for Women in Oxford, Ohio (Burner 152). The first session was held
from June 14th to 20th and was tailored to those who would canvas neighborhoods and
register voters. The second session was held the following week and was geared towards
those volunteers who would work in Freedom Schools (McAdams 66).
Although both training sessions were designed to prepare volunteers for the
activities they would participate in and the violence they might face during the summer,
racial tensions between white volunteers and COFO members escalated almost
immediately during the first session (Dittmer 242). As they sat down to watch the CBS
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documentary “Mississippi and the Fifteenth Amendment,” white volunteers giggled at the
images of locals on camera and commented to each other on the locals accent and
appearance (Dittmer 242). While this might seem minor, it was not. Civil rights workers
believed that the film accurately depicted what life in Mississippi was like and they
understood all too well that the image of the Hattiesburg Registrar was terrifying to those
who were brutalized by him. To laugh at this man’s image and to make fun of locals was
not only seen as disrespectful, but it also lacked the sensitivity COFO members believed
was necessary for the Summer Project to be successful. Although, some members of
COFO walked out of that training session, others tried to help the white volunteers
understand why their response to that film was offensive.
Even though this initial point of contention would dissipate, racial tensions
persisted throughout the summer as cultural differences between local Mississippians and
northern volunteers continued to surface. The crux of this issue centered on the fact that
members of COFO believed that they were accurately depicting the reality in Mississippi,
while northern volunteers complained that “the black organizers were aloof,
unappreciative, and disdainful” (Dittmer 243). Even with these tensions and
misunderstandings, COFO members continued their work in orienting volunteers to the
discrimination and brutality they might face as well as the activities they were planning to
implement through group discussions and role-playing. As Bob Moses explained “our
goals are limited. If we can go and come back alive, then that is something” (Belfrage
10).
This point, unfortunately, would become more meaningful during the second
orientation session when news spread that three civil rights workers (including one who
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had been trained in the first orientation session) had been arrested and released in
Neshoba County, and had not been heard from since. While the nation waited to hear
news about the whereabouts of the missing civil rights workers, those who had been
working in the movement in Mississippi knew that it was unlikely that Michael
Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman were still alive. Later in the summer
the car of the three civil rights workers would be found in the river, charred and burnt,
but it would not be until the end of the summer that their bodies would be recovered. In
the midst of this fear and chaos, the Summer Project began, and COFO members
somehow needed to convey to white volunteers both the danger of working for civil
rights in Mississippi and the dire need for their help. As one white, COFO volunteer put
it “I feel that supreme effort should be given that men might be free” (Koenig 1). But all
things in Mississippi were not this idealistic; the real work still lied ahead.
By mid-summer, the Summer Project was well underway. The goals of voter
registration and Freedom Schools were in full swing, and it was time for the attention of
COFO members and volunteers to return to the MFDP challenge. According to Chris
Myers Asch, the MFDP was originally conceived of as a smaller political organization
that would work within the constraints of the state Democratic Party (210). However,
when local blacks attempted to join the regulars, they were met with strong opposition.
As Frances Piven and Richard Cloward note “…during the spring of 1964 blacks were
barred from the primaries, denied access to regular party caucuses, and otherwise
prevented from participating in regular party functions” (247). John Dittmer added that
“on June 16—before the official start of the summer project—local blacks had attempted
to participate in a number of the 1,884 precinct meetings held across the state.
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[Although,] a few blacks were admitted in larger cities such as Greenville and
Jackson…these were rare exceptions” (273). The regular Mississippi Democratic Party
turned blacks away at the door, changed the location of their meetings to ensure blacks
would not attend, or canceled those meetings altogether to maintain white dominance
within their state political party. As members of the MFDP who had attempted to work
within this existing state political structure became frustrated, they decided to change this
aspect of the Summer Project. Instead of working within the state Democratic Party, they
would use the MFDP “to challenge the composition and legality of the all-white
Democratic Party,” at the Democratic National Convention (Asch 210).
On July 19, 1964, Bob Moses, director of the Summer Project realized that the
National Democratic Party convention was a month away, and sent an emergency
memorandum “to all COFO field staff stating that ‘everyone who is not working in
Freedom Schools or community centers must devote all their time to organizing for the
convention challenge’” (Dittmer 272). In all probability, Moses feared that the lack of
preparation had already hindered their success and he believed that they would not be
ready in time for the national convention.
Shifting into the MFDP challenge, workers and volunteers continued to register
voters, but they only took locals who asked to register to the courthouse. Instead workers
shifted into canvassing activities to “freedom” register black voters on behalf of the
MFDP. Following the advice of Joseph Rauh, Jr., an attorney for the United Auto
Workers of America and counsel to the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the
MFDP road to Atlantic City,
wound through the same tiered primary process the party regulars were subjected
to. The process began at the precinct level where all registered voters were free to
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participate in the election of delegates to a county convention. At the county
convention, representatives to a district convention were chosen. The process was
then repeated at several district conventions” (McAdams 81-2).
Finally reaching the state convention, on August 6, 1964, the MFDP packed the Masonic
Temple in Jackson, Mississippi with 2,500 people attending. Considering that only 200
people were in attendance a few months earlier when the MFDP was created on April 26,
1964, this increased level of participation was seen by those involved as a tremendous
success. The following day before a nationally televised audience, James Chaney whose
body—with the bodies of Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman—was found a week
earlier, was laid to rest four miles south of Meridian, Mississippi. Schwerner and
Goodman’s bodies were transported to their home state of New York where they would
be laid to rest.
While the events leading up to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic
City had given members of the MFDP a sense of purpose—they saw winning the
challenge as a way to give meaning to the senseless loss of life during the Summer
Project—however, most Democrats did not believe that they could win their challenge.
Even so, members of the MFDP remained optimistic. Over the summer, several state
conventions had passed resolutions calling for the seating of the MFDP including
Oregon, Michigan, and New York. Additionally, the civil rights establishment was
behind their cause. This included Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. who “toured Mississippi in
July to encourage blacks to sign up with [the M]FDP and on August 19th sent a telegram
to the president urging [him to seat the MFDP] ‘as the only democratically constituted
delegation from Mississippi’” (Dittmer 286). Other civil rights leaders also supported the
MFDP included Dr. Roy Wilkins of the National Association for the Advancement of
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Colored People, James Farmer of the Congress on Racial Equality, and Walter Reuther
and Joseph Rauh, Jr. of the United Auto Workers of America. Going into the challenge,
members of the MFDP believed that “nine Democratic delegations and twenty-five
members of Congress supported [the MFDP’s] seating as the official Mississippi
delegation” (Hogan 192; Carson 124; Holt 167; The Student Voice 1, 4). This support
that the MFDP garnered over the summer of 1964 was due in large part to Ella Baker
who spent the summer lobbying delegates and Congressmen in Washington, D.C.
Following the plan created by Joseph Rauh, Jr. their goal was to convince “ten
percent of the committee—eleven members—[to] file a minority report supporting [the
M]FDP” that would then be taken to the convention floor (Dittmer 287). Once the issue
was on the floor, the MFDP needed to convince eight states to request a roll call, which
would force every delegation “to go on record, avoiding the voice vote ‘rubber stamp’
that convention chairs so often used to decide unpopular issues” (Dittmer 287). It was on
the convention floor that Rauh believed the MFDP could win and going into the hearing,
he was confident he had the votes he needed.
An Assault on the Southern Establishment and the Preservation of Southern
Culture
While civil rights activists and Summer Project volunteers worked to bring
national attention to the state of Mississippi during the summer of 1964, segregationists
rejected these activities and did not sit by passively. They claimed that activists had
created a violent racial climate in the state and they argued that outside agitators (the term
they used to describe northern volunteers) only increased that atmosphere. Viewing the
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infiltration of northerners in Mississippi as an assault on the southern establishment,
segregationists prepared to fight to preserve their culture and way of life.
Quietly preparing for battle, segregationists passed a series of state laws and
purchased a tank built for war (The Student Voice 1). These new laws included:


The riot control law (state Senate bill #1526) that authorized the sharing of police
forces and jail space between cities, strengthened the number of police forces, and
increased supplies including gas masks, shotguns, and helmets for law
enforcement (The Student Voice 2).



The curfew law (state House bill #64) that restricted the movement of individuals
and groups to specific hours (The Student Voice 2).



The state highway patrol law (state House bill #564) that almost doubled the
number of state highway patrolmen in the state and gave them full power in both
civil disorders and undercover investigations. Additionally, the Governor of
Mississippi had the discretion even over the heads of local law enforcement as to
when and where state patrol could be sent within the state creating what some
called a state private army (The Student Voice 2).



The anti-picketing law (state House bill #546) that prohibited “picketing of all
public buildings, streets and sidewalks and other places belonging to the city,
county and state. The maximum penalty on conviction [was] $500 and/or six
months in jail” (The Student Voice 2).



The increased penalties law (state Senate bill #1517) that authorized larger
penalties to be assessed by municipal courts that increased the maximum fines
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from $100 to $300 and increased the maximum jail time from 30 days to 90 days
(The Student Voice 2).


The outlawing of boycott literature distribution law (state Senate bill #1545) that
provided “a maximum penalty of $500 and/or six months in jail for printing or
circulating materials concerning boycotts” (The Student Voice 2).

Other laws under consideration in the state of Mississippi included:


State Senate bill #1969 that proposed to outlaw Freedom Schools by making “it a
misdemeanor to teach in or conduct a school not licensed by the state” (The
Student Voice 2).



State House bill #270 that would prohibit “entry into the state with the intention
of violating state laws” with a maximum penalty of a $1000 fine and up to two
years in prison (The Student Voice 2).



State Senate bill #2027 that would prohibit “‘criminal syndicalism’ which [was]
defined as the doctrine which advocates or teaches ‘the commission of crime,
violence and force as a means of accomplishing or affecting a change in
agricultural or industrial ownership or control…or in affecting any political or
social change’” (The Student Voice 2).



State Senate bill #2136 that proposed to “require certification by the state of all
clinics or schools where general education and general health subjects would be
taught” (The Student Voice 2).

In addition to these measures, Senators James Eastland and John Stennis worked with
their southern counterparts in the U.S. Senate to prevent the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. Although, they were unsuccessful in their attempt to block this legislation,
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they still tried to influence President Johnson when they could. On June 23, 1964,
Senator Eastland stated to the President during a telephone conversation about the three
missing men in Mississippi (Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman)
that he did not believe they were missing. Instead Eastland explained the issue away by
saying that it was a publicity stunt. He added,
I’ll tell you why I don’t think there’s a damned thing to it. They were put in jail
in Philadelphia in east Mississippi, right next to John Stennis’s home county, and
they were going to Meridian. There’s not a Ku Klux Klan in that area. There’s
not a Citizen Council in that area. There’s no organized white men in that area…I
happen to know that some of these bombings where nobody gets hurt are
publicity stunts. This Negro woman in Ruleville that’s been to Washington and
testified that she was shot at nineteen times is lying. Of course, anybody that gets
shot at nineteen times is going to get hit (Johnson 432).
Although we cannot be sure that Eastland and other members of the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party actually believed this account, they continued to make similar
statements throughout the months leading up to the national convention.
By August, the regular Mississippi Democratic Party delegation convened their
state convention and prepared for the national convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
While they knew that the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party was challenging their
seating at the credentials committee hearing, they also knew that they needed to proceed
carefully. On one hand, they were angry with President Johnson and the National
Democratic Party for their support of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and their shift away from
a state’s rights perspective. On the other hand, Barry Goldwater’s stance on state’s rights
appealed to them, but they knew that outward support of Goldwater before the
Democratic National Convention could have detrimental effects. In particular, they
feared that making this move would guarantee the seating of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party and open the state Democratic institutions to the MFDP (Crespino
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101). While the idea of showing support for Lyndon Johnson did not appeal to them,
they knew that it was better for them to stay quiet going into the national convention and
win the delegation seating. Then when they returned home following the national
convention, they could reconvene their state convention and reject the National
Democratic Party’s platform and candidates, thus creating a space for them to support
Barry Goldwater for president. Even so, many regular Mississippi Democratic Party
members struggled to accept this strategy because of their disdain for the National
Democratic Party leaders, but Governor Paul Johnson told “the regular delegates that he
had been personally assured by the President that the MFDP would not be seated”
(Carson 124; Holt 165). And with that knowledge, the regulars agreed to wait until the
timing was right to break from the national party. Going into the hearing, the regulars
believed that they had the support of the other southern delegations and they were
confident their plan would work.
Lyndon Johnson’s Coronation and the Mississippi Delegation Challenge that
Threatened it All
While tensions continued to rise in Mississippi between civil rights activists and
segregationists, President Johnson wanted the 1964 Democratic National Convention to
be his moment to shine on the national stage. As the national convention drew near and
the Mississippi delegation issue remained unresolved, Johnson’s fear continued to grow.
As Walter Mondale pointed out, the insistence of the MFDP members to be seated placed
them on a collision course with the President (4). Summing up the situation, Mondale
explained,
It had been less than a year since President Kennedy’s assassination, and Johnson
was deeply concerned about his presidency and his place in history. He had just
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signed the landmark Civil Rights Act into law, which outlawed legal segregation,
and he looked to the convention as his moment to finally step out of Kennedy’s
shadow and articulate his own ambitious agenda for civil rights and the Great
Society. But Johnson also believed that patience was the key to advancing the
civil rights cause. He feared the Freedom Democrats were moving too quickly,
and that their challenge would spark a messy fight between the rival Mississippi
delegations at the convention (4).
From President Johnson’s perspective, we can understand his worry as he describes the
issue to the Governor of Texas, John Connally in a telephone conversation on July 23,
1964. Explaining the complicated nature of this situation, Johnson stated to Connally
that,
Joe Rauh and Martin Luther King and folks that normally run with that crowd are
leading ‘em. Humphrey is trying his best to put an end to it, but he hasn’t had
much luck with ‘em…It’s going to be pretty difficult for a fellow like Donald
Russell…and you or anybody else from that part of the country with a substantial
Negro population…to sit by and let their sister states be thrown out when they
were duly elected…On the other hand, I don’t see how a fellow like Dick Hughes
and Governor Lawrence and Dick Daley…can possibly go back to their states and
say that they were for seating the Alabama group and the Mississippi group when
they won’t say they’ll support their nominees…So it looks like you just pretty
well split the party…Worse than Goldwater and Rockefeller even (Johnson 467).
Working on this issue from behind the scenes, Johnson called Walter Reuther on August
9, 1964. In this conversation, Johnson asks Reuther for help explaining the situation by
stating “…We don’t want to cut off our nose to spite our face. If they give us four years,
I’ll guarantee the Freedom delegation somebody representing views like that will be
seated four years from now. But we can’t do it all before breakfast” (Johnson 511). Six
days later, Johnson angled his strategy towards the civil rights establishment by calling
on Dr. Roy Wilkins to end the Mississippi delegation fight. Using this conversation as a
platform to discuss the inherent political issues, Johnson explained “Roy, do you know
how much trouble I’m gonna have when I name this Vice President? It’s going to be
almost like naming the Freedom Party to these folks. They’re going to have hell
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swallowing it” (Johnson 517). While Johnson does not explain why Democrats will
struggle to accept his running mate, it can be inferred that some would be unhappy
because they wanted him to select Robert Kennedy. At the same time, others would be
unhappy because Hubert Humphrey (Johnson’s presumed running-mate) not only did not
share the segregationists’ point of view, but he was also an advocate of civil rights.
Concluding this conversation, Johnson added “If I were the Negro…I’d just let
Mississippi sit up on the platform, if they wanted to, and I’d stand at attention and salute
the son of a bitch. Then I’d nominate Johnson for President and my Vice President and
I’d go out and elect my Congressman…And the next four years, I’d see the promised
land” (Johnson 517).
It is clear from these telephone conversations, as well as several others recorded
in the White House that Johnson was extremely worried about the Mississippi delegation
debate and the possibility of a convention floor fight. As Wesley Hogan noted, this issue
more than any other threatened to divide the National Democratic Party even more, and
as a result, this issue became “‘the most important single issue’ of the convention for the
president” (Hogan 191). Going into the national convention, even Johnson was not sure
what would happen if the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party did not back down.
At the same time, Johnson also understood what was at stake in the arena of
national politics. He knew that Republicans had already held their national convention
and selected Barry Goldwater as their presidential nominee. With this move, Johnson
confidently believed that he had secured the black vote, since many African Americans
did not support Goldwater. However, Johnson also knew that Goldwater’s nomination
could be problematic. While Goldwater was known for his cowboy mystique and
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frequent oratorical slips, he was thought by some to be capable of gaining the trust and
support of southern delegations who favored state’s rights and segregation. This
solidified for Johnson his need to unify the National Democratic Party by healing some of
the divisions that had surfaced as a result of his civil rights agenda. Furthermore,
Johnson knew that the southern delegations could not be pushed too hard. Not only
would pushing them too hard inhibit his ability to unite the Party, but Johnson, the
politician, also knew that the repercussions could be far reaching. This was particularly
true, since many southerners sat on powerful congressional committees and the
consequences of pushing too far would be felt across the Democratic establishment.
Moreover, Johnson knew that the southern delegations would probably act together at the
national convention, which would likely mean that if Mississippi’s delegation walked out
of the convention, other southern delegations would follow suit including the delegation
from Johnson’s home state of Texas.
The Mississippi delegation debate weighed heavily on Johnson’s mind. He had
worked hard to orchestrate the events of the national convention to unify his Party, but
the issue of civil rights still lingered. All the while, Johnson’s supporters were busy with
the final details of the national convention and they hoped it would proceed without any
surprises or disruptions. While the delegation challenge in Mississippi threatened to
unhinge everything, Johnson continued to monitor the situation from behind the scenes,
growing wearier about the days ahead.
Walter Mondale reflecting on the Atlantic City convention argued that “Johnson’s
handling of the Freedom Democrats’ challenge walked a thin line at times between
hardball and over-the-line tactics” (12). “On August 19, just five days before the
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Democratic National Convention, the president arranged a meeting with black leaders,”
this last failed attempt to resolve the situation led Johnson to consider other options
(Burner 171). With the assistance of the FBI, agents were authorized to tap the
telephones of several MFDP supporters including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s hotel
room as well as the SNCC headquarters and the Union Temple Baptist Church where
MFDP meetings were held (Hogan 191; Carson 124; Mills 113). The wiretaps were
authorized by the Attorney General, but they were operated under Cartha De Loach, the
Assistant FBI Director (Hogan 191; Mills 113). “Whenever agents’ intercepted
especially vital information, they telephoned Washington where the material was typed
and rushed to the White House by messenger,” this allowed the President to become
“privy to ‘the most intimate details of the plans of individuals supporting the MFDP
challenge (Mills 113; Hogan 191). While this information proved to be mildly fruitful
leading up to the national convention, as the hearing and further discussions unfolded this
information became increasingly important to the President.
The Convening of the Credentials Committee at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention
Two days prior to the opening ceremonies of the 1964 Democratic National
Convention on August 22 the credentials committee convened in Atlantic City, New
Jersey. The 110-member committee under the direction of Chairman David Lawrence
gathered to hear various state delegation debates. Opening the hearing at 2:55pm,
Chairman Lawrence began his remarks by situating the committee’s tasks within the
conception of party unity (DNC 1; Mills 117). Originally the credentials committee
hearing was located “in a room just large enough for the panel members and witnesses,”
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but T.V. newsman, Sandy Vanocur in conjunction with Joseph Rauh, Jr. worked to
change the venue knowing that the MFDP’s best chance to win their challenge would
come if the American people were allowed to hear what was going on in Mississippi
(Mills 116).
The room was steamy and crowded with long tables set up in a rectangular shape
and committee members seated around the perimeter of the room at those tables. At the
one end of the room in the center, there was a table with a chair and microphone for the
person who was testifying. In the back of the room behind members of the credentials
committee was the press and their cameras. From this vantage point, they focused their
lights and cameras on the testifying table to capture the rhetorical moment (Moses,
Interview; Schwerner-Bender, Interview; Mondale, Interview). It was decided before the
hearing began that the Mississippi delegation challenge would be the third case heard
(Mills 117). As they waited, members of both Mississippi delegations were seated
directly opposite one another.
When it was time to hear the Mississippi delegation debate, it was decided that
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party would speak first. Joseph Rauh, Jr., the
attorney representing the MFDP was given one hour to make his case for the MFDP’s
seating at the national convention (Mills 117). Testifying on their behalf was a mixture
of individuals who represented every facet of the Summer Project. Some were native
Mississippians, one was a northerner who volunteered to help with the Summer Project,
and yet others were established civil rights leaders who represented many of the
organizations involved in civil rights activities within the state. Representing the
diversity of the MFDP, those who testified on their behalf included both genders and both
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white and black witnesses. Speaking on behalf of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party was Dr. Aaron Henry, Reverend Edwin King, Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer, Mrs. Rita
Schwerner, Reverend James C. Moore who read Reverend Robert Spike’s testimony, Mr.
James Farmer, Dr. Roy Wilkins, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Testifying first was
Aaron Henry who established through his testimony the framework of the MFDP’s
arguments. Following Dr. Henry’s testimony, Reverend Edwin King spoke to his
experience as a sympathetic white and native Mississippian through his first-hand
account of the dangers faced by those who were considered “traitors” to their own race.
Testifying third was Fannie Lou Hamer who stirred the audience through her invitational
style that implicitly argued in favor of the MFDP’s seating, and at the same time
identified with her audience through her straight-forward delivery. Following Mrs.
Hamer was Rita Schwerner who spoke on behalf of her murdered husband, Michael
Schwerner, by addressing the issues of violence faced by those who were considered
“outsiders” by segregationists.
Following Mrs. Schwerner’s testimony, Joseph Rauh, Jr. called on the civil rights
establishment to broaden their message including Reverend James C. Moore from the
National Council of Churches who read Reverend Robert Spike’s testimony, Mr. James
Farmer from the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Dr. Roy Wilkins from the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). These
witnesses testified to the individual intimidation they faced in Mississippi as they fought
for civil rights and explained the ways in which they had “been shut out of the
Mississippi Democratic Party” (Dittmer 288). Simultaneously, they attempted to appeal
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to their audience by pledging their loyalty to Johnson and the National Democratic Party
before turning the question of loyalty to the regulars who “were highly critical of both
President Johnson and the national party” (Dittmer 288). In addition, the MFDP
members believed that they could highlight the fact that the regulars had recessed their
own state convention in order to reconvene following the national convention, a move
that could create an opportunity for them to endorse Barry Goldwater for president
(Dittmer 288).
Walter Mondale, a member of the credentials committee recalls the MFDP
testimony stating,
Our committee heard Joe Rauh lead a powerful presentation on behalf of the
Freedom Democrats. We heard Aaron Henry and the Reverend Ed King, cochairs of the MFDP delegation, testify about the brutality they had experienced
while campaigning for civil rights and the Freedom Party in Mississippi. The
Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. urged us to seat the Freedom Democrats in the
name of justice. Roy Wilkins of the NAACP asked us to apply ‘the rule of
morality’ and seat the MFDP.
And in a moment people recall to this day, a sharecropper named Fannie Lou
Hamer transfixed the room—and the nation—as she told of being shot at,
arrested, and beaten for urging her fellow black citizens to vote (Mondale 4-5).
Opposing the MFDP seating were the Mississippi Democratic Party members who
testified on their own behalf included E.K. Collins and Ruble Griffin. Governor of
Mississippi, Paul Johnson, U.S. Senators from Mississippi, James Eastland and John
Stennis, and all of the members of the U.S. House of Representative that represented the
state of Mississippi conveniently did not attend the credentials committee hearing even
though they were the leaders of the regular delegation (Mills 117). As such, Mr. Collins
and Mr. Griffin argued that the MFDP should not be seated “on the grounds that the party
was run by nonresidents of the state, its delegates represented only forty of [the] eighty-
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two counties, and its organizers were affiliated with Communist-front organizations”
(Asch 212). While many of these arguments were true, the MFDP hoped that the
testimony of their members to “the obstacles black Mississippians faced when trying to
vote” would overcome their opponents’ arguments (Asch 212). On the other hand, Chief
Spokesman for the regulars, state senator E.K. Collins of Laurel, Mississippi, argued that
the regulars should be seated because of their past support of presidential nominees.
Moreover, Collins attempted to persuade the committee to seat the regulars by denying
that blacks had difficulty voting in the state of Mississippi.
Conclusion
In sum, this chapter described the context of the Mississippi delegation debate at
the 1964 Democratic National Convention by intertwining the experiences of individual
participants within the larger narrative of the rhetorical event. To more fully understand
the context of the Mississippi delegation debate, this chapter began by situating the
debate not simply as a historical moment, but also as a rhetorical phenomenon. Using the
perspectives of both the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party, this chapter highlighted the key issues at stake for each
side in this debate. In addition to these two perspectives, this chapter also described the
national perspective focusing on the role Lyndon Johnson played as well as the
constraints placed on this debate by the present structure of the National Democratic
Party. Finally, this chapter provided the necessary context to analyze the Mississippi
delegation discourse that addressed both the stakes and stakeholders of this debate. Now
that we are situated within the context of the 1964 Mississippi delegation challenge,
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chapter three will integrate the context and arguments of the affirmative position that
argues in favor of the MFDP seating.
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Chapter Three
The Affirmative Case: The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Testimony
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the testimony offered by the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) at the 1964 Democratic National Convention
credentials committee hearing. Originally, I planned to study the MFDP testimony by
analyzing the statement of each witness to understand how each one built upon the next
to create the argument in favor of the MFDP’s seating at the national convention. After
interviewing Rita Schwerner-Bender, one of the people who testified on behalf of the
MFDP, I realized that this approach would not tell the whole story. These speeches were
not isolated rhetorical moments, but were delivered in concert with each other. To isolate
each witness’s testimony, as I originally planned, seemed to suggest that the order in
which they were delivered and the exact movements within each speech were more
important than the overall argument that was being made. Moreover, I learned from Mrs.
Schwerner-Bender that the MFDP’s testimony was orchestrated by Joseph Rauh, Jr.,
counsel for the MFDP (Interview). Rauh not only decided who would speak and in what
order, but he also indicated to each witness what that person should speak about when
testifying. In this way, Rauh was able to influence the testimony by creating a clear
argument in favor of the MFDP seating. Therefore, this chapter will first remind us of
the context in which the MFDP spoke including some of the key events during the
summer of 1964 as well as details of the national convention from the MFDP’s
perspective. Secondly, this chapter will describe each of the eight witnesses who spoke
on behalf of the MFDP and briefly highlight the rhetorical movements of each witness’s
testimony. Thirdly, this chapter will analyze the testimony offered by the MFDP
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showing how key terms guided their testimony by explaining the problems they
encountered in Mississippi before describing the solution to these problems. Finally, this
chapter will conclude by summarizing the MFDP’s argument and placing it within the
framework of the moral, political perspective.
The Context from the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’s Perspective
To understand the testimony offered by the members of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party (MFDP), it is important to begin with the circumstances that motivated
their action at the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey. During
the summer of 1964, the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), the umbrella
organization for civil rights groups working in Mississippi, created and implemented the
largest civil rights project in Mississippi to that date—known to those involved as the
Summer Project or Freedom Summer (Holt 31). The goals of this project were simple.
They wanted to draw national attention to the voter registration discrepancies within the
state by registering new voters and highlighting the ways that segregationists barred
blacks from participation in the political process. They wanted to create educational
opportunities for local black children who had not received an adequate education as a
result of both the Jim Crow laws and circumstances that required them to work from a
young age to help support their families. They wanted to create a new democratic
political party (the MFDP) that would work within the organizational confines of the
regular Democratic Party in Mississippi to fight discrimination and increase participation
within the political landscape of the state.
By June of 1964, COFO members were ready to begin their summer initiatives
and the Project began as white volunteers arrived in Oxford, Ohio for orientation.
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Sponsored by the National Council of Churches, the two week-long orientation sessions
were developed to help acclimate the volunteers to the hostile Mississippi environment
they were about to enter and prepare them for the work they would be undertaking. The
first session held from June 14 to 20 was tailored to those canvassing neighborhoods and
registering voters, while the second session held the following week was geared to those
who would help with the Freedom Schools and community centers throughout the state.
Although these training session were meant to prepare white volunteers for the goals of
Freedom Summer and the extreme tensions they would face from segregationists who
saw them as “outsiders,” it was Bob Moses, director of the Summer Project, who tried to
make this point clear when he told volunteers: “our goals are limited. If we can go and
come back alive, then that is something” (Belfrage 10). But even this message of
warning may not have been enough to convince them of the seriousness of this endeavor.
Then, on June 21, 1964, a day after the first group headed to Mississippi to begin their
work and the second group arrived for training, the message that three civil rights
workers—James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman—were missing was
received. Chaney was a black Mississippian from Meridian, Schwerner was a white New
Yorker, both were CORE staff members, and Goodman, a white SNC volunteer, who had
just arrived in the state hours before were reported missing after they did not check in
with COFO members at the designated time. It was later discovered that these three men
had been arrested and subsequently released from a jail in Neshoba County. When Bob
Moses and the other SNCC staffers in Oxford, Ohio heard this news, they believed that
the three men were dead. But, they knew that they needed to tell the volunteers who had
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just arrived at the orientation so that, as Moses put it, “‘they could have a choice’”
(Hogan 162-3).
As civil rights workers and volunteers tried to move forward with the Summer
Project, the first two goals of voter registration and education in Freedom Schools were
in full swing by mid-summer. It was at this point that SNCC and COFO workers and
volunteers under the direction of Bob Moses turned their attention to the third goal, the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party challenge. While SNCC and COFO members
founded the MFDP in April as a smaller organization that would work within the
constraints of the state Democratic Party, this aspect of Freedom Summer changed when
the regulars barred blacks from participating in the process (Asch 210). As Frances
Piven and Richard Cloward note, “during the spring of 1964 blacks were barred from the
primaries, denied access to regular party caucuses, and otherwise prevented from
participating in regular party functions” (247). John Dittmer tells us that by June 16th
“local blacks had attempted to participate in a number of the 1,884 precinct meetings held
across the state” (273). But most were denied access with a couple of rare exceptions in
larger cities such as Jackson or Greenville (Dittmer 273). Angered by these moves,
members of the MFDP decided to channel their political energy by challenging “the
composition and legality of the all-white Democratic Party” at the 1964 Democratic
National Convention (Asch 210).
By mid-July, Bob Moses was concerned that they would not be ready for the
Democratic National Convention, which was only a month away; as such, he sent an
emergency memorandum “to all COFO field staff stating that ‘everyone who is not
working in Freedom Schools or community centers must devote all their time to
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organizing for the convention challenge’” (Dittmer 272). Transitioning into their work
for the MFDP challenge, workers and volunteers continued to register voters when asked,
but they primarily focused their canvassing efforts on “freedom” registering locals
instead. Following the advice of Joseph Rauh, Jr., an attorney for the United Auto
Workers of America and legal counsel for the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the
MFDP road to Atlantic City
wound through the same tired primary process the party regulars were subjected
to. The process began at the precinct level where all registered voters were free to
participate in the election of delegates to a county convention. At the county
convention, representatives to a district convention were chosen. The process was
then repeated at several district conventions and finished at the state convention
where delegates would be selected to participate in the national convention
(McAdams 81-2).
On August 4, 1964, six weeks following the disappearance of Schwerner,
Chaney, and Goodman, their three brutally murdered bodies “were found buried in an
earthen dam five miles outside of Philadelphia, Mississippi” (Hogan 185). Two days
later, the MFDP members held their state convention in Jackson, Mississippi where “over
eight hundred delegates from forty Mississippi counties” selected forty-four delegates
and twenty-four alternatives (Hogan 181). Beyond selecting delegates, they discussed
their credentials committee hearing strategy, mourned the loss of Chaney, Schwerner, and
Goodman, and listened to Ella Baker, the keynote speaker. As Barbara Ransby notes in
Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision,
This speech was different. Only two days before, the risks that the struggle for
justice entailed had been dramatically revealed by the discovery of the bodies of
the three missing civil rights workers…Ella Baker stood before the grief-stricken
crowd of 800 that had gathered in Jackson’s Masonic Hall on that hot summer
night and delivered a political message full of anger and determination. Sensitive
to the agony that the families of the victims must have felt at that moment, Baker
was both mournful and militant as she eulogized the three young men, and she
urged movement activists to carry on where their three brave young comrades had
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left off. At the same time, she underscored the lesser value that white society
placed on black lives: ‘Until the killing of black mothers’ sons is as important as
the killing of white mother’s sons, we who believe in freedom cannot rest’
(Ransby 335).
The following day, August 7, 1964 before a national televised audience, James Chaney
was laid to rest four miles south of Meridian, Mississippi. Even though Michael
Schwerner’s family requested that he be laid to rest next to James Chaney in Meridian,
Mississippi, this request was denied because even death in Mississippi was segregated.
As a result, Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman’s bodies returned to their home
state of New York and would be laid to rest there. It is important to note that when the
bodies of three men were examined it was determined that Schwerner and Goodman had
both been shot once, while Chaney had been shot three times. According to Wesley
Hogan, an autopsy report on Chaney indicated that,
whites had literally beaten [him] to death..that his “jaw was shattered, the left
shoulder and upper arm were reduced to pulp; the right forearm was broken
completely across several points, and the skill bones were broken and pushed in
towards the brain,” reported Dr. David Spain of the University of Mississippi
Medical School Hospital. Spain concluded that “these injuries could only be the
result of an extremely severe beating with either a blunt instrument or chain. The
other fractures of the skill and ribs were the result of bullet wounds. It is
impossible to determine whether the deceased died from the beating before the
bullet wounds were inflicted.” He added that in his “extensive experience of 25
years as a Pathologists and as a Medical Examiner, I have never witnessed bones
so severely shattered, except in tremendously high speed accidents such as
aeroplane crashes” (186-87).
While representatives of CORE’s national office asked Dave Dennis to deliver a
calm eulogy to keep riots from being incited, it was clear from the moment he stood that
this was not going to be possible. According to John Dittmer in Local People: The
Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi,
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Dennis delivered a powerful message:
I feel that he has got his freedom and we are still fighting for it. But what I want
to talk about right now is the living dead that we have right in our midst, not only
here in the state of Mississippi, but throughout the nation. Those are the people
who don’t care…That includes the president on down to the governor of the state
of Mississippi…I blame the people in Washington, D.C., and on down in the state
of Mississippi for what happened just as much as I blame those who pulled the
trigger.
I don’t grieve for James Chaney. He lived a fuller life than most of us will ever
live. He’s got his freedom, and we’re still fighting for ours. I’m sick and tired of
going to the funerals of black men who have been murdered by white men. I’ve
got vengeance in my heart tonight, and I ask you to feel angry with me…(and
speaking to the local people): Don’t just look at me and go back and tell folks
you’ve been to a nice service. Your work is just beginning. If you go back home
and take what these white men in Mississippi are doing to us…if you take it and
don’t do something about it…then God Damn your souls! (284).
The words of Ella Baker and Dave Dennis describe the mixture of feelings the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party delegates, civil rights workers, and Summer
Project volunteers felt as they prepared for their trip to Atlantic City, New Jersey. Their
task was to balance their feelings of agony and anger with their hope that things could
change in Mississippi if the MFDP delegation was seated.
Leaving by bus for Atlantic City just days before the credentials committee
hearing was scheduled to convene, the MFDP delegates ate soda crackers and drank
Cokes “because they had little money for real meals” (Mills 115). The buses started
arriving in Atlantic City on Friday August 21 and everyone was directed to the Gem
Hotel, a “small, run-down hotel [located] about a mile from the convention hall” (Dittmer
285; Mills 115; Henry 180). As Aaron Henry recalled,
Ella Baker had made the arrangements and had done the best she could with
limited funds. The Gem Motel provided the worst accommodations imaginable,
and it was several miles from the convention hall. We had to sleep five and six to
a room, and there were never enough beds to go around. People were sleeping
under the beds and in chairs, and no room was considered filled until there was no
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lying room left. Although this was uncomfortable, the main problem was that we
were so cut off from the activities of the convention (180).
As the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party delegates continued to arrive, those who
were already there met on the veranda of the Gem Hotel for a rally (Henry 181). The
enthusiasm of these delegates was clear. Even so, the MFDP delegates “stood out among
the rank-and-file party faithful. Sharecroppers and small landowners, maids and
mechanics, schoolteachers and businessmen, the Freedom Democratic Party delegation
accurately reflected the socioeconomic composition of the state’s black population”
(Dittmer 285). Describing the scene at the national convention, Sally Belfrage, a
Summer Project volunteer explained,
A small plane trailed a streamer over the sea: BOBBY BAKER FOR VICE
PRESIDENT. Pretty girls were dressed in LBJ advertisements, and a man as
Santa Claus. Barry Goldwater beamed down at the crowded beach: IN YOUR
HEART YOU KNOW HE’S RIGHT. The pop-art, circus quality of Atlantic City
must seem unreal at the best of times, but during a convention and after a
Mississippi summer it numbed nearly to the point of alienation. We had
exhausted our supply of tensions in a confrontation with Southern reality, and
now were flung with no transition into the world of deals and decisions, ulcers
and Dexedrine, funny hats and red, white, and blue—expected to participate, to be
political (237).
Adding to this image of the convention Rick Perlstein explained that “the Republicans
erected a gargantuan eighty-foot Goldwater billboard on the boardwalk directly across
from Atlantic City’s Convention Hall. It featured the campaign’s slogan—“In Your
Heart You Know He’s Right.” (Soon a placard was placed above it, reading “YES,
EXTREME RIGHT” (402).
With the 1964 Democratic National Convention scene set, the MFDP delegates
and Summer Project volunteers painted protest signs and lobbied delegates on the
boardwalk outside the convention hall. As they prepared to deliver their testimony before
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the credentials committee on August 22, 1964, the MFDP witnesses needed to figure out
how they could channel all of these feelings into a political reality that they could bring
home to the people of Mississippi who had suffered for so long and who had fought so
hard.
The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Witnesses and Their Stories
Now that we have situated ourselves within the context of the Mississippi
delegation challenge from the MFDP’s perspective, let us take a closer look at the
witnesses and the testimony they offered. In the weeks leading up to the credentials
committee hearing, Joseph Rauh, Jr. along with attorneys Eleanor Holmes Norton and H.
Miles Jaffe had “prepared the brief from which Rauh would argue” (Mills 117). This
brief included descriptions of the history and operations of the MFDP as a political party
within the state, legal arguments in favor of the MFDP seating, a comparison between the
two state Democratic parties, and legal precedents that supported their challenge
including a precedent from Texas that the President had been involved in when he was a
Congressman (MFDP Brief i-v). In addition to preparing this legal brief, Joseph Rauh,
Jr. had prepared approximately fifteen witnesses “to testify about being deprived of their
right to vote or to participate in political activities” (Henry 181). As all of this
preparation and emotion came together on Saturday August 22, 1964 at 2:55pm in the
grand ballroom of the convention hall, Joseph Rauh, Jr. began the MFDP testimony by
stating “in this hour I shall show you that the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party is
the loyal, legal, and long-suffering body of Mississippi” (Mills 117; Henry 181; DNC
21).
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The Testimony of Dr. Aaron Henry
Moving into the first witness’s testimony, Mr. Rauh introduced Dr. Aaron Henry.
Born in the Mississippi delta to sharecroppers, Aaron Henry learned from an early age
the ways of the segregated south. As a young man, he worked part-time as a delivery boy
for Henderson Drug Store to help pay his boarding while he attended Coahoma County
Agricultural High School (Henry 32). Following high school, Henry enlisted in the army
where he served for three years during World War II (Dittmer 120). Upon returning
home, Henry attended Xavier University in New Orleans where he earned a degree in
pharmacy (Dittmer 120). Returning to Clarksdale, Mississippi following his schooling,
he managed a drug store for a short time and later purchased it (Dittmer 120). Joining the
NAACP after learning about the organization from one of his high school teachers (Ms.
Thelma K. Shelby) in 1954, Dr. Henry became state President in 1960 (Curry 40; Dittmer
120). In 1962, when the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) was created, Dr.
Henry was elected president (Carson 78). Called “Mississippi’s most recognized black
leader, [who] had won the respect of NAACP moderates and many SNCC and CORE
activists,” in 1963 Dr. Henry was selected as the gubernatorial candidate for Freedom
Vote (Dittmer 202). In 1964, when the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP)
was created, Dr. Henry became the Chairman of the state political party (Dittmer 288).
Testifying before the credentials committee, Dr. Henry explained to them that
even the MFDP delegations attendance at the national convention could cause them to be
arrested when they returned to Mississippi. Here, he explained that the state Attorney
General secured an injunction against the MFDP for their use of the word democratic in
its name, which the regulars claimed was illegal (Mills 117). Dr. Henry stated “but, sir, if

55

jail is the price that we must pay for our efforts to be of benefit to America, to the
National Democratic Party, and to Mississippi then nothing could be more redemptive”
(DNC 21). Continuing to explain the MFDP position, he used the key term of loyalty to
describe their point of view, since they would be loyal to the National Democratic Party
and President Johnson. Shifting from the MFDP’s position to the actions of the regulars,
Dr. Henry described the power structure within the state which has “an affinity for the
bottom” (DNC 23). Connecting the terror and violence in Mississippi to the regulars, Dr.
Henry used examples and quotations to argue that “on them is the blood and the
responsibility of this reign of terror” (DNC 23).
Transitioning from the regulars to the MFDP, Dr. Henry explained how the
members of the MFDP tried to work within the system by attempting to join the regular
Democratic Party in Mississippi. Describing the tactics the regulars used to bar them
from joining, Dr. Henry then described how the MFDP was organized to follow the same
protocol as the regulars so that they could challenge their seating at the national
convention. Making a comparison between the regular delegation and the MFDP
delegation, Dr. Henry concluded his testimony by stating “the hopes, the dreams, and the
desires of many Americans will ride on your decision here today” (DNC 28).
The Testimony of Reverend Edwin King
Following a short question-and-answer session, the second MFDP witness,
Reverend Edwin King was called to testify. A native of Vicksburg, Mississippi,
Reverend King grew up in a prominent white family. It was not until he was a senior in
high school that he came face-to-face with the realities of racism in Mississippi when he
volunteered to help in the black community following a destructive storm (Houck and
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Davis 774). Graduating from Methodist Millsaps College located in Jackson,
Mississippi, Reverend King then “went north for his graduate theology training at Boston
University” (Houck and Davis 774). When Reverend King returned home in the early
1960s he became chaplain of Tougaloo College and began working in the civil rights
movement. In 1963, Reverend King was selected as the candidate for Lieutenant
Governor in Freedom Vote (Carson 97-8; Houck and Davis 774). Following the mock
election, he continued to work for civil rights with the Council of Federated
Organizations (COFO).
Beginning his testimony by defining himself, Reverend King called himself: (1) a
white Mississippian, (2) a native Mississippian, and (3) the National Committeeman for
the MFDP. Claiming that “this nation is being populated with refugees from the closed
society in Mississippi,” Reverend King explained that many whites were unwilling to
openly work for civil rights in Mississippi because of the social and violent consequences
they faced (DNC 33). Using his own experiences to further explain the terror
sympathetic whites faced, Reverend King described a car ride from Canton to Jackson,
Mississippi where the car he was a passenger in was driven off the road and the driver of
the car was beaten severely. He then explained to the credentials committee that “the
Mississippi Democratic Party brags that it controls the State of Mississippi. It certainly
controls the police of Mississippi” who when this situation occurred refused to take any
action (DNC 34).
Comparing the two state Democratic parties, Reverend King used a second story
to explain the differences. He described how a student from Tougaloo College (where
Reverend King was the chaplain) was pulled over and threatened by the state police for
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his bumper sticker that supported President Kennedy, this story showed again how the
power structures in Mississippi functioned. Concluding his testimony, Reverend King
compared the MFDP to the regular Mississippi Democratic Party by using an open/closed
metaphor to define the regulars’ perspective within the closed society and the MFDP’s
perspective within the democratic values of American citizenship (DNC 38).
Following Reverend King’s testimony, Chairman Lawrence attempted to resituate
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party testimony to “the question of the election
machinery and the forms of election and so forth” (DNC 38). However, in a dramatic
moment, Joseph Rauh, Jr. disagreed stating,
If Your Honor please, I must respectfully disagree. It is the very terror that these
people are living through that is the reason that Negroes aren’t voting. They are
kept out of the Democratic Party by the terror of the regular party and what I want
the Credentials Committee to hear is the terror which the regular party uses on the
people of Mississippi which is what Reverend King was explaining which is what
Aaron Henry was explaining and which is what the next witness will explain,
Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer (DNC 39).
The Testimony of Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer
And with that, Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer was introduced as the third witness. The
daughter of two sharecroppers, Mrs. Hamer was born in Montgomery County,
Mississippi (Lee 1). The youngest of twenty children, Fannie Lou (Townsend) Hamer
picked cotton next to her parents from an early age. Some accounts suggest that she
might have had a sixth grade education, while others suggest maybe less. As an adult,
she married Perry (Pap) Hamer and continued to work as a sharecropper and timekeeper
on the W.D. Marlow plantation in Ruleville, Mississippi. At the age of forty-four, Mrs.
Hamer attended a SNCC voter registration meeting at a local church where she first
learned of her right to register to vote. Caught up in the moment, she agreed to attempt to
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register to vote the next day and this decision launched her into the civil rights struggle
(Carson 73). Working for SNCC as a field secretary, Mrs. Hamer became known for her
beautiful singing voice, her commanding presence and fearlessness, and her unwavering
commitment to the local community. Elected the Vice Chairperson of the MFDP, Mrs.
Hamer’s testimony not only catapulted her into the national spotlight, but it is also the
most remembered testimony of this national convention.
Mrs. Hamer began her testimony by bravely stating her name and where she
lived. Using a narrative style, Mrs. Hamer then moved immediately into her first story
explaining her first attempt to register “to try to become a first-class citizen” (DNC 40).
Sharing with her audience that she had been a timekeeper and sharecropper on the same
plantation for eighteen years, Mrs. Hamer then explained that she was told to leave the
plantation by the owner because she attempted to register. Mr. Marlow, the plantation
owner explained her dismissal by saying “…we are not ready for that in Mississippi”
(DNC 40-1). Transitioning from the issue of voter registration to the brutality she faced
in Mississippi, she then told the committee how sixteen bullets were fired into a
neighbor’s house for her. It is important to note that it was typical during that time for a
black person who attempted to register to vote to have his or her name printed in their
local newspaper for a period of time no less than two weeks. This action not only alerted
segregationists, but it also made the person who had attempted to register a target for
violence as Mrs. Hamer’s example suggests.
Shifting into her second story, Mrs. Hamer then told of her experience being
arrested and beaten severely in a Winona, Mississippi jail. Describing her experience in
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some detail, she moved between her own experience of violence and the experiences of
others. Concluding she pointedly stated to the credentials committee,
All of this is on account we want to register, to become first-class citizens, and if
the Freedom Democratic Party is not seated now, I question America, is this
America, the land of the free and the home of the brave where we have to sleep
with our telephones off of the hooks because our lives be threatened daily because
we want to live as decent human beings, in America (DNC 43-4)?
Functioning as an enthymematic argument, Mrs. Hamer’s conclusion began by creating a
connection between voter registration and citizenship through her initial premise. She
then questioned what American democracy stood for and by extension the National
Democratic Party. However, what Mrs. Hamer never explicitly stated in her conclusion
was that the regulars were in control of the power structure that supported this kind of
abuse. Instead, she invited her audience to make that inferential leap where the regulars
were not only in support of the terror, fear, and brutality in Mississippi; they were the
ones who controlled it. By contrast, Mrs. Hamer also seemed to be suggesting something
about the MFDP. Later reflecting on the power of Mrs. Hamer’s testimony, Aaron Henry
described it as,
One of the most colorful and most uninhibited presentations ever made in the
convention hall, Mrs. Hamer told her story to the committee…Her rendition of
her experiences created new tension among the committee members. It was clear
that many of them had never seen a woman like Mrs. Hamer nor heard a firsthand
account of Mississippi goings-on (181).
Following Mrs. Hamer’s powerful testimony, E.K. Collins of the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party delegation objected to the next witness on the grounds that
she was not a Mississippian that she was not in Mississippi, and that she was “only being
put on for passion and prejudice against the delegates here from Mississippi” (DNC 45).
Joseph Rauh, Jr. countered that Mrs. Rita Schwerner was speaking on behalf of her
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husband who had lost his life in the struggle for civil rights during the summer. Stepping
in to mediate this situation, Chairman Lawrence responded to the objection by stating “I
think we can rely on the members of our committee—they are all capable people—to
screen out of the testimony any testimony which is not important to the issue and
particularly applicable to the issue” (DNC 45).
The Testimony of Mrs. Rita Schwerner
Mrs. Rita Schwerner, the widow of Michael Schwerner then became the fourth
witness to testify on behalf of the MFDP. She and her husband who were from New
York “had joined the CORE staff in Mississippi that January [of 1964]” (Dittmer 246).
The couple worked together to organize community centers in the Neshoba County
region (where Michael would later be murdered). Following the disappearance of her
husband and his colleagues, Mrs. Schwerner returned to the state of Mississippi to search
for them. Her testimony focused on the challenges she faced during that difficult time.
For the remainder of the summer she spent most of her time in Washington, D.C. until
the 1964 Democratic National Convention when she joined the MFDP and testify on her
husband’s behalf (Schwerner-Bender, Interview).
Mrs. Schwerner began her testimony by tying her identity to her husband’s to
establish her ethos as a witness. She then explained why they came to Mississippi as well
as her husband’s role in the formation of the MFDP. Describing her husband’s
disappearance and her attempts to find him and his colleagues, Mrs. Schwerner explained
how she and Reverend King first went to the Governor of Mississippi’s office then to the
Governor’s mansion only to realize that the Governor was unwilling to meet with her or
help. Explaining how the bodies of the three missing men were found only two-and-a
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half weeks prior, Mrs. Schwerner then told the committee that the federal not the state
authorities had contacted her. Concluding her statement, she explained that she had not
been allowed to see any official report on the condition of the bodies or any other official
report, and that a death certificate had not been issued. While Mrs. Schwerner’s
testimony was personal to her experience, Aaron Henry saw the larger implications when
he observed that “Mrs. Rita Schwerner was another extremely effective witness [because
she] emphasized that [her husband’s] death could be made meaningful through giving
Mississippi Negroes the rights that they deserved” (Henry 181-2).
At this point, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party testimony shifted from
the stories and experiences of individual participants to the civil rights establishment.
Having shown that blacks in Mississippi “had been abused physically and
psychologically in their attempts to register to vote and participate in the functioning of
the Democratic Party,” Joseph Rauh, Jr. also needed to show the credentials committee
that the MFDP had the support of movement leaders (Henry 182).
The Testimony of Reverend Robert Spike delivered by Reverend James C. Moore
The fifth witness was Reverend Robert Spike, the executive director of the
National Council of Churches Commission on Religion and Race. Born in Buffalo, New
York, Robert Spike “received his theological training from Colgate-Rochester Divinity
School and from Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary in New York
City” (Newman 7). Following his schooling he worked as a pastor in Greenwich Village
where he was transformed from a “‘conservative Baptist to [a] social activist” (Newman
7). Although, Spike intended to testify on behalf of the MFDP at the 1964 Democratic
National Convention he was “confined to [an] Atlantic City Hospital for much of the
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convention…nursing injuries from a street accident,” and as a result, Reverend Spike’s
testimony was read by Reverend James C. Moore also of the National Council of
Churches (Newman 18).
Reverend Spike’s testimony began by defining the organization he worked for
(the National Council of Churches) and the relationship between his organization and the
Summer Project in Mississippi. Using an outsider’s perspective, Spike argued that he
could objectively assess the situation in Mississippi. He then goes on to describe the
disenfranchisement and harassment that he witnessed in Mississippi. Connecting these
observations to the MFDP, Reverend Spike then explained to the committee the inception
and development of the MFDP as a political organization from his perspective. Claiming
that the creation of the MFDP was “nothing less than the most dramatic grassroots
development of responsible citizenship in our time,” Reverend Spike argued that the
MFDP was the inspired response of people seeking citizenship (DNC 50). Concluding
his testimony, he stated that the inspired voice of the MFDP needed to be legitimized by
the credentials committee so that it could be heard (DNC 50).
The Testimony of Mr. James Farmer
Following the testimony of Reverend Spike was Mr. James Farmer of the
Congress on Racial Equality (CORE). Born in Marshall, Texas, Mr. Farmer was a child
prodigy who enrolled at Wiley College at the age of fourteen. Working with the
NAACP, Mr. Farmer was a co-founder of CORE. Known for his role in organizing
Freedom Rides in the early 1960s, his work not only “led to desegregation of southern
transportation facilities, [but it] also contributed to the development of a self-consciously
radical southern student movement” (Carson 37).
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Beginning his testimony by comparing the MFDP position to that of the
Underground Railroad, Mr. Farmer then shifted the underground to above ground.
Connecting this imagery to the MFDP challenge, Mr. Farmer argued that the MFDP is
the only way blacks would gain political expression or representation (DNC 51).
Claiming that the seating of the MFDP could be both real and symbolic, he then shifted
his testimony to the Republican’s nomination of Barry Goldwater. Explaining to the
credentials committee that the only way Lyndon Johnson could win the 1964 election
was if the Democrats stood together, Mr. Farmer tied party loyalty to the Mississippi
delegation seating. Comparing the two state Democratic parties, Mr. Farmer concluded
by saying,
The eyes of 20 million Negroes are upon this Party, and this Convention, as are
the eyes furthermore of many other millions of Americans of good will. They are
watching you now. They are watching to see that you can demonstrate to the
world that making a political decision on principle and on morality is also sound
viable politics (DNC 51).
The Testimony of Dr. Roy Wilkins
Following Mr. Farmer’s testimony, the seventh witness who testified on behalf of
the MFDP was Dr. Roy Wilkins of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP). Born in St. Louis, Missouri, Roy Wilkins grew up in St. Paul,
Minnesota. Working his way through college, he graduated from the University of
Minnesota with a degree in sociology. By the mid-1930’s, he was working with the
NAACP (NAACP 1). Dr. Wilkins became the Executive Secretary in 1955 and the
Executive Director in 1964 (NAACP 1).
Dr. Wilkins began his testimony by situating himself within his own organization,
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, by stating that at the
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55th annual convention 2,810 delegates agreed that the MFDP should be seated at the
1964 Democratic National Convention (DNC 52). Resituating the issue of representation
to suggest that the MFDP needed to be seated for the nation to have a brighter future, Dr.
Wilkins claimed that representation in government inferred a voice in that government.
Using this idea of representation to create a hierarchy that placed the rule of morality
above the rule of politics, Dr. Wilkins reminded the credentials committee what happened
the last time a group of citizens were not given a voice in their own government by
reciting the story of American colonists’ Declaration of Independence from Great Britain.
Dr. Wilkins then concluded his testimony by stating that our first loyalty should be to
America (and her ideals).
The Testimony of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Closing the testimony of the MFDP, the eighth witness was Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Born in Atlanta,
Georgia, Dr. King attended Morehouse College and Crozer Theological Seminary.
Embracing the Gandhian principle of nonviolent direct action as a means to address civil
rights issues, Dr. King became an icon of the Movement. Among his accomplishments
(prior to his testimony at the 1964 Democratic National Convention) included his
leadership in the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott, the 1961 Albany Movement, the 1963
Birmingham campaign, and the 1963 March on Washington (King 50, 151, 170, 218).
Touring Mississippi in July of 1964, Dr. King claimed that “nothing had inspired me so
much for some time as my tour of Mississippi…on behalf of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party. These were a great people who had survived a concentration camp
existence by the sheer power of their souls” (249).
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Dr. King began his testimony by claiming that the state of Mississippi had gone to
more extremes than any other state to prevent blacks from voting. Calling into question
“the very idea of representative government,” Dr. King then questioned why America
could secure freedom for the people of other countries, but could not secure that same
freedom for all of its own citizens (DNC 55). Equating the right to vote to having a voice
in government, Dr. King then argued that the MFDP was the only democratically
constituted party from Mississippi (DNC 55). Defining the Mississippi delegation issue
as a choice, Dr. King used repetition to describe the regulars as the party that (1) requires
federal troops so that one black man can attend a state university, (2) would not willingly
register black voters, (3) promoted violence and lawlessness, and (4) pledged to defy the
National Democratic Party platform (DNC 55-6). Shifting to the MFDP, Dr. King then
stated “if you value your party, if you value your nation, if you value the future of
democratic government, you have no alternative but to recognize with full voice and vote
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party” (DNC 57). Concluding his testimony, Dr.
King claimed that the seating of the MFDP has symbolic value that would show
oppressed people all over the world that it was “the intention of this country to bring
freedom and democracy to all people” (DNC 57).
Analyzing the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Testimony
Now that the MFDP testimony is situated in the context of the national
convention, the witnesses who testified, and the general movements of each witness’s
testimony, let us examine the MFDP testimony for the larger rhetorical and
argumentative dimensions. To understand how the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party witnesses attempted to act in a principled way while challenging the seating of the
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regular Mississippi Democratic Party, my analysis begins with an understanding of the
problems and what was at stake for the MFDP. Using these problems as a way to ground
the MFDP testimony, my analysis will then focus on the solution to those problems and
how that solution is significant to our understanding of how the debate discourse of the
MFDP could be both persuasive and ineffectual.
Anchored in their experiences during the Summer Project, members of the MFDP
had two significant problems they need to face. First, they needed to address the issue of
violence in Mississippi. While violence had previously been reserved for blacks only, the
Summer Project had increased tensions between those working for civil rights and those
who believed in state’s rights and segregation. This meant that no one working for civil
rights in Mississippi was safe, including white Mississippians who were sympathetic to
the civil rights cause and white volunteers from across the nation. The MFDP members
had learned this point well with the murders of James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and
Andrew Goodman. While the severity and frequency of violent acts were increasing the
issue of power was a second but related issue to this problem. Although civil rights
activists originally thought that bringing white volunteers into the state would force the
inherently racists power structures of Mississippi to change, it actually had the opposite
effect. Those people who were a part of the power structures saw white volunteers as
“outsiders” attempting to undermine the state’s authority, and instead of backing down to
those volunteers or even the cameras of the press, they reacted harshly and swiftly.
Since, the power structures, including the police, judges, and political leaders who were
either directly or indirectly supporting violent acts within the state, this escalating
situation put civil rights activists and workers in an even worse position.
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This worsening situation led to the second main problem they faced: the lack of
representation and voice in governmental and political affairs.

The laws were on the

side of the segregationists and there were no easy or direct avenues to change those laws
until activists and locals entered the political scene in Mississippi. But the problem
became more severe when they attempted to join the regular party, since the regulars
barred blacks for joining. While civil rights activists and workers knew that the violence
and lack of black political participation in Mississippi was wrong, they had no way of
changing it, at least until they had applied enough pressure. Still every move they made
during the summer of 1964 seemed to be met with greater hostility. Having attempted to
work within and through the state power structures, including the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party, they decided to solve these problems in a different way.
The advocated solution was a political one. To unseat the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party at the 1964 Democratic National Convention would not only force the
state power structures to recognize their concerns, but it would also give voice to those
who had been silenced. Furthermore, they reasoned that the credentials committee
members, the President, and the American people (when faced with the brutality and
discrimination blacks had endured in Mississippi for the right to vote) would understand
what was at stake and be compelled to act on their behalf. Using key terms such as
loyalty, support, and participation, members of the MFDP argued for their seating by reappropriating our understanding of representation on the moral, political level, and then
they used this orientation to create a relationship for the audience between voter
registration activities, fear and violence, and the credentials committee hearing. As
Lawrence Guyot indicated to me in a telephone interview, this connection between voter

68

registration, violence, and what was going on at the hearing was the key to their
rhetorical strategies. This was particularly true, since many Americans in 1964 could not
understand how attempting to register to vote or attending a national party convention
were grounds for being killed (Guyot, Interview). Thus, the purpose of the MFDP
testimony was not only to make this connection for credentials committee members, but
to persuade them into action.
Addressing the Inherent Problems in Mississippi
Speaking of Violence and the Structures of Power that Supported It
Violence becomes a key component to the overarching arguments of the MFDP
seating, which began with Joseph Rauh, Jr.’s introduction when he stated to the
credentials committee, “I have only an hour to tell you the story of terror and tragedy in
Mississippi” (DNC 20). Viewing this introduction as one claim forwarded by the MFDP
members, we then begin to see how other members support this claim using statistics and
examples. Using statistics Aaron Henry stated,
since January 1, 1964 over 31 churches have been bombed and burned. These
churches were used by Negro religious congregations. There have been 15
known murders of Negroes and whites who were sympathetic to the Negroes’
position. The cross burnings, floggings, the shootings number in the
hundreds…On [the regulars] is the blood and the responsibility for this reign of
terror” (DNC 24).
Reverend Edwin King, also speaking about violence, stated that
In Mississippi those who would work for freedom no longer face just social
ostracism or losing their jobs. People this summer who say they oppose church
burnings and home bombings, are told, ‘Your home will be bombed.’
Ministers are told, ‘Your church will be burned.’
Because of my work for freedom in Mississippi, I have been imprisoned, I have
been beaten, I have been close to death, my life has been threatened many times
(DNC 33).
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While Dr. Henry chose to support the claim about violence with statistics and Reverend
King chose to use examples, it is Fannie Lou Hamer who drives the point home by
sharing with her audience that following her first attempt at registering to vote, she was
asked by her employer to leave the plantation. Hamer soon realized that anywhere she
stayed she and those who housed her were in danger. Succinctly articulating this point,
she stated that “on the 10th of September 1963, 16 bullets was fired into the home of Mr.
and Mrs. Robert Tucker for me. That same night two girls were shot in Ruleville,
Mississippi. Also Mr. Joe McDonald’s house was shot in” (DNC 41).
While examples and statistics thicken the MFDP narrative of violence in
Mississippi towards those who were working for civil rights, Joseph Rauh, Jr. knew that
he needed to go deeper if the members of the credentials committee were going to
understand the severity of this issue. To accomplish this goal, he enlisted two witnesses
to share personal stories of violence. The first to share his story was Reverend Edwin
King, who began by saying the following: “only two months ago the most recent attempt
of my fellow white Mississippians to murder me was made” (DNC 33). Reverend King
described the car ride he, his wife, and several others who were returning from a voter
registration workshop in Canton, Mississippi experience. Continuing he explained that
their car was run off the road and three carloads of white men emerged to kill them.
Reverend King claimed that “the only reason we were not murdered is that the driver of
the car was a teacher at Tougaloo College” who happened to be from Pakistan and
eventually after being severely beaten produced his passport and with that the white men
decided to let them live (DNC 34). King tells of reporting the incident to the Mississippi
State Highway Patrol and the Sheriff of the county only to be turned away. Addressing
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the issue of power and its equation to the police in the state of Mississippi that were
supported by the regular Democratic Party in Mississippi, King stated “the Mississippi
Democratic Party brags that it controls the State of Mississippi. It certainly controls the
police of Mississippi” which is why there are so few whites in the MFDP delegation
(DNC 34).
While Reverend King’s story spoke to the possibility of death and the severity of
being beaten by police officers within the state, Fannie Lou Hamer’s story brought
violence to another level and forces her audience to face it directly. Mrs. Hamer began
by sharing with her audience the events of her jailing in Winona, Mississippi, as she and
several other activists returned from a voter registration workshop on the Continental
Trailway bus. She recalled two people going into the washroom and two people going
into the restaurant at a bus stop in Montgomery County, only to be kicked out of the
restaurant by the State Highway Patrolman and Chief of Police, who soon arrested them
(and Hamer because she stepped off the bus to see what was happening). She recalled
being kicked as she attempted to get into the police car before being taken to the county
jail booking room. Hamer tells her audience that she was placed in a cell with a young
woman named Miss Ivesta Simpson before describing the screams from down the hall.
Hamer stated “I could hear the sounds of licks and horrible screams, and I could hear
somebody say, ‘Can you say, yes, sir, nigger? Can you say yes, sir?’” (DNC 42).
Moving to her own beating, Hamer explained that the State Highway Patrolman asked
her where she was from, checking on that information, and returning to her cell to say
“‘You are from Ruleville all right, [and we’re going to make] you wish you was dead’”
(DNC 42-43). She then continued to describe her beating where two black prisoners
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were ordered to beat her with a blackjack by the State Highway Patrolman. By telling
these details, Hamer reinforced for her audience the power structure that existed in
Mississippi that was squarely placed on the side of the police, while she also embodied
this part of her argument through her mere presence before the credentials committee.
Walking with a limp and testifying from a seated position, Hamer told her audience that
she had polio as a child, which made the beating she received even worse for her.
Incidentally, as a result of the beating Fannie Lou Hamer received in the Winona,
Mississippi jail cell, she would remain in pain and walk with a limp for the rest of her
life. Finally, Hamer claimed that during her beating, her dress had worked up her body
and that she tried even in this difficult moment to retain some dignity by pulling it down,
only to have one of the white men watching her beating pull it back up. Arguably the
more powerful story, this part of Hamer’s testimony reinforced the power structure she
claimed existed earlier in her speech, while also making a distinction between her
experience and the “other” experience that can be generalized, first describing the licks of
a black woman down the hallway, moving then to the betrayal of the black prisoners who
beat her, and finally stating that she was in jail “when Medgar Evers was murdered”
(DNC 43).
As if anything else needed to be said about violence following Mrs. Hamer’s
story, Joseph Rauh, Jr. also wanted the audience to connect the issue of violence to
Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman who had been murdered in
Mississippi during the summer and who were involved with the inception of the MFDP.
Asked to speak on her husband Michael’s behalf, Mrs. Rita Schwerner began her
testimony by stating “I am the widow of Michael Schwerner who was killed in
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Philadelphia, Mississippi, on June 21, of this year” (DNC 46). While the story of her
husband and his companions had been told by the press throughout the summer, Mrs.
Schwerner spoke of her experience following his disappearance, stating that she had
heard the news while she was in Oxford, Ohio helping with the Summer Project
orientation and had “returned to the State of Mississippi about two days after the
disappearance [of her husband] in an effort to get somebody to help me to find my
husband and his two companions” (DNC 47). What becomes clear through her testimony
were the ways in which the Governor of Mississippi and others within the state power
structure did not help her. She concluded her husband’s story stating that,
when the bodies of my husband and the other two men were discovered some 21/2 weeks ago, I was informed of the discovery by the Federal authorities. The
State authorities had in no way tried to do anything to help me. I have not been
allowed to see any official report on the condition of the bodies of my husband, or
the other two men. No official report has been released for anyone else to see,
and I would like you to know that to this day the State of Mississippi and the
County of Neshoba has not even sent to me a copy of the death certificate of my
husband (DNC 48).
Pushing the concept of power within the state, Mrs. Schwerner used her story to
equate the regular Democratic Party in Mississippi to Mississippi Governor Johnson and
the police. This equation functioned within her testimony to reinforce the power
structure in the state and then rhetorically turned her story into the “slain activists”
narrative that her audience was familiar with to create a sense of shared past. As Mrs.
Schwerner simultaneously invited the audience into this shared memory, she also asked
them to react against the dominant power structures and support the seating of the MFDP.
Also invoking the memory of Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman was Dr. Aaron
Henry, who supported Mrs. Schwerner’s claim that the state authorities did not help her
by quoting the Governor of Mississippi, Paul Johnson, in a statement where Governor
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Johnson referenced the murders of the three men by claiming that “no one in Mississippi
condones murder, but we are not going to be run over” (DNC 22-3). Dr. Henry then
added the Lieutenant Governor of Mississippi, Carrol Gartin’s voice to this tragedy by
quoting him as saying: “Mississippi ha[s] done nothing to apologize for nor be ashamed
of” (DNC 23).
Drawing on the MFDP’s argument about the pervasiveness of violence in
Mississippi, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. claimed that “no state in the Union has gone to
such extremes to prevent the participation of Negro citizens in political life as the State of
Mississippi” (DNC 54). Reverend Edwin King added the sympathetic white perspective
stating “there are not many white people openly working this way in Mississippi. We
have four white delegates in our freedom delegation here. There are more who would
like to have supported us but could not do so for fear of their very lives” (DNC 33).
Pushing the issue further, Dr. Aaron Henry stated that “there is always enough evidence
to convict a Negro but never enough to convict a white man. The murder of Medgar
Evers, and the subsequent trial of Byron de la Beckwith is a case in point” (DNC 24).
Adding further evidence, Dr. Henry addressed the regular party by directly quoting the
legal counsel for the regulars, E.K. Collins, as stating in regard to segregation that “we
must win this fight regardless of the cost in human lives” (DNC 24). Finally, Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. concluded this aspect to the MFDP argument by stating in reference to
the regular Democratic Party in Mississippi that “this is the Party which allows an
atmosphere of violence and lawlessness to rule the land, and which stands by, calm and
unmoved, by the countless murders of citizens seeking to secure civil rights” (DNC 56).
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With the issue of violence firmly stated, the MFDP members needed to
simultaneously argue that the regular Mississippi Democratic Party did not represent their
entire constituency. They needed to show the credentials committee that blacks had no
voice in their state government and were barred from participating in the Mississippi
Democratic Party. In particular, they needed to show that the laws and the enforcers of
the laws were against them. To do this, they needed to show that blacks were denied
access to voting and that they were barred from joining the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party.
No Vote, No Voice: The Issue of Representation in Mississippi
Using statistics, Aaron Henry argued that blacks were denied the right to vote
when he stated that “only around 20,000 of 450,000 Negro citizens over the age of 21
who desire to be Democrats and vote for Lyndon Johnson are permitted to vote” (DNC
25). While Dr. Henry used a startling statistic, Reverend Edwin King tried to explain this
issue during his testimony by stating that
the regular party is the one which would not let us participate in its precinct
meetings. It is the party which writes and enforces the voter registration laws in
Mississippi. These are laws which in the last three years have seen over ninety
percent of the 75,000 Negroes who have dared to go to the courthouse and tried to
register, over ninety percent have failed the test, and apathy does not keep
Negroes from voting (DNC 35).
While these examples offered an inside perspective into the problems blacks faced when
they attempted to register to vote, Reverend Robert Spike addressed the larger picture
with his testimony. Speaking on behalf of his organization, the National Council of
Churches, Reverend Spike argued that his organization was in the perfect position to be
objective about the issues, stating “we have seen the effects of the disenfranchisement of
400,000 people. We have seen and have been subjected to some of the harassments
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resulting from encouraging people in Mississippi to register to vote and participate in a
political party” (DNC 49). Returning to the statistics and adding the weight of his
organization behind the MFDP cause, Dr. Roy Wilkins of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) spoke of a resolution in favor of the
MFDP seating that was passed during the summer at the 55th Annual Convention of the
NAACP. He explained that the members of the NAACP,
recognized the lot of the National Democratic Party in Mississippi, which is that it
has no lot there at all, and that if 900,000 residents of that state, 42.3 percentage
of the population, heretofore denied any participation whatsoever in Government
in that state is to have any opportunity whatsoever to be represented, it must be
through the Mississippi Freedom Party and through the political and moral
declaration of this Committee (DNC 53).
Finally, Fannie Lou Hamer’s story about attempting to register to vote combined
the personal with the political to strike the essence of the MFDP’s argument regarding
voter registration. As Hamer stated, “it was the 31st of August in 1962 that eighteen of us
traveled twenty-six miles to the county courthouse in Indianola to try to register to try to
become first-class citizens” (DNC 39-40). She continued by explaining her attempt to
register at the county courthouse, where two people at a time were allowed to take the
exam while Highway Patrolmen watched before she and the others learned that they had
all failed the exam. She described them returning to the bus and starting back to
Ruleville before being pulled over by the State Highway Patrolmen who charged the
driver with “driving a bus the wrong color” (DNC 40). In fact, they claimed that the bus
was too yellow. Paying the fine amongst themselves, they returned to the bus and
continued home to Ruleville.
Shifting the story, Hamer revealed to the audience that she had lived on the same
plantation for the previous eighteen years working as a sharecropper and timekeeper (a
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position with more responsibility that suggests that the plantation owner she worked for
thought highly of her). Upon returning home, she learned that the plantation owner, Mr.
W.D. Marlow, had learned of her attempt to register and was unhappy. She first heard
the news from her daughters, then from her husband, Pap, and finally, from the plantation
owner himself. As Hamer recounted, Mr. Marlow claimed that she needed to withdraw
her name, saying “we are not ready for that in Mississippi” (DNC 40-1). Hamer
concluded her story by telling the audience that she replied to the plantation owner “‘I
didn’t try to register for you. I tried to register for myself’” before leaving the plantation
(her home and place of employment) that evening (DNC 41).
This story described her experiences in attempting to register to vote, but it was
also a turning point for Hamer that was significant in her own life. Prior to this moment,
she was unaware of her right to vote and the ability for collective action to change the
abuses local blacks in Mississippi faced. In a moment of strength and courage, without
serious thought to the personal consequences she would endure, she agreed to attempt to
register to vote. Secondly, in this story, she introduced the idea of citizenship at varying
levels, stating that she wanted to become a first-class citizen implying that she was not
one already. At the same time, she also called citizenship within a participatory
democracy into question, an idea she would pick up at the conclusion of her testimony.
Finally, this story announced varying degrees of anger that she faced including the
plantation owner’s anger along with other white community members. This was
something she would not be able to hide from, since blacks who attempted to register to
vote had their names printed in their local newspaper for a time no less than two weeks.
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This simple action had immediate and often severe consequences as segregationists
viewed this action as an act of “treason” by blacks.
Having adequately argued that blacks were denied access to voting within the
state of Mississippi, the members of the MFDP also needed to show how they had been
barred from joining the regular Mississippi Democratic Party. To do this they need to
explain how they had attempted to participate and the ways in which the regulars denied
or negated their participation. Ultimately, they need to argue that they had done
everything within their power to join the regulars and, having found no success, were
compelled to create their own political party.
Dr. Aaron Henry stated this claim up front before supporting his claim with his
experience in Clarksdale, Mississippi. He asserted,
We of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party have tried all we know how to
become part and improve the Mississippi Democratic Party. In Clarksdale there
we arrived before the hour of 10 a.m., the time scheduled for the convention.
After the arrival of several Negroes that were clearly in the majority from the
standpoint of the number of whites present, the hours of the convention were
deliberately set back to give the white delegation president an opportunity to
inform their mothers, their fathers, their cousins and their friends in order to swell
their delegation with whites so as to negate the presence of Negroes (DNC 24-5).
Attempting to balance his argument, Dr. Henry then reminded the credentials committee
that even if blacks were allowed to participate in the precinct meetings that he just
described, the result would only have meant that “six percent of the Negro citizens of our
State would have had the right to participate in the Democratic Party as ninety-four
percent of the Negroes of our state over 21 years of age are denied the right to vote”
(DNC 25). Broadening this statement further, Dr. Roy Wilkins explained Dr. Henry’s
remarks from earlier in the hearing by offering his own perspective anchored in the
experience of the individual stating “ladies and gentlemen, you come from political
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districts, you come from precincts, you come from counties, you come from states, and
you know that you would not tolerate a situation in your state where 42 percent of the
population had no voice” (DNC 53).
Invoking American principles further, Dr. Wilkins then paralleled the MFDP
cause with the fight for independence against Great Britain. Dr. Wilkins reminded the
audience that American democracy only works to the extent that it governs based on the
rule of the governed (i.e. citizens). Emphasizing the right to vote and voice individual
opinion(s), Dr. Wilkins implied that citizenship is based within these rights, while at the
same time cautioned the audience to the consequences of imposing rules on those who
are silenced.
Equating the MFDP cause to the colonists’ cause, Dr. Wilkins stated “I say to that
the black people in Mississippi have no representation in the parliaments of Mississippi.
And unless you speak here today, they will have no representation in this parliament, and
that you cannot stand for” (DNC 53-4). Dr. Wilkins navigated the abuses of Mississippi
through the use of parliament and American democracy. He helped the members of the
credentials committee to understand what was at stake in this debate by implicitly
equating the Mississippi state legislature, Senators Eastland and Stennis, and the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party to the British parliament during colonial times. Dr.
Wilkins also connected Governor Johnson, whose abuses have been previously stated, to
King George. Concluding, Dr. Wilkins, then, led the credentials committee to the
necessary conclusion that the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party members are the
colonists willing to fight for independence at any cost.
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Finally, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. summed up this aspect of the MFDP
argument by using a series of repetitions (“this is the party…”) that accused the regulars
of a variety of abuses inflicted upon blacks. Dr. King began,
Ladies and gentlemen, is that a choice? This is a Party that defied the United
States Government and forced the sending of armed forces to get a single Negro
into the state university. This is the party that in 1963, allowed only 192 Negroes
per month to register, so that it would take 135 years to get one-half of the
Negroes eligible to register and able to vote, thus making a mockery of the
Democratic process (DNC 55-6).
Having used the key terms of violence and representation to situate the MFDP
testimony within a series of problems that helped the credentials committee members to
understand what was at stake in this debate. They had primed the audience to hear the
solution they proposed: that the MFDP should be seated at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention. To support this solution, members of the MFDP used the key terms of
loyalty and support to argue that the MFDP should be seated because: (1) they would
remain loyal to President Johnson and the platform and philosophies of the National
Democratic Party, (2) they would support Lyndon Johnson’s election, and (3) the
MFDP’s participation at the Democratic National Convention would shift the power
structures by opening up the state democratic machinery to all citizens. Even so,
members of the MFDP also realized that these results were probably not enough to get
their party seated at the national convention. To do this, they need to simultaneously
show that the regulars: (1) would not remain loyal to the President or the national party,
(2) would not support Lyndon Johnson’s election, and (3) would not allow all Mississippi
citizens the right to vote and participate in the state Democratic party.
Making these distinctions between the two state Democratic parties was essential
to the success of their argument. However, for the MFDP members, they also needed to
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offer a solution that could give meaning to their experiences in Mississippi. In particular,
they needed to give meaning to the senseless loss of life and the severe violence and
brutality they had faced and asked others to face during the summer. They understood
that if they were given an opportunity to participate in the National Democratic Party,
this solution would not only have symbolic value, but real, political value that could be
taken home to the people of Mississippi. To this end, they needed to argue that their
solution fit within the ideals of the National Democratic Party and they understood that
the issues of loyalty and support were central to making their solution seem plausible.
Finding a Solution to the Problems in Mississippi through Loyalty and Support
As members of the MFDP offered their solution to the problems in Mississippi,
they knew that they needed to address the underlying concerns of Lyndon Johnson and
the National Democratic Party. They understood that President Johnson wanted the 1964
national convention to be his shining moment on a national stage and that he was highly
concerned that the national party appeared to the American people united in its message
and support of his candidacy. Moreover, President Johnson worried that a floor fight
would not only threaten the image of party unity, but it would also create an opportunity
for the southern delegations to support Barry Goldwater. While the MFDP could not
address the President’s concern regarding a floor fight, since this was part of their
strategy, they could address the issue of party unity by defining it in terms of loyalty.
Connecting the issue of loyalty to the issue of support, members of the MFDP needed to
argue that loyalty was not enough, and that the action of supporting the president and
national party was necessary to create an image of party unity. As a result, the members
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of the MFDP offered their solution to the problems they defined within their testimony by
using the key terms of loyalty and support to guide their argument.
Dr. Aaron Henry began his testimony by tying the position of the MFDP to that of
the national party using the key term of loyal when he stated “the position of the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party is clearly identified on the side of the National
Democratic Party. We are willing to work with all loyal Democrats in the State of
Mississippi who will work for the election of President Johnson” (DNC 21-2). Arguing
that his party was willing to work with the national party and all loyal Democrats in
Mississippi, Dr. Henry was not only showing how his party could be beneficial to the
National Democratic Party, but he was also suggesting that all Democrats in Mississippi
do not share this loyalty to President Johnson. Continuing Dr. Henry claimed that “the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party is great enough to include all loyal Democrats
(DNC 22). Since members of the MFDP already attempted to join the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party unsuccessfully during the summer of 1964, Dr. Henry
endorsed his party’s commitment to the national party platform and philosophies by using
the key term of loyal to suggest that those who were likeminded were welcome to join the
MFDP.
Creating a further distinction between the MFDP who were loyal to the president
and national party and the regulars who were not, Dr. Henry then argued against the
regulars using their own words against them. First citing the head of the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party, Governor Paul Johnson who stated in reference to the
murders of Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman that “‘no one in
Mississippi condones murder, but we are not going to be run over’” (DNC 22-3). Dr.
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Henry implied that if the head of the regular Mississippi Democratic Party was not loyal
and lacked moral integrity, then those who followed him in the state party must share this
opinion. Working down the power structure in the state, Dr. Henry next quoted
Mississippi’s Lieutenant Governor, Carrol Gartin as saying that “Mississippi has done
nothing to apologize for nor be ashamed of” (DNC 22). This statement added weight to
previous statement, while at the same time created the beginning of a pattern that was
difficult to argue against.
Realizing that the leaders of the regular Mississippi Democratic Party were not in
attendance at the credentials committee hearing including the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Senators Eastland and Stennis, and all the U.S. representatives from
Mississippi, Dr. Henry quoted the regular’s committeeman who was in attendance as
saying, “‘we must win this fight regardless of the cost in human lives’” (DNC 24). While
Dr. Henry’s used these quotes to build his case for the disloyalty of the regular
Democratic Party in Mississippi, it was the last quote that drives home his point. Quoting
the campaign newspaper of Governor Paul Johnson, Henry stated that the newspaper
claimed that
‘The people of Mississippi have rejected decisively the influence of the Kennedydominated National Democratic Party. The Mississippi Democratic Party,
completely free of the influence of the Democratic Party, and solely an instrument
of the citizens of this state, now is safely in the hands of the conservative,
responsible majority of Mississippi voters. The Mississippi Democratic Party has
fought consistently everything it stands for’ (DNC 27).
Henry’s use of this quotation not only shows the extent to which the regulars in
Mississippi were willing to separate themselves from the National Democratic Party, but
it makes clear that these two groups will never be unified. As if this statement of division
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was not enough, a closer look at the quotation and the description of the “Kennedydominated National Democratic Party” further separated these two groups.
Merging loyalty and support, Henry claimed that “the position of the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party is clearly identified on the side of the National Democratic
Party” (DNC 21). Refocusing the delegation seating issue, he stated that the MFDP
wants to support President Johnson by “minimiz[ing] our differences and maximiz[ing]
our chances for carrying the State of Mississippi and the Nation…in November” (DNC
22). Henry further connected the MFDP to the support they would show, stating that to
support the National Democratic Party philosophies, platform, and nominees was to
support America and the state of Mississippi because that means that the MFDP was
supporting the “ideals that make America great” (DNC 22). On the other hand, Dr.
Henry explained “the Mississippi Democratic Party has continually repudiated the
National Democratic Party” and had yet to agree to support the President and his election
bid (DNC 26). Finally, Dr. Henry concluded his testimony by stating “to vote to seat the
Mississippi Freedom Party with our loyalty pledged to the National Party and to
President Johnson will perhaps be the greatest blow for freedom since the Boston Tea
Party” (DNC 27-8). This statement steeped in the history of American democracy
functioned to remind the audience that to be loyal to American ideals means that one
must stand strong even when faced with challenging times.
The second witness, Reverend Edwin King reinforced this need to stand strong in
challenging times when he stated “we need the Democratic party in Mississippi” (DNC
36). This statement suggested two things, first that there was not a Democratic Party in
the state of Mississippi and that those who considered themselves Mississippi Democrats
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were not really Democrats because they were not loyal to the National Democratic Party.
Refocusing his testimony on the goals of the MFDP, Reverend King argued that “it has
been our hope this summer to maximize cooperation with all who want Lyndon Johnson
to carry our state” (DNC 36). Moreover, Reverend King stated “we maintain that the
regular Democratic Party from Mississippi does not represent you and your interests.
The freedom delegation does” (DNC 35).
Using a similar framework to that of the American Declaration of Independence,
Reverend King then described the differences between the two parties by listing the
MFDP’s grievances against the regulars. First, Reverend King claimed “the regular
delegation is illegal, it has rejected its national affiliation, it does control the state” (DNC
35). Second, he claimed “the regular party is the one which would not let us participate
in its precinct meetings” and it is the party that “writes and enforces the voter registration
laws in Mississippi that disenfranchise local blacks (DNC 35). Third, Reverend King
claimed “this is the Party which tolerates violence, church burnings and murder as the
ultimate weapon to prevent Negro voting” (DNC 35). Finally, he claimed “this is the
Party which has aided the reign of terror in our state this summer so that we admit
honestly to you we do not come before you with delegates from every county in the state”
(DNC 35). Reverend King concluded his list of grievances against the regular
Democratic Party in Mississippi by reminding the audience of the murders of three civil
rights works in Philadelphia, Mississippi (Neshoba County), stating “we do not apologize
to you for not being able to hold a county convention in Neshoba County, Mississippi”
(DNC 36).
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Situating this debate in the metaphorical, Reverend King described the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party as open to all races and Democrats.
Simultaneously, he depicted the regular Democrats as “closed”: closed to blacks and
whites in favor of Johnson’s election and closed as in the closed society, the group that
sustained the power structure that made it possible for Mississippi to be considered the
closed society. Further building this dichotomy, while also building on the fear
Democrats had of Goldwater winning the upcoming presidential election, Reverend King
claimed that “the regular Mississippi Party is open only to cooperation with the
Republicans of Mississippi, to try to work out some way to let Mississippi Democrats
vote for Goldwater, and that is the only cooperation they are interested in” (DNC 37).
Concluding, Reverend King defended the MFDP seating claiming that they have not
come to Atlantic City, New Jersey to divide the Party. But instead to unite it by
supporting the National Democratic Party platform, its candidates, and its principles that
were built upon the words and deeds of great Democrats such as Franklin Roosevelt,
Harry Truman, Adlai Sevenson, John Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson (DNC 37).
Shifting to the testimony of the civil rights establishment, Reverend Robert
Spike’s testimony focused on how the ideas of loyalty and participation could be merged
together through the seating of the MFDP. Taking the role of an observer, Reverend
Spike stated that the members of the National Council of Churches have “witnessed the
birth of the Mississippi Democratic Party” (DNC 49). Explaining that he as well as
others in his organization, watched precinct meetings and the state convention, he then
described these events as “the most dramatic grassroots development of responsible
citizenship in our time” (DNC 50). This implied that Reverend Spike had the authority to
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judge the validity of the seating of the MFDP, but it also suggested a sense of loyalty that
the MFDP had to the National Democratic Party. He called their efforts inspired, while
equating the basic rights of citizenship to the right “to be heard and to be included” (DNC
50). Finally, Reverend Spike supported the MFDP solution that they should be seated at
the national convention by stating that “the Freedom Democratic Party is a legitimate
political force…committed to representing all of Mississippi’s people” (DNC 50).
Although, Reverend Spike’s testimony was succinct and without many examples, he does
address the larger claim that the MFDP seating would open opportunities for participation
that would help to change the situation in Mississippi and ultimately help America to live
up to her promise of representative democracy.
While Reverend Spike’s testimony described the loyalty of the MFDP from the
perspective of an observer, James Farmer’s testimony mingled the terms loyalty and
representation together to help the audience to understand that one cannot exist without
the other one if viable politics was the goal. Using the authority of his organization, the
Congress of Racial Equality, Mr. Farmer stated “the Freedom Democratic Party is, in my
judgment, the only way that Negroes of Mississippi can gain political expression or
representation in the foreseeable future” (DNC 51). He supported this claim by
addressing the issue of Barry Goldwater’s candidacy. Explaining to the credentials
committee that “Goldwater secured his nomination through intense loyalty and support”
(DNC 51). While some listeners may have felt uneasy about this statement, especially
since many Democrats were concerned that the southern delegations would walk out of
the convention and support Goldwater, Mr. Farmer’s argument that Goldwater’s
nomination was rooted in loyalty and support forced the audience to confront the issue of
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President Johnson’s electability. Mr. Farmer supported his previous statement about
Goldwater by shifting the question to the Democrats declaring to them that “the
Democratic Party can win this election only through a loyalty and support which is even
more intense than that which backs Goldwater” (DNC 51). Resituating the National
Democratic Party focus to the election of Lyndon B. Johnson, Farmer created a
distinction between the regular Democratic Party in Mississippi, who have clearly stated
they would not support Johnson’s candidacy, and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party, who would.
The next witness, Dr. Roy Wilkins of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, addressed the solution to the credentials committee
using the rule of morality. He first drew a connection between what was going on in
Mississippi and what colonists did when they were silenced by the British parliament.
Furthering this connection, Dr. Wilkins then told the credentials committee members
what they should do to solve the Mississippi delegation debate using the concept of
loyalty. He stated that “no matter where you come from, no matter what your loyalties
are, your first loyalty is to America” (DNC 54). Finishing his testimony, he asserted to
the committee that based on what they have heard today, they must do what is right. Dr.
Wilkins moving into a position of authority, then concluded by stating, “I’m not going to
tell you what to do or believe,” but then he did implicitly present the “only way” as the
answer to the question before the committee, that is, the seating of the MFDP. Finally,
Dr. Wilkins leaves the audience with an ultimatum: if you believe in American
democracy, then you must vote for the MFDP; otherwise, if you seat the regulars, then
you must not believe in the principles that define America.
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Concluding their argument, members of the MFDP attempted to appeal to the
credentials committee by pushing the key term of support even further. Dr. Henry
explained the procedure the MFDP followed when they created their political party, Dr.
Henry stated “we then organized under laws of Mississippi precinct, county, district, and
state conventions to which all citizens over 21 years of age were invited, black, white,
and polka-dot” (DNC 25). Continuing to support his premise that the MFDP followed
the correct protocol in forming a new Democratic party, Dr. Henry told the credentials
committee that “we adopted resolutions stating that we will support the national party, its
philosophy, its platform, President Lyndon Johnson and his nominee for Vice President.
We will work for their election” (DNC 26).
By contrast, Reverend Edwin King returned to the framework of the American
Declaration of Independence stating “we have beseeched, we have implored, we have
supplicated. We have entreated, we have shed our blood. We have tried in every way to
assert our rights as citizens and to assume our duties and responsibilities as American
citizens” (DNC 37-38). He then asserted that “as responsible citizens we want to work
through the Democratic Party for the good of our state and the good of our nation” (DNC
38). Reverend King concluded with a belief shared between the MFDP and the National
Democratic Party members that could be realized through the possibility of free elections
within the state of Mississippi. Creating a final hierarchy of achievement, Reverend King
first stated “when we have free elections in Mississippi we will build a truly liberal, truly
loyal Democratic Party, a part in the deep South that you can be proud of” (DNC 38).
Second, he stated “when we have free elections in Mississippi, we will join the main
stream, we will reject the extremism which has charred the beautiful name of
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Mississippi” (DNC 38). Thus, Reverend King leaves his audience with the image of a
“charred” Mississippi that with the help of the National Democratic Party, the seating of
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, and the election of Lyndon B. Johnson for
President, could rise from the ashes to become beautiful again: a symbolic redemption of
values in Mississippi.
Finally Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., an icon of the civil right movement,
concluded the testimony of the MFDP by drawing the necessary connections between the
testimonies of each witness. Dr. King began, “No state in the Union has gone to such
extremes to prevent the participation of Negro citizens in political life as the State of
Mississippi” (DNC 54). Appealing to the goodwill and morality of the credentials
committee members, Dr. King asked them to judge the validity of the MFDP arguments
not as an opportunity to complain about their sufferings, but as “the actual fulfillment of
their dream for democracy in Mississippi” (DNC 55). Broadening his argument further,
Dr. King suggested that “the very idea of representative government is at stake” in
deciding the issue of the Mississippi delegation seating (DNC 55). Connecting freedom
to American progress, he suggested that “the extension and preservation of freedom
around the world depends on its unequivocal presence within our borders” (DNC 55).
During this introductory part of his speech, Dr. King set up the argument to seat
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party based on American values of progress and
freedom that must be shown to be true at home before it can be true abroad.
Additionally, Dr. King hinted at a progression that he would maintain throughout his
speech, moving from the Union to the state of Mississippi to the nation, and finally to
democracy in general. Using this structure, Dr. King moved through various stages in the
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history of America, while also showing how this structure had inhibited certain citizens
from reaching their potential. In fact, Dr. King puts the very “idea” of American
democracy on the line suggesting that America’s conception of representative democracy
was not yet a reality, but still an idea.
Moving into the body of his testimony, Dr. King asked if the Mississippi
delegation seating is a choice. Playing on his word choice, Dr. King articulated a
distinction between an alternative and a choice before dispelling the myth of the regular
Democratic Party from Mississippi. In a symbolic hailing of sorts, Dr. King defined the
regulars first, as defying “the United States Government and forcing [them to send]
armed forces to get a single Negro into the state university” (DNC 55). Next, Dr. King
defined the regulars as the power structure that allows only 192 blacks per month to
become registered voters within the state that would mathematically take “135 years to
get one-half of the Negroes eligible to register and able to vote, thus making a mockery
of the Democratic process” (DNC 55-6). Then, Dr. King defined the regulars as the Party
that maintained violence and lawlessness in Mississippi, while racists stand by “calm and
unmoved, by the countless murders of citizens seeking to secure civil rights” (DNC 56).
Finally, Dr. King defined the regulars as the Party who had “already pledged to defy the
Platform of this great National Party” (DNC 56).
Through the use of repetition (“this is a Party that,”) Dr. King not only defined the
regular Mississippi Democratic Party in detail, but he also created a sense of urgency by
increasing the degree and severity of their behaviors. Visually this might be depicted as a
ladder of urgency, where each definition added to the next, strengthening Dr. King’s
argument of who the regulars were, while simultaneously building anticipation for the
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MFDP position. Additionally, the ladder of urgency functioned as a turn back to
Freedom Summer. Underscoring the MFDP cause, Dr. King used the abuses of the
regular Democratic Party in Mississippi to promote the program of the Summer Project
addressing the three main goals: voter registration, education, and political participation.
Returning to his discussion of alternatives and choices, Dr. King concluded
“ladies and gentlemen, if you value your party, if you value your nation, if you value the
future of the democratic government, you have no alternative but to recognize with full
voice and vote the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party” (DNC 57). Dr. King seemed
to be recognizing that no alternative existed, and therefore the members of the credentials
committee must make the right choice, but he also placed “value” repeatedly in that
choice. Dr. King built momentum in his conclusion by affirming that the right choice
holds value and in turn that value was the key to preserving American democracy.
Forewarning against the alternative, Dr. King cautioned his audience to make the right
choice, since “the history of men and of nations has proven that failure to give men the
right to vote and to govern themselves and to select their own representatives brings
certain chaos to the social, economic and political institution which allows such an
injustice to prevail” (DNC 57).
Dr. King, returning to the symbolic value discussed previously by James Farmer
in his testimony, stated that “the recognition of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party has assumed a symbolic value” (DNC 57). Following Farmer’s announcement of
the symbolic value, Dr. King’s mentioning moved the audience towards the realization of
that value where the symbolic value is the signifier of the real value that is being
signified. Broadening his argument to people all over the world, Dr. King described the
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impact the credentials committee decision would have, stating “for the oppressed people
the world over, seating this delegation would become symbolic of the intention of this
country to bring freedom and democracy to all people…it would be a declaration of
political independence…it would be a beacon light of hope” (DNC 57). Finally, Dr.
King used his last statement, a concluding premise to allow the argument to unfold before
the audience. Dr. King claimed “recognition of the Freedom Democratic Party would say
to them that somewhere in this world there is a nation that cares about justice, that lives
in democracy and that ensures the rights of the downtrodden” (DNC 57-8).
Conclusion
In sum, the testimony offered by the MFDP witnesses is not just a rhetoric of the
streets that was brought into the context of the 1964 Democratic National Convention
credentials committee hearing. This testimony reflected the intelligent and strategically
savvy ideas of Joseph Rauh, Jr. and his legal team. These ideas took shape through the
stories and experiences of the MFDP witnesses and were pulled together carefully to
create a unified case in favor of the MFDP seating.
Thus, what we learn from the rhetoric of MFDP is that there was a rhetorical
exigency that needed to be addressed through the discourse of the 1964 Mississippi
delegation debate. While their message was persuasive in terms of changing the attitudes
of the credentials committee, it was ultimately ineffectual because of the institutional and
situation constraints they faced. While the MFDP witnesses believed that their stories of
brutality, violence, and discrimination within the state were grounds for the dismissal of
the regular Mississippi Democratic Party delegation (and by extension grounds for their
seating), what they failed to understand was the relationship between these constraints
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and structural changes to the power relationships in the National Democratic Party. Now
that we understand the MFDP’s perspective, the next chapter will examine the response
to the MFDP’s testimony. First examining the testimony offered by the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party and second by examining the rebuttal testimony of Joseph
Rauh, Jr. and the closing statement of E.K. Collins.
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Chapter Four
Responding to the Affirmative Case: The Regular Mississippi Democratic Party
Testimony and the Rebuttal Testimony
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the response testimony of the Mississippi
delegation debate. The first part of this chapter examines the negative case, the testimony
offered by the witnesses of regular Mississippi Democratic Party at the 1964 Democratic
National Convention credentials committee hearing. Following the examination of the
negative case, the second part of this chapter examines the rebuttal testimony offered by
Joseph Rauh, Jr. on behalf of the MFDP and E.K. Collins’ closing statement on behalf of
the regulars.
Part one analyzes the testimony offered by the regulars and begins by reminding
us of the context in which they spoke at the credentials committee hearing including the
events that shaped their position as well as the details of the national convention from the
regulars’ perspective. Secondly, part one of this chapter examines the testimony offered
by the regulars showing how key terms guided their testimony to suggest that history and
past precedent should be reason enough for their seating. Finally, part one of this chapter
concludes by arguing that while the testimony offered by the regulars was not persuasive,
it was effective because it reminded the credentials committee of the power relationships
within the National Democratic Party.
Part two analyzes the rebuttal testimony offered first by Joseph Rauh, Jr. of the
MFDP and the closing statement offered by E.K. Collins of the regulars beginning with
the context of their statements. Secondly, part two of this chapter summarizes the
MFDP’s position so that we can understand the arguments forwarded by Mr. Rauh in
response to the testimony offered by the regulars. Thirdly, part two of this chapter
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summarizes the regulars’ position so that we can then understand the closing statement
offered by Mr. Collins that closes the debate. Finally, part two of this chapter concludes
by summarizing the context of the Mississippi delegation debate at the conclusion of the
testimony offered by both sides.
Part I: The Testimony of the Regular Democratic Party in Mississippi
To understand the rhetorical and argumentative nuances of the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party testimony, I begin by describing the situations and ideological positions
that led to this challenge from the regulars’ point of view. Characterized as
segregationists, citizens fighting against desegregation, or state’s rights advocates, the
white population in Mississippi believed that their cause was tied to a higher principle,
the preservation of American values. While this fight can be traced at least as far back as
the Civil War and Reconstruction times, the battlegrounds resurfaced in the Deep South
during the 1950’s and 1960’s.
The first battle began on May 17, 1954 when the justices of the Supreme Court
handed down their decision in Brown v. The Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas.
Responding to this decision in varied ways, some white Mississippians, such as James
Eastland, fervently denounced the Court’s decision, while others, such as John Stennis,
advocated a less contested position of practical segregation. Choosing this position
because he knew that white Mississippians were not willingly to desegregate schools or
other public places, Stennis believed that the less they advertised this, the better. Instead,
Stennis and other practical segregationists attempted to negotiate compromises that
amounted to the “separate but equal” doctrine of the Plessy decision (Plessy v. Ferguson
was a 1896 Supreme Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of state laws
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requiring racial segregation under the “separate but equal” doctrine) termed in the wake
of the Brown decision “adequate and equal” (Crespino 18). On the other side of this
issue, hard-segregationists viewed practical segregation as a weak stance, and they
instead prepared to stand up for “the southern way of life” by organizing themselves
under the umbrella of the White Citizens’ Council. Those who joined this organization
worked “to portray their organization as the voice of [the] respectable, middle-class
whites” (Crespino 23). While members of the White Citizens’ Council attempted to
position themselves as respectable, these leaders, at the same time, also tried to distance
themselves from the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) arguing that Klan members were responsible
for “lower-class violence and lawlessness” in the South (Crespino 23). Although, hardline and practical segregationists seemed to be at odds in their approach to the Brown
decision, both groups clearly understood what was at stake for white Mississippians.
They knew (better than outsiders) that integration was more than desegregation. They
argued that the cultural and educational divides between blacks and whites in Mississippi
were too great. Believing that blacks would be as uncomfortable as whites in
desegregated schools; they continued to argue this point until the federal government
intervened. At the same time, they also argued from a political standpoint that massive
black enfranchisement would be more harmful than good because it would create “an
easily manipulated bloc vote… [that] threatened to ruin the southern political system”
(Crespino 32).
While preserving “the southern way of life” was important to all segregationists,
they also knew that they needed to align “their struggle in nationalistic terms” if they
were going to convince Americans outside of the southern region that their position was
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right (Crespino 50). Benefiting from the cold war climate, segregationists constructed
their arguments as their way to prevent the spread of communism. They argued that civil
rights groups working within the state were communist-front organizations and they
paralleled their fight against civil rights activities to the larger fight against communism.
Addressing the higher principle of American values, they also claimed that their fight to
preserve the segregated South was akin to the fight to preserve America from communist
control.
By 1956, James Eastland was calling for a “coordinated southern attack against
outside pressure groups,” and as a result the Mississippi legislature passed a bill that
created the Mississippi Sovereignty Commission (Crespino 26). The Commission was
“conceived [of] as a state-level FBI, an investigative and public relations agency that
represented Mississippi’s official response to the integration crisis” (Crespino 26).
However, the extent to which it followed this vision largely relied on who was governor
at the time. Although the issue of integration was far from over, Eastland and other hardline segregationists could breathe easy at least for the moment.
However, any moments of relief that segregationists might have felt during the
first few years following the Brown decision was over by 1962. On the evening of
September 30, 1962, escorted by federal officials, highway patrolmen, and the university
police chief, James Meredith arrived on the campus of The University of Mississippi.
Governor Ross Barnett defiantly claimed he would not allow Mississippi’s schools to be
integrated. A riot ensued that evening and into the next morning as federal troops
attempted to control a large, angry crowd. While hard-line segregationists viewed this
event as a state invasion by the federal government that endangered the rights of
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Mississippi citizens and deprived them of their right to self-govern, practical
segregationists worried that this situation would shut down the state’s public schools and
lead to further violence.
Fueling the fire further for segregationists, in 1963, the Kennedy administration
proposed a civil rights bill that would give the federal government the power to deny
federal funds to states that did not protect the civil rights of all their citizens. To
segregationists this was just another example of the coercive nature of the federal
government, and the need for states’ to assert their rights. But on a practical level,
segregationists also understood that the cutting of federal funds would be detrimental to
Mississippi’s white citizens who rely on agricultural subsidies among other things.
Around the same time, Republicans within the state began to see the tensions
between the Mississippi Democrats and the national Democrats as an opportunity to gain
support. As the National Republican Party resituated itself not as the Party of Lincoln,
but as the ideological right, they hoped to attract southerners who were quickly becoming
disenchanted with their own party. However, during the early part of the 1960’s this was
not a foregone conclusion, and Republicans still needed to adjust their image, especially
since many southerners saw the Brown decision as a Republican victory. The first task
Republicans needed to accomplish was to establish their ideological position, and some
Republicans believed they had just the man for the job, Barry Goldwater, the senator
from Arizona.
By 1964, segregationists were being attacked from all sides. Civil rights groups
with the assistance from outside agitators had created a violent climate within the state.
The federal government was continuing to apply pressure, and the FBI’s presence within
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the state was becoming more frequent. President Johnson had strong-armed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 through both legislative houses and signed it into law. The
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party wanted to challenge the regular Democratic
Party’s seating in a dramatic showdown on national television.
While many of the regulars were already in favor of Goldwater, they faced a
dilemma. If they publicly stated they were in favor of Goldwater, they “would give
explicit support to rivals in the emerging Mississippi GOP… [and] worse yet, they risked
losing control of the state Democratic machinery to the MFDP” (Crespino 101). But, on
the other hand, the idea of supporting President Johnson, the person who was responsible
for the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was also an unpleasant idea. The regular
Mississippi Democratic Party members decided that their best option was to go
undecided to the national convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, win the delegation
seating challenge, and then reconvene their state convention once they returned to
Mississippi and support Goldwater’s candidacy. To make this happen, they needed to be
careful at the state convention, since the press would be present. Governor Paul Johnson
reminded the delegates of the Mississippi Democratic Party that they needed to keep
from tipping their hand for the national convention. However, this was not an easy task,
since many “Mississippi Democrats felt that they had been betrayed and ignored by
national Democratic leaders” (Crespino 102).
Going into the credentials committee hearing, the regulars were confident that
they would be seated. This was in part because they carefully constructed their position
with the help of the Sovereignty Commission, which provided the Mississippi Attorney
General with “written evidence designed to undermine the MFDP’s credibility” (Asch
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212). But, they were also confident in part because they knew that the President wanted
his convention to show the nation that the National Democratic Party was unified. To
accomplish this, the regulars knew that Johnson needed to accommodate the southern
delegations including the delegation from Mississippi. For now, they just needed to wait
and bide their time.
Analyzing the Mississippi Democratic Party Testimony
To understand how the regular Mississippi Democratic Party witnesses argued
from a legal position to maintain their right to be seated at the national convention, my
analysis begins with an understanding of the objections the regulars needed to address.
Using these objections to anchor their testimony, my analysis will then focus on the ways
the regulars interpreted the state of Mississippi’s constitution as well as the rules and
regulations of the National Democratic Party to negotiate their position by reinforcing
their right to be seated.
Aside from the dissatisfaction the regulars felt towards the National Democratic
Party, they knew that they needed to be careful if they were going to be seated. Their
first concern was addressing the objections that the MFDP raised. Knowing that the
MFDP testimony was primarily focus in three areas: the participation of blacks in the
democratic political process in Mississippi, the inconsistent support the regulars had
shown toward the National Democratic Party, and the regulars’ connection to violence
that was occurring within the state, the regulars prepared to address these issues.
Addressing the issue that blacks were barred from participating in the regular
Democratic Party in Mississippi, the regulars’ witnesses boldly denied that this was
happening. At the same time, they attempted to rhetorical turn the issue through their
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own experience to create distance between the objection and the true answer. In addition
to denying that blacks were barred from participating in the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party, they used statistics to help argue that blacks were voting in Mississippi
(or at least that they had the opportunity to do so if they chose).
Addressing the objection that the regulars would not support the National
Democratic Party nominees and platform, the witnesses for the Mississippi Democratic
Party introduced a resolution that was passed during their state convention that
guaranteed the names of the nominees from the national convention would be placed on
the ballot in November. To add power to this position, they not only used the resolution
as a buffer to the real issue, but they also made sure that the person who explained the
resolution in detail was a person who was not a member of the delegation (Ruble Griffin,
the Assistant Attorney General in Mississippi). This allowed Mr. Griffin to make claims
about the delegation coming to Atlantic City, New Jersey in good faith without being
accountable for the actions of the delegates later on. Finally, the regulars avoided as
much as possible the issue of violence within the state making comparisons between the
Ku Klux Klan and the MFDP as a way to distract from the issue of violence in their state.
Overall, the regulars’ wanted to focus on the issues they thought they could overcome
and deflect or deny all other inquires so that their chances of being seated at the national
convention were good.
Having adequately dealt with the objections of the MFDP, the regulars then used
their testimony to argue in favor of their seating at the National Democratic Party
convention. Since, they were the longstanding representatives of the Mississippi
Democratic Party, their arguments were different from the MFDP members. The burden
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of proof lay with the MFDP; it was the MFDP witnesses who needed to show that the
regulars were in violation of state law and the principles of the National Democratic Party
(not the other way around). By contrast, the regulars just needed to give the credential
committee enough reason to support their seating. To accomplish this, the regulars used
the historical context of their party to situate the debate, then they organized their
remaining testimony using a combination of explanation (of the state law) and
comparison (of the MFDP and regulars) before concluding their testimony by drawing
larger connections between the outcome of this debate and the health and well-being of
the National Democratic Party.
The Strategy of Denial
To win seating at the national convention, the regulars believed in the art of
denial. As a rhetorical strategy denial effectively helped the regulars to address certain
objections without become accountable for meaningful answers. The first objection the
regulars needed to address was the question of whether or not blacks were able to
participate in the democratic political process in Mississippi. E.K. Collins, counsel for
the regulars and state Senator from Mississippi addressed this issue early in his
testimony, stating “categorically, I deny that no Negroes attended the precinct and county
conventions” (DNC 62). Supporting this claim, Mr. Collins added that blacks were
elected during the regular Mississippi Democratic Party precinct meetings and were sent
to county conventions. Concluding this statement, he claimed “I assure you that Negroes
did attend and fully participated in them wherever they attended” (DNC 62). This short
response to the question of black participation in the regular Democratic Party in
Mississippi showed the effectiveness of the strategy of denial. Mr. Collins initial claim
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does not say that blacks were participating in the regular party activities equally with
whites, but that some participated. How much was “some” is left to the imagination of
the audience. Mr. Collins second claim that blacks were elected during precinct meetings
gave the appearance of adding weight to his initial claim, but in reality it did not say
much. Since, Mr. Collins did not support this claim with examples or statistics.
Furthermore, in his conclusion, Mr. Collins’ shifted the issue of blacks participating in
regular party activities not to the regulars, but to the local blacks stating that they were
welcome to participate in the regular party if they wanted to.
Later during the question and answer session that followed his testimony, Mr.
Collins continued to deflect the issue of black participation to the blacks themselves,
stating first that he did not know how many blacks were registered to vote in Mississippi
because the polling books did not designate the race of the registered citizen (DNC 74).
Following this, Mr. Collins responded directly to a delegate from Indiana, Mr. Massey
who continued to question the status of voting blacks in Mississippi stating that “votingage blacks have free access to the Democratic Party in Mississippi” (DNC 74). When
asked by Mrs. Austen, a delegate from New York whether or not blacks participated at
the Mississippi Democratic Party state convention, Mr. Collins responded that “they were
in attendance as observers” (DNC 76). He quickly followed this by reiterating that
blacks were elected at the precinct level, but did not make it past the county level. Again
shifting the issue, Mr. Collins embedded his own story within his answer to this question
by disabling the power of the original statement. He asserted, “a long time ago I used to
run and wasn’t elected to the state convention many times” (DNC 76). In order to ensure
that the issue was sufficiently handled, Mr. Collins’ concluded this question by
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reinforcing the participation blacks in the regular party activities by reminding the
audience that even though they were not elected to the state convention, they were still
present as spectators.
While Mr. Collins attempted to deny and deflect his answers regarding the
participation of blacks, his strategy for answering questions about the inconsistency of
the regulars support towards the National Democratic Party, Lyndon Johnson, and the
National Party’s platform appeared to be more direct. During E.K. Collins’ testimony he
addressed this issue by stating that the regulars unanimously passed a resolution that
guarantees that “the regular National Democratic electors will be placed on a ballot under
the heading of whomever this Convention selects as the Democratic President and Vice
President, and they will have a chance, the people of the State of Mississippi, to vote for
those people” (DNC 64). Mr. Collins addressed the issue of support by claiming that the
resolution passed during their state convention meant something, while the Assistant
Attorney General of Mississippi, Ruble Griffin during his testimony took a different
approach. When answering a question about the regular party’s support if they were
seated, from a delegate from Tennessee, Mr. Maddux, Mr. Griffin responded by first
stating that he was not a delegate and therefore could not speak for the delegates, but he
then answered the question declaring,
I know a lot of these people personally some of them I am meeting for the first
time, and in conversations with them, I think that they come here in good faith…I
know these people and I believe in their sincerity, and I think that they came here
to participate in the affairs of this Convention in good faith (DNC 100).
The question is what was “good faith” and how did that translate into support for the
National Party, its platform, or its Presidential and Vice Presidential nominees.
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Since, Mr. Collins and Mr. Griffin did not want to get themselves in trouble
during their testimony, they said only what they believe they needed to say about the
issue of support before turning to the last major objection, the issue of violence and its
connection to the regulars. The only reference to violence made by the regulars came
early in E.K. Collins testimony when he claimed “my fellow Democrats, I want to say to
you that much has been said today concerning various witnesses and heaping abuse upon
the State of Mississippi” (DNC 63). Concluding quickly, Mr. Collins changed the subject
by saying “…we are not going to do that” (DNC 63). For obvious reasons, the regulars
did not want the violence against blacks and sympathetic whites in Mississippi to be
traced in any way to their organization. Instead, they turned the issue to the MFDP and
used it as an opportunity to attack the MFDP members’ credibility.
Mr. Collins first attacked the MFDP members by stating,
we certainly do not accuse the membership of this organization of being
Communists though it must be pointed out again that we do not know what they
are, but we respectfully submit that it has the support of known Communists
(DNC 66).
While Mr. Collins claimed not to accuse the MFDP members of being communists, he
put enough doubt in their affiliation with communist organizations to create a sense of
fear. The next attack Mr. Collins used was in response to the accusation that the regulars
belonged to organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, the White Citizens’ Council, and the
Society for the Preservation of the White Race. He stated “well, the only thing I might
say there is the Ku Klux Klan and the Mississippi so-called Freedom Democratic Party
are [that they are] the only two organizations that I know in my state that keep their
delegations or their rolls secret” (DNC 71). Explaining this remark, Mr. Collins told his
audience that he knew they would probably see his statement as slanderous, but he
106

asserted “both the Ku Klux Klan and this organization, the so-called Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party are both operating outside of the law. That is the reason” (DNC 71).
Laying Out the Legal Arguments
Having addressed the objections posed by the MFDP, the regular party witnesses
then situated their testimony on the legal and technical issues to anchor the debate in the
particulars of Mississippi state law and the protocol of the National Democratic Party.
While E.K. Collins’ main goal was to address the objections posed by the MFDP and the
credentials committee members, his secondary goal was to set up the overarching
arguments for the regular delegation’s testimony. To accomplish this secondary goal,
E.K. Collins focused his testimony on the historical relationship the regulars had to the
national party; then he argued the issue was about protocol. Following the arguments
regarding protocol, Mr. Collins briefly described the resolution passed during the
regulars’ state convention. Finally, he concluded with a comparison between the regulars
and the MFDP that drew on larger issues related to the National Democratic Party.
To begin E.K. Collins addressed the historical context by reminding the audience
of the longstanding support the regular Mississippi Democratic Party had given to the
national party. Countering the attacks the MFDP members composed within their
testimony, Mr. Collins then reassured the credentials committee that the regulars did not
come to the hearing to “malign anyone,” they instead came “here as the regular
Democratic Party for almost 100 years in the State of Mississippi” (DNC 61). Using this
statistic, Mr. Collins then extended this history to the audience by reminding them of the
regulars’ loyalty. Stating that the regular delegation from Mississippi had supported the
national party nominees all but two times, Mr. Collins turned this context to his audience
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by stating “I don’t believe that there are among you, unless it is Georgia, a single state
that can say the same thing” (DNC 61). It is interesting that in this statement, Mr. Collins
not only resituated the context of this debate within the history of the state and
Democratic Party, but also that he was able to simultaneously scold his audience for
calling into question the regulars’ loyalty and support. At the same time, Mr. Collins also
used this opportunity to nod to another southern delegation in the process by aligning the
delegation from Mississippi with the delegation from Georgia. Finally, Mr. Collins
finished the historical context by reiterating that the state of Mississippi is a Democratic
state and had been through the years (DNC 61).
Shifting into his larger argument, Mr. Collins balanced his claim that the regulars
followed the proper protocol to be seated at the national convention with the honor of
representing the state. Mr. Collins interestingly did not begin this section of his argument
with a claim that needed to be reasoned, but instead began by declaring that the right
already existed, stating “Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to be selected as one of the persons
who will present Mississippi’s right to have delegates of the Mississippi Democratic
Party recognized and seated at this Democratic National Convention” (DNC 61). This
situated his argument by removing the credentials committee’s choice to seat another
delegation in Mississippi, and instead asserted that the right has already been given to the
Mississippi Democratic Party delegation. Moreover, Mr. Collins argued in this statement
that to seat any other delegation (including the MFDP) would be in contradiction to the
protocol set forth by the national party. Proceeding into the body of his argument, Mr.
Collins used a parallel structure to support his claim that the regulars followed the proper
protocol. On one side of the argument, Mr. Collins stated that the regular Mississippi
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Democratic Party followed the procedure outlined by the national party that moved from
the precinct level to the county level to the district level, and finally to the state
convention where “the Mississippi Democratic Party elected the forty-four delegates and
twenty-two alternatives to this Convention, together with a National Democratic
Committeewoman and myself, your new National Democratic Committeeman” (DNC
63). Believing that he sufficiently stated his case, Mr. Collins concluded this side of the
parallel argument stating that “the Democratic Party of Mississippi has complied with all
the legal requirements, and I submit that the Mississippi Delegation is entitled to be given
its credentials and be seated” (DNC 63). Moving to the other side of the argument, Mr.
Collins tried to show that the MFDP did not follow the protocol. Citing examples of
blacks participating in the regular Mississippi Democratic Party, Mr. Collins expanded
his argument by turning the issue to the legal aspects of seating a delegation. He stated,
I respectfully suggest that you do not have the right to invalidate the statutes of
the state of Mississippi and the majority of its citizens by failing to give due
recognition to the delegation which they elected in the free exercise of their
Democratic prerogatives under the laws of our state (DNC 63).
Continuing to turn the argument away from the initial issue, Mr. Collins claimed,
now, my friends, we can say a lot of things. But the laws are very plain in
Mississippi. The laws have been on the books since the days of the reconstruction
as to how our parties will operate, how the people will be selected for not only
your county and state offices, but will be selected for delegates to precincts, to
county and to district caucuses, and to State Conventions. That call was made by
the National Party (DNC 64).
Collins navigated the overarching argument of the regular delegation from
Mississippi by doing several things. First, he claimed that the regulars followed the
proper protocol outlined by the Democratic National Party, which he supported by
outlining the process. Then, Mr. Collins claimed that the MFDP did not follow the
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proper protocol by suggesting that because they participated in both the regular party’s
activities and the MFDP’s activities. Having barely developed this argument, Mr. Collins
then moved into the third feature of the overarching argument by arguing that Mississippi
laws were clear. He used this statement to transition his argument away from the
contentious argument about the MFDP and towards firmer ground, the laws of the state.
Using a parallel structure to balance this argument, Mr. Collins then concluded that the
regulars should be seated using phrases such as “selected delegation,” “the rights of
Mississippi citizens,” and “legally constituted by the state’s laws” to effectively shift the
issue away from which delegation should be seated and toward the issue of protocol as
dictated by the national party and the laws of the state of Mississippi. Finally, E. K.
Collins brought this argument to the absurd when he responded to a question from a
California delegate, Ms. Virna Canson about the joining of the two delegations (the
MFDP and the regulars) stating that the MFDP members would not be welcome
“…because they are illegal, illegally constituted, the same as the Ku Klux Klan” (DNC
72). Mr. Collins seemed careful to correct his initial statement that the MFDP was illegal
and restated very quickly that they were illegally constituted, an important distinction,
and one that the two witnesses who testify on behalf of the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party delegation attempted to preserve throughout their testimony. But, the
equation of the MFDP to the KKK on the grounds that both groups were illegally
constituted was not only fallacious, but remained a point of contention throughout the
debate.
While E.K. Collins set up the overarching legal argument posed by the regulars,
the only witness for the Mississippi Democratic Party, the Assistant Attorney General in
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Mississippi, Mr. Ruble Griffin thickened this argument with evidence that supported the
claim that the regulars were the only Democratic Party in Mississippi that was legally
constituted. Mr. Griffin began by introducing himself into the argument, and then
quickly shifted into three legal arguments to support their case. Finally, he concluded his
testimony with a series of statements.
Mr. Ruble Griffin began by claiming,
I come here not only as a lawyer representing my state of which I am proud,
believe it or not, in spite of all you have heard about it, but I speak to you, my
friends, as a Democrat, as one who does not want the Democratic Party to die in
the State of Mississippi or any other state in this union (DNC 81-2).
Moving quickly from this introductory statement into his first legal argument, Mr. Griffin
stated that there is one lawfully constituted Democratic Party in Mississippi and it “has
already been appropriated by the regular and lawful Democratic Party in the State of
Mississippi, and it cannot now be used by another group” (DNC 82). He supported this
claim by explaining to the audience through a linear progression statute 3107-01 of the
Mississippi state constitution. Stating that the statute became law in 1950, Mr. Griffin
shared that “when one party has registered a name another party cannot then come in and
register under that name” (DNC 82). Understanding that he needed to appeal to his
audience, Mr. Griffin generalized that this law is not particular to Mississippi, but is
“used fairly well all over the country” (DNC 82).
Drawing his argument back to the particulars of this case, Mr. Griffin then
explained that the regular Mississippi Democratic Party had been in existence since the
time of Reconstruction. Situating his argument with the historical narrative of the state,
Mr. Griffin then told the credentials committee that this was not the first time an issue
over which political party could represent the state of Mississippi had occurred.
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Although Mr. Griffin explained that this debate did not occur in the state Democratic
Party, he then situated his argument with this example. Explaining that during the time
that this statute became law, there were two state Republican parties. Since both parties
were functioning with the state, the new state law during this time dictated that the group
that registered their party first as the state’s Republican Party with the Secretary of
State’s office became the official party. He then described the legal process that
proceeded between these two groups.
Moving into the particulars of this case, Mr. Griffin explained that the challengers
appealed the decision to register the other group all the way to the state Supreme Court.
But that the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the statute. Continuing to pursue all legal
options, the Republican challengers, then appealed the state’s Supreme Court decision to
the United States Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied (DNC 83). Still unsatisfied
with the conclusion, the challenges then filed “a suit against the Secretary of State in
Federal Court challenging the constitutionality of the state Act” (DNC 83). This action
led to the convening of a three judge court that held the Act to be unconstitutional on the
grounds that the challenging Republican group had been in existence for seventy-two
year (DNC, 83). Mr. Griffin then explained that the case again reached the United States
Supreme Court, where the lower court’s decision was reversed (DNC 84). Concluding
his first legal argument, Mr. Griffin claimed, that as a result, the Act still stands today.
Again generalizing this issue, Mr. Griffin used antidotal evidence to identify with his
audience, stating that similar statues exist in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Indiana.
While this legal argument began with Ruble Griffin acknowledging why he was
called to testify, he also embedded within this credential his own personal narrative. He
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needed to begin by creating this image of a person who was not there “to attack or malign
anyone,” but who was there to explain the laws of Mississippi. He attempted to do this
by describing himself as a country lawyer who on one hand is not use to the fast dealings
of national politics, but who on the other hand was a friend to the national party. Once he
had built this relationship between his own story and the narrative of the state Democratic
Party, he could then turn this affiliation by connecting his democratic views to the views
of the National Democratic Party.
Once he had completed his task of introducing himself, he then made a statement
about not wanting the Democratic Party in Mississippi to die. This is interesting for two
reasons: first, his word choice suggests a larger argument worth pulling apart; second,
because this statement seems misplaced. Focusing on the particular word choice, Mr.
Griffin stated “I speak to you, my friends, as a Democrat, as one who does not want the
Democratic Party to die in the State of Mississippi or any other state in this union” (DNC
81-2). There is an I-to-you balance made in this statement where “I” means Mr. Griffin
as the witness and “you” means other Democrats. Repeating this structure, his statement
equated the “I” as the speaker to not wanting the Democratic Party in Mississippi to die,
while the “you” as other Democrats was equated to the larger death of the Democratic
Party in the union. This structure not only suggests a kind of balanced structure, but it
also implicitly aligns his goals within his testimony to those of the audience.
Focusing on the order of the words, Mr. Griffin stated that he did not want the
Democratic Party to die in the state of Mississippi. This seems very different from saying
he does not want the Mississippi Democratic Party to die in the state. While this
statement functioned as part of his self introduction, it also placed the delegation debate
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in a national context where the stakes become larger and more challenging. Finally, this
statement seems out of place at this point in Mr. Griffins’ testimony, but we later see this
theme pick up in his conclusion, which helped to create a circular structure to his
arguments where each of the three legal arguments that he made are woven in and out of
the larger arguments forwarded by the regular Democratic Party delegation in
Mississippi.
Moving into Mr. Griffins’ first legal argument, he used a straight-forward
approach to argue the legal existence of the Mississippi Democratic Party. Mr. Griffin
began by making a claim followed by a series of propositions that led the audience to the
conclusion that the law had been tested in the court system and had been proven legal.
Moreover, by situating this argument within the historical context, Mr. Griffin used his
credibility as the Mississippi Assistant Attorney General in addition to inductive
reasoning to argue that what had already occurred historical in Mississippi with the
Republican parties can be generalized more broadly to this challenge. This example is
specific enough for Mr. Griffin to generalize, but it also constrains the moral and political
arguments forwarded by the MFDP to legal ground that the regulars could argue from
more effectively.
Shifting away from the regular Democratic Party in Mississippi, Mr. Griffin then
moved into the second aspect of his first legal argument, which was the dichotomy
between the regulars and the MFDP. Having sufficiently proven that the regulars were
the legally constituted Democratic Party from Mississippi, Mr. Griffin then turned his
attention to the MFDP. During this part of his first argument, he attempted to show how
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the MFDP was not legally constituted by balancing the “facts” with personal attacks that
drip with contempt yet appear less so.
Digging into the credentials of the MFDP, Mr. Griffin explained to the credentials
committee that the Act stated “very specifically…that when you come up to register you
should furnish the name of your Executive Committeemen, the Chairman and Secretary
thereof, and that it should be filed after the Convention showing who all your people are,
your Presidential electors, your State Executive Committee, and what have you” (DNC
84). Here, Ruble Griffin was referring to registering a political party with the Secretary
of State’s office following the party’s state convention. Continuing, Mr. Griffin recited a
letter presumably sent by members of the MFDP:
July 20, 1964, Honorable Heber Ladner, Secretary of State, State of Mississippi,
Jackson, Mississippi.
‘Dear Mr. Secretary: The present Democratic Party is currently engaged in
organizing a political party in the State of Mississippi. We are holding precinct
meetings, county conventions, district caucuses, and a state convention which will
take place on August 6, in Jackson, Mississippi.
At the state convention and district caucuses, we will elect delegates to the
forthcoming Democratic National Convention, as it is our contention that there is
no real branch of the National Democratic Party in Mississippi at present.
The group which calls itself the Mississippi Democratic Party has forfeited any
claim it might make to such a position by its consistent discrimination against
Negro citizens and by its repeated and explicit disavowals of any connection with
the National Democratic Party.
We, therefore, request that you register the freedom Democratic Party as the
official Democratic Party of the State of Mississippi, or if this application is
insufficient, advise us as to what form a proper application should take.’
Signed, Mrs. Annie Devine, Secretary, Temporary Executive Committee; Edwin
King, Temporary National Committeeman (DNC 84-5).
Using this letter as evidence of the MFDP’s inability to follow the proper protocol, Mr.
Griffin claimed that this letter did not comply with the state of Mississippi laws.
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Supporting this claim with one piece of evidence, he argued that the letter was not filed
by the Secretary or Chairman of an Executive Committee, but instead that it was filed by
the Secretary of the Temporary Executive Committee and the Temporary National
Committeeman. This focus on the temporary aspect of Annie Devine and Edwin King
implicitly suggested, according to Mr. Griffin, that “they haven’t even formed a party
yet” (DNC 86).
Shifting into his next claim, Mr. Griffin re-interpreted the purposes of forming the
MFDP away from black participation and representation in the regular party and toward
an alternative that was less charitable. Mr. Griffin claimed that the MFDP formed for the
purposes of “having a group to represent the State of Mississippi with the National
Democratic Party and for no other purpose” (DNC 86). Pushing this interpretation
further, Mr. Griffin argued that you should not organize a political party as a club or as an
organization that represents your state with the national party, but that you should have “a
party which gets out and offers candidates in their primaries, not mine, from every office
from constable to governor” (DNC 86). This aspect of Mr. Griffins’ comparison of the
MFDP attempted to undermine their credibility by invalidating their activities as both
irregular and insufficient.
Moving into personal attacks, Mr. Griffin then claimed that some of the people
who spoke on behalf of the MFDP who claimed to be persecuted within the state were the
same people who ran for office in the June primaries under the banner of the regular
Democratic Party in Mississippi (DNC 86). Addressing, Fannie Lou Hamer’s credibility
first, Mr. Griffin stated
The one lady who sat there and gave that pitiful story ran for United States
Senator—I beg your pardon, she ran for Congressman against Congressman
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Jaimie Whitten, and I have the returns on it but I don’t want to bother you with all
of this information. Actually, I think she got, she received 621 votes, it was a
small turnout really but Congressman Whitten received 35,218 votes to her 621,
and I am here as a witness and I would state under oath that there is more
qualified Negroes in the City of Greenville than she received votes in the whole
23 counties in the district, and Greenville is within the district (DNC 86-7).
Using another example, Mr. Griffin cited Victoria Jackson Gray’s campaign for
the U.S. Senate against John Stennis. Claiming that Rauh’s brief supported his claim that
Mrs. Gray was running for the Senate under the banner of the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party, while participating in the organizing efforts for the MFDP, he argued
that similar to Mrs. Hamer, Mrs. Gray was unable to secure the black vote. Mr. Griffin
claimed that Mrs. Gray received 4,703 votes to Stennis’ 173,764 votes. Moreover, Mr.
Griffin stated that according to his records there were more qualified black voters in the
City of Jackson than the number of votes Mrs. Gray received across the state. While Mr.
Griffin never stated his conclusion, he implied that Mrs. Gray as well as Mrs. Hamer
were unsuccessful in their campaigns not because the white people of Mississippi held
them back, but because black Mississippians did.
Concluding this aspect of his first argument, Mr. Griffin stated “I say we are not
guilty of these things, in the first place, and then they represent no one” (DNC 89).
During this part of his testimony, Mr. Griffin not only attempted to position the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party as legally constituted, but at the same time, he also tried to
attack the credibility of the MFDP. He did this using a combination of re-interpretation
and personal attacks that were meant to refocus the debate on legal grounds. Mr.
Griffin’s strategy of re-interpretation suggests that the MFDP was wasting the time of the
National Democratic Party’s credentials committee because they wanted to form a state
“club” not a political party. By admonishing the vision of the MFDP, he created an
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argumentative space where he could argue that the MFDP was not a legitimate political
party because they did not follow the proper protocol.
Moreover, Mr. Griffin articulated, in this aspect of his argument, an example that
on its face suggested that Fannie Lou Hamer was participating in the regular Democratic
Party in Mississippi when she ran for office. However, this example has a deeper
meaning. The regulars knew as they listened to the MFDP testimony that their words
were persuasive, and that more than any other witness, Fannie Lou Hamer’s story was
powerful. To overcome this rhetorical obstacle, the regulars knew that they needed to
attack her, but they also knew that they needed to maneuver carefully. Their goal was to
attack her without appearing to attack her and what better strategy to attack her than to
emulate her Winona story. The key to this strategy was to use her fellow black
Mississippians by reinterpreting her run for political office not in the truth, but in a
narrative that suggested that she lost in part because her own people would not vote for
her.
Moving into his second legal argument, Mr. Griffin claimed that the statute
regarding the organization of a political party in the state of Mississippi was very clear.
Starting in general terms before moving into specifics, Mr. Griffin stated that the same
method was used in twenty-five other states including Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, and Montana (DNC 89). Describing the Mississippi
statute specifically, Mr. Griffins argued that the statute provides that each political party
in the state would hold a state convention in 1952 and every four years thereafter (DNC
89). Mr. Griffin continued that the purpose of the state convention was to

118

have a state executive committee appoint delegates to this convention, nominate
candidates for President and Vice President, and the presidential electors, adopt a
platform, promulgate principles, and take such other action as shall by the
convention be deemed necessary (DNC 89-90).
Describing the process further, Mr. Griffin claimed that “the method of selecting
candidates to the state convention is through the precinct and county system” and should
occur at 10 am on the appropriate date at the usual voting place (DNC 90). Using the
regular Mississippi Democratic Party’s brief as evidence, Mr. Griffin argued that the
MFDP did not hold precinct meetings in every county. Citing Joseph Rauh Jr.’s brief as
additional evidence, Mr. Griffin stated that the MFDP held precinct meetings in only
thirty-five of the eight-two counties in Mississippi. Explaining that the MFDP did not
have a quorum when they held their state convention, he claimed that
the statute provides that each county shall be entitled to representation in the state
convention equal to the number of members it has in the lower house of the
legislature. We have one-hundred-and-twenty-two members of the lower house
of the legislature, and I think it would require two-thirds of one-hundred-andtwenty-two to have a quorum. I think a simple matter of arithmetic would show
there was not even a quorum in their convention (DNC 91).
Reinforcing his argument by turning back to his previous claims, Mr. Griffin restated that
the MFDP did not hold their precinct meetings at 10am and that they held precinct
meetings and county conventions often at the same time. Again re-interpreting these
facts for the credentials committee members, Mr. Griffin argued that the MFDP members
“would go over in the corner, I suppose, and sit there—and sit around and hold
convention” (DNC 90).
Refocusing his testimony around the issue of participation, Mr. Griffin used a
parallel structure to show that the regulars followed the proper protocol, while arguing
that the MFDP members did not. Mr. Griffin argued that “they say they did not have an
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opportunity to participate,” but this was not true (DNC 91). Supporting this claim with
three affidavits, Mr. Griffin reasoned that the MFDP did not follow the proper protocol at
their precinct meetings. Confirming this statement with the affidavit of a reporter from
the Delta Democratic Times newspaper, this reporter claimed, according to Mr. Griffin,
that he observed four MFDP precinct meetings where the ballots to elect delegates were
not secret and that there was no attempt made to determine if the participants were even
qualified electors under Mississippi state law (DNC 92).
Providing a contrast in approaches between the MFDP and the regulars, Mr.
Griffin quoted another affidavit from Mr. Oscar Townsend that suggested that some
black women who participated in the regulars’ precinct meeting in Ruleville, Mississippi
also sent a letter stating that they participated in the MFDP precinct meeting. Claiming
that the letter to Mr. Townsend was sent by Fannie Lou Hamer, Mr. Griffin again
attacked Mrs. Hamer, while at the same time, made a larger claim about the MFDP’s
inability to follow the proper protocol.
Using a third affidavit from Mr. Vince Brocardo, Mr. Griffin attacked another
MFDP member, Dr. Aaron Henry. According to Mr. Brocardo’s affidavit, Mr. Griffin
claimed that Mr. Brocardo and Dr. Henry attended the same regular party precinct
meeting and were both nominated as delegates to the county convention. As Mr.
Brocardo stated in his affidavit, the only issue during the precinct meeting was that he
won with forty votes to Dr. Henry’s fifteen votes. Pushing this issue further, while
simultaneously attacking Dr. Henry, Mr. Griffin claimed “Dr. Henry just got less votes
than [Mr. Brocardo] did, it is just that simple, ladies and gentlemen, so help me. That is
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all there is to it, and he comes in here with all these allegations against people when he
went there and participated in our affairs” (DNC 95).
While Mr. Griffin’s first legal argument focused primarily on the historical
context of the state statute, his second legal argument was more personal. He argued
from a position of authority using various state statutes to support his claims, but he also
shifted into attack mode. Arguing that specific members of the MFDP who testified on
their behalf not only did not follow the proper protocol, but they did this purposefully.
Attempting to undermine the MFDP members’ credibility further, he maintained his
focused attacks on local Mississippians and refrains from attacking the civil rights
establishment.
Moving into his third legal argument, Mr. Griffin addressed another state statute
that spoke to an ethical dimension. Mr. Griffin argued that “in order to participate in any
party’s affairs, you must intend to be in accord with the principles of the party and
support its candidates” (DNC 95). Adding that he believed that this was a universal
statute across the country, Mr. Griffin claimed that this statute was designed to ensure
“integrity of political parties” (DNC 95). Listing the “facts,” Mr. Griffin implicitly
claimed that the MFDP members did not show themselves to be of high integrity
because: (1) members of the MFDP voted in the 1964 regular Democratic Primary, (2)
they participated in the regulars’ precinct elections, and (3) the leaders of the MFDP ran
for office through the regular Mississippi Democratic Party. Moving to his conclusion,
Mr. Griffin posed his claim within a question to the audience, stating “now, I ask you,
have not they gone back on the very pledge they took on the state law to stay with the

121

party to which they were then in, and participating in? There is no way to get around it.
It is just that simple” (DNC 96).
Having concluded this aspect of his testimony, Mr. Griffin restated his original
claim that the MFDP could not use the “democratic” name and that even if they tried to,
they would not be recognized in the state of Mississippi. Addressing the injunction that
was described during the MFDP members’ testimony, Mr. Griffin explained the
injunction by describing how it had been modified. Mr. Griffin claimed that
At the time I drew this brief there was a temporary injunction standing against
these people which would have prohibited them from using the word
‘Democratic’ in any fashion acting as delegates or representatives of any party
that—other than that it was usurping the name of the word ‘Democratic’ because
that belonged to someone else. That injunction had been modified to one extent,
and that was to allow these people to come here to Atlantic City. So when my
brief refers to the fact that the injunction is total, it is in error. It was not in error
when I wrote it, but it is in error now, and I want to bring that to your attention
(DNC 96-7).
Again, reinforcing his claim, Mr. Griffin stated that the MFDP was not a registered
political party and could not be under the state statute. He reminded the credentials
committee members that the state statute had been upheld twice by the United States
Supreme Court and that similar statutes have been upheld in other states, too. Finishing
his legal arguments, Mr. Griffin concluded
If you seat these people as your delegates, I ask you now, who shall put the name
of President Johnson on the ballot in November? There will be no party in
Mississippi to put President Johnson’s name on the ballot under the Democratic
label. The only way they can put his name on there would be by petition, and we
all know that is not effective (DNC 98).
While E.K. Collins and Ruble Griffin believed that their arguments were firmly
grounded in the law, they also knew that they needed to show, at least half-heartedly, that
the regular Mississippi Democratic Party would participate and support the National

122

Democratic Party. Although, they knew that this was not truly possible, since the state
Democratic Party was at odds with the national party over the issue of civil rights among
other things, they knew that they could not afford to ignore this issue either. As such, the
next aspect to the regulars’ argument was to situate their party’s support through the
resolution they passed at their state convention.
Resolving to be Ambiguous
E.K. Collins alluded to the resolution passed at the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party’s state convention when he said
My friends, we have passed, by unanimous vote, in our State Convention, a
Resolution guaranteeing to you that the regular National Democratic electors will
be placed on a ballot under the heading of whomever this Convention selects as
the Democratic President and Vice President, and they will have a chance, the
people of the State of Mississippi, to vote for those people (DNC 64).
Adding later in his testimony,
Yes, my friends, we are here today as the regular duly constituted delegates of the
State of Mississippi. We are here with a resolution as a mandate given to us by
this Convention, and we gave you that resolution. We are here not to beg, not to
apologize, but to ask that we be given a fair hearing on the law and the facts, and
not by some explosive, some story that is concocted simply to cause an
unwarranted action (DNC 68).
Having ambiguously alluded to this resolution twice in his testimony, E.K. Collins hoped
that these statements would be enough to create a space where the regulars did not have
to say that they would not support President Johnson, yet would allow them to continue
to run the democratic machinery within the state. This, however, would not be possible
as E.K. Collins and Ruble Griffin would soon find out during the question-and-answer
session that followed each witness’s testimony.
The first question came from Mrs. Joyce Austen, a delegate from New York, who
asked if the resolution was meaningless because of the state primary laws in Mississippi.
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Responding to this question, Mr. Collins explained that the primary deadline had already
passed, which meant that the National Democratic Party nominees would go on the ballot
in Mississippi without a primary (DNC 76). Asked about the resolution again, Mr.
Collins decided to read the resolution to the credentials committee stating,
BE IT RESOLVED at the Democratic Party of the State of Mississippi in
convention assembled at Jackson, Mississippi on this the 28th day of July, 1964,
that when this Convention adjourns on this day it does adjourn as authorized by
Section 2 of Chapter 32 of the laws of the State of Mississippi, passed at the first
extraordinary session of the Mississippi legislature of the year of 1963 until ten
A.M. on Wednesday, September 9, 1964, at the Mississippi Coliseum, the City of
Jackson, Mississippi, then and there to take any and all other further action that
may be deemed proper by such adjourned Convention (DNC 78).
At this point in the regulars’ testimony, the questions about the resolution end, that is,
until Ruble Griffin finished testifying. Receiving a question from a Tennessee delegate,
Mr. Maddox regarding whether the regulars could assure the national party that they
would support the Democratic nominee, Mr. Griffin deferred to Mr. Collins. Addressing
this question, Mr. Collins read a statement authorized by the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party that stated:
The Mississippi Democratic Party has been the true and faithful friend of the
National Democratic Party for almost a century. The hope of every delegate who
represents the great State of Mississippi at this convention is that the convention
will produce a platform and nominate a leader our people can support. We came
to Atlantic City with a desire to travel the Democratic road, which has been
traditional in Mississippi. We hope that the actions of this convention allow us to
follow that course. We feel this position represents the viewpoint of the vast
majority of all of the delegates here (DNC 102).
Again the issue of what the resolution meant resurfaced, and another delegate from
Washington, Mr. King asked Mr. Collins how he would reconcile this resolution with the
resolution the regulars passed against the civil rights plank of the National Democratic
Party platform. Deflecting his answer, Mr. Collins began by saying he could not speak
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for all the citizens of Mississippi and then turned his answer to an unrelated topic that
redirected attention to other aspects of the debate. Specifically, Mr. Collins responded by
stating,
Well, I could not answer that, because I believe we have 2,157,000 people down
there, and I certainly could not do it. I am Chairman of the Judiciary Committee
of the Senate. There are hundreds of bills come in there, and hundreds of
resolutions, resoluting against things that certainly I don’t agree with, or the
committee does not agree with, and they throw them asunder (DNC 107).
While the regulars did not want to alert the national party just yet to the fact that
they would not support President Johnson’s election bid, they knew that they needed to
partially address the issue of support. To do this, Mr. Collins and Mr. Griffin stuck to
their script and deflected the attention to the resolution in other ways. Although, this
might be considered another argument within the overarching structure of their
testimony, this aspect functioned less as an argument and more as a transition between
the larger claims regarding state history and protocol, as these witnesses move into their
conclusion, they needed to tie the individual arguments they had made into the larger
argument that they should be seated at the 1964 Democratic National Convention. To
accomplish this, both Mr. Collins and Mr. Griffin needed to draw out the comparison
between the two political parties and turn this understanding into an argument in favor of
“saving” the national party.
E.K. Collins concluded his testimony by first reminding his audience that the
regular Democratic Party delegation was the lawful representatives from Mississippi.
Having situated his conclusion within this overarching argument of the regulars’
testimony, Mr. Collins then explained the unseating of the regulars to a political cross
with consequences. These consequences, according to Collins, included a divided
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country. Speaking to the larger principles of American democracy, he attempted to
combine these two aspects of his conclusion when he stated “certainly a party bearing the
all-American name of Democratic shall not engage in such a fool-hardy act of
expediency” (DNC 67).
Drawing his conclusion to the hyperbolic, Mr. Collins used an if-then structure to
move his audience into action by calling on a return to “democratic” values. Mr. Collins
argued,
Ladies and gentlemen of this Committee, if the Democratic Party of the State of
Mississippi dies as a result of the action of this Convention, which it most
certainly will if the representatives of the people are not seated, we may erect a
monument thereto on the spacious grounds of our Capitol and inscribe thereon:
‘Here lies the party of our fathers, which has brought us through times of war and
economic distress, killed not by Mississippians, but by people outside of the great
State of Mississippi at the great Convention being held in Atlantic City in 1964.’
Yes, my friends, we are here today as the regular duly constituted delegates of the
State of Mississippi. We are here with a resolution as a mandate given to us by
this Convention, and we gave you that resolution. We are here not to beg, not to
apologize, but to ask that we be given a fair hearing on the law and the facts, and
not by some explosive, some story that is concocted simply to cause an
unwarranted action (DNC 68).
The if-statement for Mr. Collins was “if the Democratic Party of the State of Mississippi
dies as a result of this convention” functioned in two ways. It suggested that the idea of
the regular Democratic Party in Mississippi dying still has an alternative. Embedded
within the alternative, which at this point remained unstated, was that the credentials
committee’s decision would dictated what would happen to the regular party. This is
interesting, since both witnesses who spoke on behalf of the regular party insisted
throughout their testimony that the regular party functioned within the state independent
of the national party. However, Mr. Collins now seemed to be indicating that the life of
the state party rests with the national party. Moving to the then-statement, Mr. Collins
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claimed that if the state’s party was killed, then we should erect a monument to
commemorate this awful occasion. Not only should a monument be erected, but that that
monument should be located on the state capitol grounds and should specifically state
that outsiders, not Mississippians, killed the state party. Building this claim within the
American history, Mr. Collins finished his testimony by reminding the audience that the
regulars were duly constituted and came to the convention with a resolution as a mandate
(DNC 68). Finally, Mr. Collins concluded “we are here not to beg, not to apologize, but
to ask that we be given a fair hearing on the law and the facts, and not by some,
explosive, some story that is concocted simply to cause an unwarranted action” (DNC
68).
Mr. Collins conclusion not only wrapped up his testimony, but it also shifted the
power structure. When the regulars enter into the credentials committee hearing they did
not have the burden of proof, but they were under fire. Americans were becoming more
aware of civil rights activities and the backlash of those in power. Particularly, the
images of police dogs and fire hoses being used against nonviolence protesters had reach
both the television and newspapers throughout the country, and many of the stories told
by witnesses of the MFDP supported these images and reports. In this environment, the
regulars did not want to admit any wrongdoing, while at the same time, they hoped they
could weather the storm at the national convention.
However, they were also in a precarious spot and they need to carefully articulate
their position using a combination of denial and deflection, while maintaining their
arguments on legal grounds. Although they attempted to do this in varied ways, E.K.
Collins used this final aspect of his argument to state his case by standing firm. He
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started by saying what the regulars would not do: (1) beg or (2) apologize. Then shifting
his statement, he balanced these claims by stating what the regulars wanted: (1) a fair
hearing based on state laws and the facts and (2) only warranted action, which meant the
seating of the regular Mississippi Democratic Party.
While Mr. Collins attempted to balance fear and hope, Ruble Griffin, returned to
his initial argument that to seat the MFDP was to kill the Democratic Party. He began by
stating,
Ladies and gentlemen, I say to you, not as a threat but as a local Mississippian,
and I hope a true American, do not kill our Party. Do not kill our Party. You will
kill it if you fail to seat the people, the lawful delegates from Mississippi, which
proved it represents the vast majority of the people of Mississippi. You will kill
the Party (DNC 98).
Mr. Griffin, similar to Mr. Collins also used an if-then structure to conclude his
testimony, however, Mr. Griffin began by saying that his conclusion was not meant as a
threat. This might lead one to believe that this was in fact a threat under the disguise of
not being one. Mr. Griffin continued using the if-then structure, but in reverse order. In
this example, Mr. Griffin began with the then-statement before revealing the if-statement.
This structure forced the listeners to focus on the careful choice of words, since meaning
was delayed until the if-statement was stated. In this structure, the then-statement,
similar to Mr. Collins’ testimony stated that the credentials committee will kill the Party,
if they did not seat the regulars. The regulars were then equated to lawful delegates who
represent the citizens of Mississippi (DNC 98). Transitioning from this statement to the
next by explaining that he knew some of President Johnson’s kin, Mr. Griffin stated “I
believe that you would do your party harm, you would gain nothing, and I beg of you,
and I beseech you, do not kill our Party” (DNC 99).
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Conclusion
Unlike the MFDP who attempted to gain political traction for their arguments in
favor of their seating at the national convention through a moral imperative, the regulars
used a different strategy. Instead, they attempted to mediate their deception of the issues
back home in bureaucratic norms by reminding the credentials committee of the
institutional constraints of the present political system. Because these constraints were
structural and grounded in the power relationships of the National Democratic Party, the
regulars understood their purpose at the hearing well. Moreover, the regulars used their
testimony as an opportunity to rationalize the racist structures in Mississippi by using
past precedent and state laws to support their cause. Thus, what we learn from the
testimony of the regular Mississippi Democratic Party was the way that power was
constructed and used as political currency to maintain the status quo. While the regulars
may not have changed the attitudes of the credentials committee through their testimony,
in the end, their discourse was effective because they were able to remind the committee
what was at stake. Now that we understand the regular’s perspective, part two of this
chapter will continue by examining the rebuttal testimony offered by Joseph Rauh, Jr. on
behalf of the MFDP and the closing statement offered by E.K. Collins on behalf of the
regulars.
Part II: Rebuttal Testimony: Reinforcing Positions
When the Mississippi delegation debate began, those in favor and opposed to the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) seating knew that each side would be
allotted one hour to testify before the National Democratic Party credentials committee.
This understanding, however, became complicated at the conclusion of the MFDP
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testimony when Joseph Rauh, Jr., counsel for the MFDP, asked for the remaining fifteen
minutes of their time to be reserved for rebuttal. In response to this statement, Mr.
Leventhal stated “we have announced that we adopted the rule for this, Mr. Rauh, of
having one side make its presentation and then the other. It was the belief that it would
be more orderly that way” (DNC 58). Mr. Rauh immediately protested this ruling and
asked the credentials committee members,
how was it chosen that we were first, then, and I would not have a chance to rebut
the stories of the other side? In Mississippi they tell one story; here they tell
another. I want to hear what they say here so that I can read you the record of
what they say in Mississippi. I was perfectly willing to go first on the assumption
that the normal rules of the group that goes first also has a rebuttal (DNC 58).
Mr. Rauh concluded his protest by imploring the credentials committee members for
assistance in this matter arguing that he should have the right to rebut “the stories that
will be told by groups who are notorious for saying one thing at a Democratic
Convention and going home and supporting our opponents” (DNC 58).
At this point, Chairman Lawrence attempted to mediate this issue by suggesting
that Mr. Rauh apply for this right following the regulars’ testimony, if he still felt the
same way. But, Congressman Green, a delegate from Oregon interjected that she would
join Mr. Rauh in his protest. She argued that her home state had a delegation debate later
in the afternoon and that the Oregon delegation was advised that they would have the
right to rebuttal (DNC 59). Arguing from principle, Congressman Green concluded by
stating that the rules should not be changed so late in the process. Mr. Leventhal
attempted to assert his power by asking Congressman Green who advised the delegation
from Oregon of this and then restated the ruling. Chairman Lawrence agreed with Mr.
Leventhal and stated that “that was not the agreement with Oregon or any other state or
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territory,” but Congressman Diggs moved the committee to allow both sides to use their
remaining time for rebuttal, which was quickly second by Congressman Green (DNC 5960). Eventually Chairman Lawrence ruled in favor of the MFDP stating that “we want to
be as fair and agreeable as we possibly can with the whole proposition. We will, of
course, have to reserve the same opportunity for the opposition” (DNC 60). While
Joseph Rauh Jr. believed that the regulars should incorporate their rebuttals within their
testimony, he reluctantly agreed and the debate continued.
To understand the strategies employed during the rebuttals of those in favor and
opposed to the seating of the MFDP, it is important to recall the types of arguments that
had previously been forwarded by both sides. These arguments help to ground the
rebuttal of each side as they attempted to balance both their response to the claims
forwarded by the opposing side, while at the same time, reinforce their own arguments.
Summarizing the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’s Testimony
Using a problem-solution design, the MFDP witnesses first articulated the
problems they faced in Mississippi before arguing that these problems could be solved by
seating their delegation instead of their opponent. They began by building their problem
through the key terms of violence and representation arguing that the violence blacks and
sympathetic whites faced in Mississippi was supported by the power structures within the
state. The MFDP witnesses then attempted to connect this violence not only to the power
structures, but also to the members of the regular Mississippi Democratic Party. At the
same time, they also argued that Mississippi blacks had no voice in their own state
government. Arguing that this occurred because the regulars: (1) controlled the voter
registration laws in the state and (2) did not allow blacks to participate in the state’s
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Democratic Party, the MFDP witnesses attempted to connect representation with having a
voice in state government. By converse, MFDP claimed that the silenced voices of
countless black citizens in Mississippi meant that that aspect of the Mississippi citizenry
was not represented.
Turning to the solution aspect of their argument, the MFDP then argued that they
should be seated as the delegation from Mississippi by focusing their discussion around
the key terms of loyalty, support, and participation. Claiming that the MFDP would be
loyal to the national party and Lyndon Johnson, they attempted to align themselves with
the goals of their primary audience. Moreover, they argued that the MFDP would not
only be loyal, but that they would actively support President Johnson, the national party
platform, and its philosophies. Concluding their arguments, the MFDP witnesses claimed
that if they were allowed to “participate” in the national convention the results would be
felt across the United States. Specifically, they believed that their seating would: (1)
change the situation in Mississippi that they outlined throughout their testimony and (2)
become an opportunity for America to live up to its promises not just to white citizens,
but all its citizens.
The MFDP is not the Same as the KKK: Rebuttal of Joseph Rauh, Jr.
Focusing on the credential committee members as the primary audience, Mr.
Joseph Rauh, Jr. used the structure of his rebuttal to support the goals of the MFDP. Mr.
Rauh began his rebuttal by addressing several claims made by the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party witnesses, and then turned his attention to the arguments of the MFDP,
both restating and reinforcing them. This movement back and forth between objections
and claims not only showed a balanced approach to Mr. Rauh’s rebuttal, but it also
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preserved, as Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair state in their book Logical SelfDefense, the dialectical nature of the overarching argument (248).
To begin, Mr. Rauh stated “we have just heard that the Freedom Party was like
the Ku Klux Klan. I didn’t believe I would ever hear that those who have been beaten
were like the beaters” (DNC 114). Having addressed the absurdity of this statement just
by restating it, Mr. Rauh moved to counter this argument by explaining that there are
“63,000 human beings registered in the Freedom Party, right there, available for every
member of the credentials committee to come up afterwards and look at them” (DNC
114). Mr. Rauh continued to explain that the MFDP would gladly share with the
credentials committee their registration lists. Turning the issue back to the regulars, he
concluded,
we will not give them to the Mississippi people for the very simple reason, you
heard Aaron Henry, you heard, Mrs. Hamer, you heard the others say what would
happen. A man’s life is at stake if those are given. But, ladies and gentlemen of
the credentials committee, you may come and see them (DNC 114).
This distinction between the regular Democratic Party members in Mississippi and the
credentials committee members was significant. Mr. Rauh not only draws this distinction
as a means to redirect this claim, but he implicitly equated the regulars with groups in
Mississippi who might hurt those who have registered with the MFDP. On one hand, this
statement denied that the MFDP was equal to the KKK, deflating the regulars’ claim by
the act of making the MFDP’s registration lists available to the credentials committee.
On the other hand, Mr. Rauh also turned this comparison back to the regulars and
indirectly claimed that the regulars were more similar to the KKK than the MFDP.
Shifting to the regulars’ second objection, Mr. Rauh addressed the claim that the
MFDP did not hold precinct meetings in all eight-two counties in Mississippi. Instead of
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addressing the total number of counties in Mississippi and the extent to which the MFDP
held precinct meetings across the state, Mr. Rauh began by stating the number of counties
that did hold precinct meetings in. Again, turning the claim back to the regulars, Mr.
Rauh stated “isn’t it terrible that we were scared to hold one in Neshoba County, where
three boys were murdered, one of whose wife was here? Isn’t it terrible we couldn’t have
one there? But we did have them in thirty-five counties” (DNC 114). By invoking the
memory of Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman during this part of
his rebuttal, Mr. Rauh reminded and reinforced the dangerous and violent atmosphere
within the state. At the same time, he also explained to his audience the reason they did
not hold precinct meetings throughout the state.
Looking more closely at Mr. Rauh’s words, his repeated phrasing “isn’t it
terrible” helped to reinforce the argument he was making, while also interpreting the facts
in a particular way that favors the MFDP. He also reminded his audience of the murder
of Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman whose images appeared all over the boardwalk
outside the convention hall as delegates from the MFDP attempted to make their presence
known. Finally, he described the murder of Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman as the
“three boys [who] were murdered” (DNC 114). Identifying the three murdered not as
men, but as boys, Mr. Rauh increased the tension between what happened during the
summer in Mississippi and the way that the segregationists attempted to deny this
situation. But it also seemed to make the murders worse. Focusing on how the audience
interpreted this story of violence, Mr. Rauh used the “boys” murder to increase the
intensity surrounding the delegation debate decision.
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Pulling back a little here, Mr. Rauh then used this particular situation in
conjunction with Reverend Spike’s statement about Freedom Summer and the inception
of the MFDP as “the greatest grassroots action of modern time” to make a more general
statement about the MFDP (DNC 115). He stated “and they say we don’t have a party.
We have a party. We have a party that one can be proud of, people who came and
registered with us” (DNC 115). These statements in Mr. Rauh’s rebuttal not only
function as a claim, but they also build upon one another through repetition. Using this
structure, the meaning of Mr. Rauh’s statement did not occur until the audience heard the
last sentence, which because of this crescendo effect lends itself to a stronger appeal with
the audience.
The third claim that Mr. Rauh addressed was that blacks have the right to vote in
Mississippi. Mr. Rauh countered this claim by stating that only six percent of blacks in
Mississippi were currently registered to vote. Continuing he argued that “they want to
vote but they can’t get the right to vote” (DNC 115). Turning the issue to the audience,
Mr. Rauh situated the issue of registered black voters to the event of the credentials
committee hearing claiming that “by seating the Freedom Party, that will make the right
to vote real in Mississippi” (DNC 115).
Resituating his rebuttal through a comparison between the MFDP and the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party, Mr. Rauh explained to the credentials committee that the
regulars talk one way at national conventions and another way in Mississippi. Citing
Governor Johnson of Mississippi and state Senator E.K. Collins, Mr. Rauh quoted them
as saying “we will fight segregation no matter what it costs in human lives” (DNC 115).
Further citing Governor Johnson, Mr. Rauh quoted him as saying “our Mississippi
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Democratic Party is entirely free and independent of the influence or domination of the
national party” (DNC 115). This transition functioned first to move the audience into the
second part of Mr. Rauh’s rebuttal, the part where he argued the MFDP position more
directly, but it also functioned as a strategy to undermine the claims that the regulars were
making at the hearing. Pushing this distinction further, Mr. Rauh continued by asking a
rhetorical question: if they are independent of the national party, then why are they so
concerned with their delegation being seated? As this question lingers, Mr. Rauh wasted
little time in answering it for the credentials committee, stating that “they are here to
warm the seats and keep the Freedom Party from them, because if the Freedom Party is
once seated, Mississippi will change” (DNC 115). Mr. Rauh used this rhetorical question
not as a direct question that required an answer from the audience, but as a means to
make a claim about the purpose and rationale behind the delegation debate. At the same
time, Mr. Rauh used wording similar to Fannie Lou Hamer’s testimony when she stated
“and if the Freedom Democratic Party is not seated now, I question America…” to create
linguistic consistency within the arguments forwarded by the MFDP (DNC 43-4).
Amplifying this position, Mr. Rauh concluded that the credentials committee
members have it in their power “to make the greatest change in the history of modern
times by making the Freedom Party the real Party in Mississippi” (DNC 116). He then
returned to quoting members of the regular Mississippi Democratic Party. Quoting
Governor Johnson from 1963, Mr. Rauh claimed that Johnson stated that “my
determination is to do anything I can to get the Kennedy dynasty out of the White House”
(DNC 116). Helping the audience to interpretation this quote, Mr. Rauh explained that
Governor Johnson’s major political ambition was to see John F. Kennedy removed from
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the White House, and he reminded the audience that Governor Johnson called President
Kennedy a dim wit. While this quote and interpretation may seem out of step with the
types of arguments the MFDP was trying to make, it functioned with Mr. Rauh’s rebuttal
to remind the audience of the great President Kennedy, while at the same time, showed
how the regulars would say one thing at the national convention and another thing back
home. Continuing by equating Governor Johnson with former Mississippi Governor,
Ross Barnett, Mr. Rauh explained that these men were not only co-leaders of the
Mississippi Democratic Party, but they were also co-defendants in a criminal contempt
case for violation of a court order. Citing Barnett, Mr. Rauh quoted him as saying that
President Johnson was “a counterfeit confederate who resigned from the South” (DNC
116).
Sufficiently showing that the regulars spoke about the national party differently at
home as oppose to at the national convention, Mr. Rauh then argued in favor of the
MFDP seating by reinforcing the arguments already stated. He began by claiming that
the National Democratic Party was “the party of minorities” (DNC 117). Identifying this
statement with a previous statement made by the regulars, Mr. Rauh argued that the
credentials committee was comprised of minorities, some of whom were first generation
Americans, some who were blacks, and some who were Jews (DNC 117). He concluded
this argument by stating “we are all a minority” (DNC 117). Comparing this with the
regulars, Mr. Rauh again cited Governor Johnson and former Governor Barnett.
Specifically, Mr. Rauh quoted Johnson’s campaign as stating that the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) stood for “Niggers,
alligators, apes, coons, and possums” (DNC 117). Further proving this distinction, Mr.
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Rauh quoted the regular Mississippi Democratic Party Committeeman, George Thomas
Brady as comparing blacks to chimpanzees and caterpillars (DNC 117). Telling the
credentials committee that E.K. Collins was not as he stated previously, the National
Committeeman for the Mississippi Democratic Party because he was not officially in that
capacity until the next week, Joseph Rauh then used this information to quote the current
Committeeman, George Thomas Brady.
Asking the credentials committee members if that kind of analogy was what
counted in the National Democratic Party, Mr. Rauh returned to a claim forwarded by the
regulars that blacks could attend the regulars’ precinct meetings. Mr. Rauh responded to
this claim by stating that he had a stack of affidavits that proved otherwise (DNC 117).
Continuing to argue this point, Mr. Rauh claimed,
of course Fannie Lou Hamer had the nerve to go there. She had the nerve to lay
her life on the line, and you heard her here, the beating she took in that prison
because she went to a voting school, and she had the nerve to go to a precinct
meeting, and they say, ‘See, it is all open. Fannie Lou Hamer was there.’ Fannie
Lou Hamer, who was beaten, lost her job, and then was beaten for the privilege
(DNC 117-8).
Shifting into the second aspect of this argument, Mr. Rauh addressed the issue that the
MFDP members concocted their stories. Using repeated questions, Mr. Rauh stated, “do
you think Aaron Henry concocted his story? Do you think Fannie Lou Hamer concocted
her story? Do you think Edwin King, a Reverend of the Gospel, concocted his story”
(DNC 118). Then he turns the question by answer it for the audience saying “I don’t
believe [that] you believe that at all” (DNC 118).
This aspect of Mr. Rauh’s rebuttal functions in several ways. First, it reminded
the audience of Fannie Lou Hamer’s story, a powerful story of bravery and perseverance
that anchors the MFDP testimony. Again pressing into the minds of the audience through
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this reminder of Mrs. Hamer’s experience, he built the connection between voter
registration activities, violence, and the decision before the credentials committee.
However, Mr. Rauh also realized that if the MFDP was going to be successful, they
needed to show how Hamer’s story of violence was not isolated. To accomplish this
goal, Mr. Rauh pressed on the issue of “concocted stories” by using the repetition of
witnesses who supported the same claim to violence beginning with Dr. Aaron Henry
moving to Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer and concluding with Reverend Edwin King. This
movement between the three witnesses not only supported Mr. Rauh argument that their
stories were legitimate, but it also ends with the example of a Reverend. While the
audience could maybe dismiss the story of one, it becomes more difficult to dismiss the
story of three, and even more so the story of a Reverend.
Building on the momentum that Mr. Rauh created through the repetition of
questions, Mr. Rauh addressed the legal arguments that grounded the regulars’ testimony.
He began by stating that the regulars claim that the MFDP was not a legal party, and then
asked: “what does it take to be a legal party in Mississippi” (DNC 118)? Mr. Rauh
balanced this argument by stating that the regular Mississippi Democratic Party was not
legal because they did not have a single black person involved in their entire state
convention. Amplifying this statement, Mr. Rauh reiterated his claim by stating “not
only is nobody on their delegation. There wasn’t a Negro in the whole state convention.
They excluded them all” (DNC 118). On these grounds, Mr. Rauh concluded, the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party was illegal.
Moving back to the MFDP, Mr. Rauh transitioned by asking the credentials
committee “what about us” (DNC 118)? Stating that the law was clear, Mr. Rauh
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explained that “when there are two groups with substantial membership, and we have it
right there, you have the right to choose those who will work for you, or for your
platform” (DNC 118). Having placed the delegation debate in the hands of the
credentials committee, Mr. Rauh then attempted to position the MFDP by comparing
them with the regulars. He argued that the regulars would not support a civil rights
platform and have gone so far as to state that their own platform included the repeal of
the Civil Rights Act (DNC 118). He continued to explain that the regulars could not
support the National Democratic Party platform stating that “we know it [and] they know
it” (DNC, 118-9). By comparison, Mr. Rauh argued that the MFDP would enforce the
Civil Rights Act in Mississippi (DNC 118). Repeating his previous conclusion, Mr. Rauh
stated,
they only sweet talk you hear to keep the Freedom Party from the seats, because if
the Freedom Party get the seats here, when they go back to Mississippi, they will
build a new Mississippi that will make the Democratic Party proud of it (DNC
119).
Again making the point about the reasons for appearing before the credentials committee,
in this part of his rebuttal, Mr. Rauh was not only making a comparison between the two
parties, but he was also attempting to influence the credentials committee’s decision by
explaining to them what was at stake.
Shifting gears here, Mr. Rauh claimed that the regulars have had plenty of
chances to show their support for President Johnson. Stating that they would not show
their support, Mr. Rauh at the same time, argued that everyone knew what would happen
on September 9th, 1964, when the regulars reconvened their state convention. Stating the
obviously, Mr. Rauh claimed “on September 9 they are coming out for Barry Goldwater,
and if we seat them we have just been made monkeys of once again” (DNC 119).
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Reminding the audience that the questions from the delegates of Indiana and Wisconsin
confirmed this, Mr. Rauh reinforced this idea with the example of the regulars at the 1960
convention. He stated “they had a meeting. They recessed. They came here. They went
back. They rejected the President of the United States, John Kennedy. They rejected
Lyndon Johnson” (DNC 119). Using repetition Mr. Rauh argued that history was
repeating itself by comparing the regulars’ action in 1960 to that in 1964 stating that
“they had a meeting. They are going back. They are not going to like our platform. We
are going to have a great liberal platform that they are not going to like in Mississippi. If
we adopt a platform they did like in Mississippi, we would get licked in the United States
of America” (DNC 120).
While the use of repetition and simple sentence structure helped the audience to
follow along, it also helped Mr. Rauh to continue to push on his point that history is
repeating itself. This comparison was integral to Mr. Rauh’s argument as he attempted to
influence the credential committee members. Situating his argument within the
disappointment from 1960 and the fear that the same result will occur in 1964, Mr. Rauh
adequately argued this point.
Returning to the issue of legality, Mr. Rauh claimed that the MFDP was a legal
party. Grounding this claim within the situation in Mississippi, Mr. Rauh argued that
you can’t follow the laws of Mississippi if you are a Negro. The laws are made to
throw Negros out of every right in Mississippi. All you can do in a legal way is to
do the best you can. And we have done the best we can (DNC 120).
Using the repetition of the phrase “we have,” Mr. Rauh supported this claim through a
series of propositions. He stated “we have built registration. We have held precinct
meetings where we could, even at risks. We held county conventions. We held a state
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convention, and we pledged but they won’t pledge” (DNC 120). Making a direct
comparison between the two parties, Mr. Rauh then claimed that the biggest difference
between the MFDP and the regular Mississippi Democratic Party is not that the MFDP is
primarily black and the regulars are all-white, “it is that we are for Lyndon Johnson and
they are for Barry Goldwater” (DNC 120). Returning to the issue of seating, Rauh asked
the credential committee members,
are you going to throw out here the people who want to work for Lyndon
Johnson, who are willing to be beaten in jails, to die for the privilege of working
for Lyndon Johnson. And then seat some people who come in here and won’t
even get up and say ‘I will see that Governor Paul Johnson and Governor Ross
Barnett support Lyndon Johnson (DNC 120-1)?
Continuing to press this issue of support, Mr. Rauh reminded the audience that just last
week Governor Johnson had called President Johnson’s administration “weak, vacillating
and crawfishes” (DNC 121).
Again restating the overarching argument of the MFDP, Mr. Rauh concluded this
aspect of his argument stating “we are here. We love the Democratic Party. We will
work for its candidates. There is no legal problem” (DNC 121). Invoking his own ethos
as an attorney, Mr. Rauh explained to the audience that you do not have to do the
impossible to comply with the law. Then turning back to the legality of the MFDP, he
stated “we did everything humanly possible and even more because there was a risk”
(DNC 121).
Reaching the conclusion of his rebuttal, Mr. Rauh stated that the issue of the
Mississippi delegation seating came down to a few fundamental things: “(1) will the
Democratic Party stand for the oppressors or for the oppressed and (2) will we stand for
loyal people, those who testified, or the disloyal regular party” (DNC 121)? Turning the
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issue to audience, he stated “and remember, they had their chance. They had their time.
They made no effort to contradict these people. They have made no effort to contradict
the statements. Of course they can’t. They are out of their own mouths” (DNC 121).
Generalizing the delegation issues, Mr. Rauh argued,
the Democratic Party cannot fight the white backlash by surrendering to it. The
seating of the Freedom delegation is legally and equitably right. The liberal
principles on which the Democratic Party has grown great demands that it stand
with the Freedom Party at this convention.
The Democratic Party has won over the years when it stood fast for principle. It
cannot win this time by hauling down the flags. And let me say one thing more.
The question at this convention: they represent the power structure. Senator
Collins is here representing Governor Johnson and the power structure of
Mississippi. Your choice is coming down to whether you vote for the power
structure of Mississippi that is responsible for the death of those three boys, or
whether you vote for the people for whom those three boys gave their lives.
And so I say to you in all seriousness and all earnestness there concluding
feelings. We willing not win this election by hauling down the flag of principle,
and what is much more important to me, and I believe to this wonderful
credentials committee, is that unless we stand up for principle and defeat those
people who have given so much for our Party and our President, what is worse
than the fact that we won’t win is that we won’t deserve to win” (DNC 122-3).
The conclusion of Joseph Rauh, Jr.’s rebuttal spoke to the broader issues and implications
of this debate. He began by calling the members of the credential committee to a higher
principle of American democracy and told them that surrendering to outside pressure will
not change things. Using the ethos of the National Democratic Party as the party of
principle, he argued as an insider and connected the issue of seating to the social and
political beliefs of the audience. Situating the audience’s beliefs by condensing
everything that they stand for around the image of the flag, Mr. Rauh not only conjured in
the minds of his audience members images of the American flag, but he also spoke to
what the flag stands for: unity, principle, and action. Turning this symbol on its side,
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Mr. Rauh then created a space to argue what was truly important by tying the seating of
the MFDP to the election of Lyndon Johnson. Predicating this statement on the belief
shared by the credential committee members that President Johnson needed to win the
presidential election for the National Democratic Party work to continue, he finished by
stating that they would only deserve to win if they do the right thing and seat the MFDP.
Summarizing the Regular Mississippi Democratic Party Testimony
While the MFDP attempted to anchor their testimony in a problem-solution
design, the regulars did not operate under the same burden of proof. They instead argued
from a position of authority. Situating their testimony in the state’s historical context, the
regulars argued at the legal level about protocol and then used the resolution they passed
at their state convention as a means to deflect their testimony away from the issues of
loyalty and support.
The regulars began by grounding their delegation seating to the historical context
of the Mississippi Democratic Party. They argued that their party had been the
Democratic Party in Mississippi for almost one-hundred years, and they claimed that they
had a right to be recognized and seated on those grounds. Transitioning into their first
argument, the regulars defined their party as a product of the laws in Mississippi, which
they remind the audience had been in existence since the time of reconstruction.
Claiming that their delegation should be seated because they followed the proper
protocol, they simultaneously defined the statutes and explained how they fulfilled them.
By contrast, they also argued that the MFDP did not and could not fulfill these state
statutes.

144

Moving into their second argument, the regulars argued that they had shown their
loyalty to the national party through the resolution that they passed at their state
convention. Explaining what this meant, they claimed that the resolution guaranteed the
credentials committee that President Johnson and his running-mate would appear on the
ballot in Mississippi under the Democratic Party name as long as the regulars were
seated, and therefore capable of doing so. Concluding the regulars’ arguments, they
argued by comparison aligning their seating with a belief in American democracy, and at
the same time, attempted to equate the seating of the MFDP with supporting communism.
This is not about Emotions: The Closing Statement of E.K. Collins
Speaking briefly to audience following Mr. Joseph Rauh Jr.’s rebuttal, Mr. E. K.
Collins addressed one claim made by the MFDP and forwarded two claims in favor of the
regulars seating. While Mr. Rauh focused his rebuttal on his primary audience of the
credentials committee, Mr. Collins was less inclined to do so. He, instead, focused on the
“facts” of the case, and at the same time attempted to re-position the regulars’ testimony
within the legal framework they forwarded during their testimony.
Mr. Collins began by addressing the claim that 63,000 blacks were voting in
Mississippi, but Chairman Lawrence interjected to correct this statement stating that
Joseph Rauh, Jr. claimed that there were 63,000 blacks registered with the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party. Adjusting to this correction, Mr. Collins stated that “if there
are they did not vote for their people back home” (DNC 123). Turning his closing
statement quickly to his own party, Mr. Collins claimed that “Mississippi has never voted
Republican since the day it became a state in 1817” (DNC 123). He explained that the
regular Mississippi Democratic Party has continuously voted a Democratic Ticket. He
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then modified this statement by stating “two times we did not vote for the national
electors in that state. One time they only lost by 8,000 votes, the last election. Prior to
that only one other time in 1948” (DNC 124). While Mr. Collins was attempting to
carefully show that the regular Mississippi Democratic Party had been loyal to the
national party electors, what he did not say was that in both 1948 and 1960, when they
did not support the national party was because the issue of civil rights was at stake. A
more careful look at these events might suggest that the issue of civil rights was central to
the 1964 election, and as a result, the regulars support might seem more questionable.
Instead, Mr. Collins quickly shifted his rebuttal to his own experience to draw
attention away from this issue and stated,
I will say this to the colored people of Mississippi and all the world and I will tell
him that I did not represent the interests. I represent the people that are maimed
and injured. I have never represented a corporation or some of your interest you
talk about in my life, because I don’t need to (DNC 124).
Continuing in this way, he cited a specific example of helping a young black girl to
anchor his claim that he, and by extension, the regular Democratic Party in Mississippi,
represent the people. He explained “I will tell you what I did this year for a Negro girl in
my county in the State of Mississippi. I received at the hands of twelve men in the jury
box more than $60,000 during the year of 1964 for a Negro girl” (DNC 124). With no
further detail about this example, he concluded “now, that is just one of the things that I
would like to point out to you that we in Mississippi have fought the battles for those
people the same as we do for anyone else” (DNC 124).
Speaking more broadly to the credentials committee members, he claimed that
there were people who were not interested in helping the downtrodden, “but by far and
large the biggest hearted people in the world—and ask the men and women down there if
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that isn’t true—live down in Mississippi” (DNC 124). Although, he claimed that whites
in Mississippi helped blacks, he did not give specifics. At the same time, he made a point
to call blacks in Mississippi “downtrodden” and explained using this term because Mr.
Joseph Rauh Jr. used it.
Moving from the “big hearts” of the people of Mississippi, Mr. Collins then
claimed that they were loyal. Citing that Mississippians have more Congressional Medal
of Honor winners per capita—during World War II and the Korean conflict—as
compared to any other state, Mr. Collins concluded his rebuttal by arguing from a
position of legality. He stated “my friends, I submit it to you because there is not one
scintilla of evidence, legal evidence or otherwise, only emotions to refuse to seat the
Democratic delegation that is sent to you by the State of Mississippi” (DNC 125).
It was the issue of emotions versus the issue of legality that Mr. Collins hoped
would help the regulars win seating. While he made several claims in his rebuttal, he
does not spend much time building those claims into arguments that are supported by
evidence. This might be because he thought that he and Mr. Ruble Griffin had already
sufficiently laid out the legal arguments for the credentials committee, or it may be
because he thought that he did not need to provide evidence since the evidence was
included in the regular Mississippi Democratic Party’s brief, or it may be because he felt
the tide shifting against the regulars as he began his rebuttal. Whatever the case may be,
Mr. Collins focused his rebuttal on a personal example and attempted to deflect attention
away from the issues presented by the MFDP. Ultimately, he hoped that the legal issue
would guide the credentials committee decision and as such he reminded them in the
conclusion of the rebuttal of the emotion and legal aspects of this issue. Turning the
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question not to the question of principles as Mr. Joseph Rauh, Jr. had, Mr. E.K. Collins
situated the issue in the right of the regular Democratic Party in Mississippi to be seated
on the grounds that they were selected by the citizens of the state.
Conclusion
The reader learns from this part of chapter four that the Mississippi delegation
debate structure at the 1964 Democratic National Convention was not consistent with
traditional debating practices. The discussion that preceded this aspect of the debate
shows that Joseph Rauh, Jr. believed that the format would be traditional, while the
leaders of the credentials committee seemed to have previously agreed upon a more fluid
approach. While Joseph Rauh, Jr. and a couple of the credentials committee members
voiced objections, the regulars remained silent on this issue suggesting that they may
have already been aware of the structure or even influenced it.
Regardless of who had a role in making this decision, what emerges from this part
of the debate were the varied strategies employed by each side. Speaking on behalf of
the MFDP, Joseph Rauh, Jr. attempted to resituate the debate by focusing on the claims
made by those who had testified on behalf of the regular Mississippi Democratic Party.
Weaving between objections and arguments, Mr. Rauh addressed the burden of proof by
reinforcing the position of the MFDP. Then using this position to further articulate the
issues at stake, Mr. Rauh reminded the credentials committee of the compelling
testimony that they had heard from the MFDP witnesses. Finally, Mr. Rauh resituated
the magnitude of their decision within the moral imperative of their seating at the national
convention through his dramatic finish. By contrast this fluid debate structure was more
evident in the closing statement of E.K. Collins on behalf of the regular Mississippi
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Democratic Party. Instead of using his remaining time to rebut the testimony offered by
Joseph Rauh, Jr., Mr. Collins’ statement focused more on detracting from the issues
raised by the MFDP that finished as abruptly as it had started.
Thus, this part of the Mississippi delegation debate shows the complicated nature
of the rhetorical situation. The credentials committee at once were moved by the
testimony offered by the MFDP, but at the same time faced a significant dilemma
regarding how they could and should proceed. This dilemma became even clearer when
Chairman Lawrence, in a surprising move, did not ask the credentials committee to make
a decision about the Mississippi delegation seating and instead tabled the issue. In the
hours that followed, this issue would gain considerable attention as Chairman Lawrence
appointed a sub-committee to find a compromise and Lyndon Johnson continued to
monitor the situation from behind the scenes. Now that we understand the testimony in
response to the MFDP, the next chapter will evaluate the Mississippi delegation debate
not only in the immediate context of the credentials committee hearing, but also within
the larger trajectory of civil rights movement activities.
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Chapter Five
Drawing Conclusions about the 1964 Mississippi Delegation Debate
Members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) came to the 1964
Democratic National Convention with a plan to unseat the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party. Their goal was to convince “ten percent of the committee—eleven
members—[to] file a minority report supporting [the M]FDP” that would then be taken to
the convention floor (Dittmer 287). Once the issue was on the convention floor,
members of the MFDP needed to convince eight states to request a roll call that would
require each state delegation “to go on record, avoiding the voice vote ‘rubber stamp’ that
convention chairs so often used to decide unpopular issues” (Dittmer 287). It was on the
convention floor the Mr. Rauh believed that the MFDP could win and going into the
challenge, he was confident that he had the votes he needed.
On Saturday August 22, 1964, two-days before the opening ceremonies of the
Democratic National Convention, the credentials committee convened. Hearing four
delegation debates that day, the credentials committee listened to the Mississippi
arguments during the afternoon session. While the MFDP had been confident going into
the hearing, they left the debate cautiously optimistic. From the perspective of the
MFDP, there had been a rhetorical exigency that needed to be addressed through the
delegation debate discourse. Leaving the hearing, members of the MFDP thought that
their message had been received well and that they had won the debate on both logical
and emotional grounds. However, while the MFDP witnesses changed the attitudes of
the credentials committee members through their testimony, ultimately their discourse
was rendered ineffectual because of the institutional constraints of the present political
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system. Although members of the MFDP may have struggled to understand this point at
the time of the hearing, the regulars understood it very well. Responding to the testimony
offered by the MFDP, the regulars focused their testimony by reminding the credentials
committee of the reality of current power relationships in the National Democratic Party.
In the end, the regulars were successful because they were able to remind the audience of
what was at stake. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation was to analyze the
arguments of the Mississippi delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention in order to more fully understand the rhetorical situation.
Studying this debate not as a historical moment, but as a rhetorical phenomenon,
this project has attempted to fill a gap in the scholarship by examining a significant yet
under-researched aspect of the civil rights movement. Moreover, the foundation of this
study was the rhetorical situation. Using Lloyd Bitzer’s definition, this study analyzed
the arguments of the Mississippi delegation debate first by situating those arguments
within the rhetorical context. Then by assessing the debate discourse through a close
reading of the text that examined how the discourse responded to an exigency.
Additionally, this study also employed oral history interviewing techniques to thicken the
historical descriptions of the rhetorical situation and to enhance the meaning inferred
from a close reading of the arguments.
While chapter one provided the reader with the initial orientation to this
dissertation, chapter two situated the Mississippi delegation debate within the particular
rhetorical situation. This chapter began by describing the context from President
Johnson’s perspective including his worries and actions behind the scenes. Shifting the
context to the state of Mississippi during the summer of 1964, chapter two then explained

151

the increased intensity of movement activities as well as the segregationists’ response to
those activities. Highlighting the perspectives of both state Democratic parties (the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and the regular Mississippi Democratic Party),
chapter two then described the context from each party’s perspective as they prepared for
the 1964 Democratic National Convention. Finally, this chapter concluded by resituating
the historical context of this event within the rhetorical dimensions of the debate.
In chapter three, the reader was given a detailed description and analysis of the
affirmative case (the MFDP testimony). This chapter began with a description of the
context including some of the key events during the summer of 1964 as well as the details
of the national convention from the perspective of the MFDP. Following this description,
a detailed account of the witnesses who spoke on behalf of the MFDP as well as the
rhetorical nuances of each witness’s testimony was provided. Chapter three then
systematically traced for the reader, the arguments forwarded by the MFDP through a
detailed analysis of their testimony. Using a problem-solution structure, this chapter
claimed that the MFDP witnesses used key terms (violence and representation) to
articulate the problems they faced in Mississippi and then used different key terms
(loyalty, support, and participation) to solve those problems by arguing in favor of their
seating at the national convention. Finally, this chapter concluded by arguing that while
the testimony offered by the MFDP was persuasive, it remained ineffectual because it
could not structural change the power relationships within the National Democratic Party.
Following the affirmative case, chapter four provided the reader with a detailed
description and analysis of the response testimony of the Mississippi delegation debate.
Split into two parts, the first part examined the testimony offered by the regular
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Mississippi Democratic Party, while the second part examined the rebuttal testimony
offered by Mr. Joseph Rauh, Jr. on behalf of the MFDP and the closing statement offered
Mr. E.K. Collins on behalf of the regulars. Part one of chapter four began by reminding
the reader of the context in which the regulars spoke including the events that shaped
their position and the details that led up to the national convention from their perspective.
Following this description, part one of this chapter analyzed the testimony offered by the
regulars that showed how key terms guided their testimony by suggesting that history and
past precedent were grounds for their seating at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention. Finally, part one of this chapter concluded by arguing that while the
testimony offered by the regulars was not persuasive, it was effective because it reminded
the credentials committee of the power relationships within the National Democratic
Party.
Part two of chapter four began with an explanation of the context of the rebuttal
testimony. Following this description, part two of this chapter summarized and analyzed
the MFDP’s position as it was presented by Mr. Rauh in response to the testimony
offered by the regulars. Then, part two of chapter four summarized and analyzed the
regulars’ position through the closing statement offered by Mr. Collins that concluded the
delegation debate. Finally, part two of this chapter concluded by summarizing the
context of the Mississippi delegation debate at the conclusion of the testimony offered by
both sides.
Interpretation of the Findings
What emerges from this historical moment is an interesting rhetorical situation.
From the perspective of the MFDP, there was a rhetorical exigency that needed to be
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addressed through the delegation debate discourse. To this end, the witnesses who
testified on behalf of the MFDP used a problem-solution structure. Beginning with the
problem, MFDP witnesses testified to two issues signified by the key terms of violence
and representation. Here, the key term of violence functioned to explain the hostility and
brutality that both local blacks and sympathetic whites faced as they fought for civil
rights in Mississippi. Defining the violence they faced even further, the testimony
offered by the MFDP was focused in two ways: (1) the increased intensity and severity
of violent acts against them and (2) the ways in which the power structures within the
state of Mississippi supported these acts. Adding weight to the issue of violence, MFDP
witnesses also focused their testimony around the issue of representation. Using the key
term of representation in this aspect of this case, they argued that blacks did not have a
voice in their own state government. To support this claim, they argued that: (1) the
voter registration laws in Mississippi were against them and (2) they were not allowed to
participate in the regular Mississippi Democratic Party. Moreover, they generalized this
aspect of their argument by drawing on the American dream and then argued that the
nation was not living up to its promise.
Having adequately shown that a problem existed, the witnesses of the MFDP then
argued that the solution to these problems was the seating of the MFDP at the national
convention. Again focusing their testimony around key terms, they used these key terms
to guide the audience to their conclusion. Using the key terms of loyalty, support, and
participation, these terms did not function within the MFDP testimony as separate
components of their argument but instead work together. Beginning with the key term of
loyalty, MFDP witnesses argued that the MFDP would be loyal to both Lyndon Johnson
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and the National Democratic Party. Transitioning between the loyalty and support,
witnesses suggested that the MFDP’s loyalty would be observable, since they would be
working to get Lyndon Johnson elected as president. Then tying the election of Johnson
to the key term of support, witnesses testifying on behalf of the MFDP argued that they
would also support the national party, its platform, and its philosophies. Finally, the
MFDP witnesses drew larger connections to their argument by focusing the last aspect of
their testimony around the key term of participation. Using this term, they argued that
the MFDP’s participation as the delegation seated at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention would help blacks in Mississippi in two ways: (1) it would change the
situation in Mississippi by opening up the democratic process and (2) it would help the
nation live up to the promises it has made to all its citizens, thus making it a true
democracy.
While the witnesses who testified on behalf of the MFDP focused their testimony
around key terms, the regular Mississippi Democratic Party did not have the same burden
of proof when they presented their case, and as a result, the structure of their case is
slightly different. Instead their case is focused around three issues: (1) historical
precedent, (2) democratic protocol, and (3) the regular’s resolution. To begin, witnesses
testifying on behalf of the regulars argued that historical precedent gave them the right to
be seated at the national convention. Here, they argued that the regulars had been the
Democratic Party in Mississippi for almost 100 years and that their party was a creature
of the laws of the state. Pushing this issue further, they concluded this first aspect of their
case by stating that because they had been the Democratic Party in Mississippi for so
long that they had the right to be recognized and seated.

155

Moving to the second aspect of their argument, the regulars claimed that they
should be seated because they followed the democratic protocol. Using a parallel
structure to argue this part of their case, they began by explaining that they followed the
proper protocol by going through the process of precinct meetings to county conventions
to district meetings concluding with a state convention. They then stated that they had
selected forty-four delegates and twenty-two alternates as mandated by the National
Democratic Party. Moving to the other side of this part of their case, the regulars
simultaneously claimed that blacks in Mississippi participated in the regular party affairs,
and as a result, they did not have the right to invalidate the laws of Mississippi and the
voice of its citizens. Concluding the second aspect of their argument, the regulars argued
that they had complied with the legal requirement and therefore should be seated at the
national convention. Moving to the third aspect of their argument, the regulars argued
that their party passed a resolution that meant that as long as they were selected to
represent the state of Mississippi they would put the names of Lyndon Johnson and his
running-mate on the Mississippi ballot under the Democratic banner. With that
statement, the regulars concluded their testimony by comparing the two state Democratic
parties that claimed that if you believe in democracy you should seat the regulars and if
you do not believe in democracy then you should seat the MFDP.
While Mr. E. K. Collins had created the overarching argument of the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party, Mr. Ruble Griffin provided the evidence necessary to
make the case that the regulars should be seated on legal, technical grounds. He began
his testimony by arguing that Mississippi is a Democratic state, but that if the regulars
were not seated that the party would die. Using this as a framework to argue from, Mr.
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Griffin then claimed that the regular Mississippi Democratic Party was the only lawful
Democratic Party from the state. Using state statutes as evidence to support this claim he
argued that: (1) only one political party can use the name “democratic” and that that right
already belonged to the regulars, (2) that there is a proper procedure for organizing a
political party in Mississippi and that the MFDP did not follow it, and (3) that a citizen
can only participate in one political party to ensure the integrity of the system and that
many members of the MFDP had previously participated in regular party activities thus
making them unable to participate in the MFDP. Concluding his argument by returning
to the fear that the Democratic Party would die in Mississippi unless the regulars were
seated, Mr. Griffin concluded his testimony.
Following the regulars’ testimony, Mr. Rauh, counsel for the MFDP rebutted the
testimony of the regulars by addressing the specific points posited by their witnesses.
Mr. Rauh began by addressing objections: (1) that the MFDP and KKK were similar, (2)
that the MFDP did not hold precinct meetings in all eighty-two counties, (3) that
Mississippi blacks had the right to vote in the state, and (4) that members of the MFDP
were welcome to attend the regulars’ precinct meetings. Transitioning from addressing
the objections posed by the regulars, Mr. Rauh then argued in favor of the MFDP seating
through a series of claims that guide the audience toward the necessary conclusion. Mr.
Rauh first argued that: (1) the regular Mississippi Democratic Party was not legal, (2) the
state laws were clear, (3) the regulars were not loyal, (4) history was repeating itself, and
(5) the regulars would not support Lyndon Johnson’s nomination. Moving to his second
argument, Mr. Rauh the compared the MFDP to the regulars by claiming that: (1) the
MFDP was a legal party, (2) the MFDP members had done the best they could with
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regard to holding meetings in the eighty-two counties, and (3) the MFDP members did
everything they could and then some to show support for the national party. Turning the
issue to the credentials committee, Mr. Rauh closed his rebuttal by calling the audience
into action.
Having lost any momentum they had going into the hearing, Mr. Collins offered a
closing statement on behalf of the regular Mississippi Democratic Party that he focused
by addressing one objection and making two claims. He began by claiming that 63,000
blacks were voting in Mississippi only to be corrected by Chairman Lawrence that the
MFDP stated that 63,000 blacks were registered. Arguing that if they were registered
then they were not voting for their own people, he moved on to his first claim. That is,
that the regulars had never voted Republican, Mr. Collins used questionable evidence to
support this claim, and then moved to his second claim. Here, Mr. Collins claimed that
loyalty was attached to the regulars because they had the highest number of
Congressional Medal of Honor winners per capita of any state. Having adequately
attempted to detract from the MFDP’s argument, Mr. Collins concluded his statement by
claiming that there was no legal evidence offered by the MFDP to support their position
only emotions.
Thus, what emerged from this historical moment was an interesting rhetorical
situation. For members of the MFDP there was a rhetorical exigency that needed to be
addressed through the discourse of the delegation debate. While their arguments were
persuasive in terms of changing the attitudes of the credentials committee members,
ultimately their discourse was rendered ineffectual. This was because of the institutional
constraints of the National Democratic Party. Although members of the MFDP may have
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struggled to understand this point at the national convention, the regulars understood it
well. As a result, their argumentative style was different from the MFDP’s. Instead of
arguing from the point of rhetorical exigency, the regulars focused their testimony by
reminding the credentials committee of the realities of the current power relationships in
the National Democratic Party. In the end, the regulars were effective because they were
able to remind their audience what was at stake.
For those of us who study discourse and believe that it has the power to create
change, this debate is a hard lesson. Although there are times—such as the Mississippi
delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic National Convention—when discourse and
debate are not enough that does not necessarily mean the debate is over. In some cases
such as this one, it was just the beginning.
As such, the Mississippi delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention became a turning point in the U.S. civil rights movement. After losing the
delegation challenge, members of the MFDP returned to Mississippi disappointed and
disillusioned (Mills 132-3). Responding to these feelings some recommitted themselves
to grassroots efforts in the local context. Others left the movement angry, and still others
became far more radical in their thoughts. Moreover, Kay Mills rightly pointed out that,
The Mississippi challenge had wide impact, positive and negative. It ultimately
opened the state party to black participation and encouraged a different breed of
white politician to seek office. The MFDP didn’t want those two seats in 1964,
but it opened many more seats at future national conventions. Its challenge was
one more link in a chain of events that brought black Americans and then women,
Latinos, and Asian Americans into fuller political participation. There had been
civil rights debates at national conventions before, but this one reached directly
into American homes because of the emerging power of television (132).
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While members of the MFDP returned home unsatisfied with the results of the
delegation debate. Lyndon Johnson did accomplish what he said he would just four years
later at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Illinois. Many of the
people who were members of the MFDP in 1964 had become a part of the political
structures in Mississippi by 1968 and were selected as delegates to the national
convention. Thus, it seems that the Mississippi delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic
National Convention not only influenced the trajectory of the larger civil rights
movement in significant ways, it also contributed to changing the face of national party
politics in the United States.
Limitations of the Study
While the purpose of this dissertation was to analyze the arguments of the
Mississippi delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic National Convention in order to
more fully understand the rhetorical situation, this study was limited by both the scope
and depth of this project. First, the scope of this project was limited to the transcript of
the delegation debate and the context provided by historical accounts and oral history
interviews with four participants. Second, this study focused solely on the 1964
Mississippi delegation debate and did not include an analysis of other state delegation
debates that occurred at the credentials committee nor did this study take into
consideration the events that followed the hearing. Third, this study analyzed the
arguments of the Mississippi delegation debate by first situating those arguments within
the rhetorical context. Then by assessing the debate discourse through a close reading of
the text that examined how the discourse responded to an exigency. While this approach
anchored this study, other approaches may yield different results. Finally, this study was
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limited by the memories of the participants who were interviewed as well as the
information available from the perspective of the regular Mississippi Democratic Party.
Although, the transcript of the 1964 Mississippi delegation debate is preserved at
the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas, the National
Democratic Party has copyright of the text. While other researchers who have studied
this debate have also relied on this text, I know that the three major networks during that
time (ABC, CBS, and NBC) were present at the hearing and recorded the testimony
offered. This leads me to wonder if other accounts of this hearing still exist and if those
accounts might not offer a different perspective that would enhance the analysis of this
object of study. Additionally, the context of this study primarily focused on historical
accounts and the oral history interviews of four participants. While there had been much
written about the historical context of this time period, there is still more work to be done
and as such is a limitation of this study. Moreover, I feel extremely fortunate to have had
the opportunity to speak with four participants of the Mississippi delegation debate
including:


Rita Schwerner-Bender whose husband was murdered for his involvement in the
Mississippi civil rights movement during the summer of 1964 and who testified at
the delegation challenge on his behalf;



Bob Moses who was the director of the summer project, traveled with the MFDP
to Atlantic City, New Jersey, and was present at the credentials committee
hearing;
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Lawrence Guyot who was chairman of the MFDP and did not traveled to Atlantic
City because he had been arrested days before because he asked a police officer
what the charge against another activist was who was being arrested;



Former Vice President Walter Mondale who had been a delegate from the state of
Minnesota, was a member of the credentials committee, and head of the subcommittee charged with finding a solution to the Mississippi delegation challenge
that would meet President Johnson’s expectations.

While the opportunity to speak with these four participants illuminated the context and
object of my study, I also realize that additional participant perspectives may have
enhanced or challenge the context that this project provides.
Moving beyond the scope of this project, the object of this study was the
Mississippi delegation debate at the 1964 Democratic National Convention. Although
this sustained focus on the Mississippi challenge allowed me to dig more deeply into the
particular arguments and rhetorical nuances of this debate, there were other delegation
challenges including the states of Alabama and Oregon as well as Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands. While this project focused on the Mississippi delegation debate adding
the other delegation challenges heard at the 1964 Democratic National Convention
credentials committee hearing might provide alternative points of view that might lead to
different results.
In addition, this study analyzed the arguments of the Mississippi delegation
debate by situating those arguments within the rhetorical context and by analyzing the
debate discourse through a close reading of the text. By closing reading the arguments of
the delegation debate, this study examined how the discourse responded to an exigency.
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While this approach anchored this study, I also understand that differing approaches may
yield different results. Therefore, my approach to this study does limit the analysis
offered.
Finally, as previously mentioned, this study used oral history interviews with four
participants to enhance the context traditionally offered by historians about this particular
moment in history. While interviewing additional participants might enhance or
challenge my findings, the issue of accuracy was also a limitation of this study. Since the
event occurred in 1964, the memories of participants in 2010 and 2011 could be
questioned. I believe that the opportunity to speak with these participants and use their
memories of their experiences in my study was worth the risk of memory accuracy. I
have taken this limitation into account and have tried to cross-reference the information I
obtained from these interviews against the information I have obtained from other
interviews as well as the primary and secondary sources materials available to me.
Additionally because of the nature of this topic, there has been much written about this
time period that is sympathetic to the experience and viewpoint of local activists and
volunteers. While these studies are important and contribute to the substantial body of
literature, there has not been as much written about the segregationists’ point of view or
the regular Mississippi Democratic Party. Although I have tried to find as many sources
as possible, this area of my research was limited by the small amount of scholarship
conducted from this point of view.
Suggestions for Future Research
One suggestion for future research is to search for additional text(s) and/or video
footage of the 1964 Mississippi delegation debate. Additional text(s) would provide
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opportunities for deeper analysis as well as the option to compare texts to see how they
are similar and different. Moreover, video footage provided by one or more of the
national networks present at the credentials committee hearing would provide visual
images and sound recordings that could enhance the object of study.
Another suggestion for future research would be to interview additional
participants. While I spoke to key participants in this rhetorical event, there were many
delegates that represented the MFDP and regular party delegations as well as 110members of the credentials committee. Adding additional voices to what has already
been said would further enhance this research, while also making it more reliable.
A third suggestion for further research would be to include the entire transcript
from the 1964 Democratic National Convention credentials committee hearing. This
expanded analysis might focus less on the Mississippi delegation debate, but it would
provide an opportunity to analyze and critique this moment in history as well as the
issues at stake during this particular national convention. In addition, further research
might also use alternative approaches to offer different points of view. Finally, future
research might also examine this rhetorical event within the context of the larger
trajectory of the MFDP as a state political party. This focus might be especially fruitful,
since just four years after the 1964 Mississippi delegation debate, many of the MFDP
delegates were seated at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Illinois as
representatives of the state of Mississippi.
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Appendix 1: Cast of Characters
Vince Brocardo

An attorney from Clarksdale, Mississippi.

James Chaney

A local black man and civil rights activist
from Meridian, Mississippi. In June, James
Chaney and two others were arrested in
Philadelphia, Mississippi after visiting the
site of a church bombing. Upon their
release, the three men went missing. In
early August their bodies were found in an
earthen dam after a FBI confidential
informant told them where to look.

E.K. Collins

A state Senator from Mississippi who
testified on behalf of the regular Mississippi
Democratic Party as the National
Committeeman.

Richard Daley

The Governor and head of the Illinois
delegation at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

Foster S. Davis

A reporter from the Delta Democrat Times
newspaper who covered the area of
Greenville, Mississippi.

Cartha DeLoach

The assistant FBI director in 1964.

James O. Eastland

A U.S. Senator who represented the state of
Mississippi in 1964.

James Farmer

A civil rights activist and leader of the civil
rights organization, the Congress on Racial
Equality who testified on behalf of the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

Barry Goldwater

A U.S. Senator who represented the state of
Arizona and was the Republican presidential
nominee in 1964.
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Andrew Goodman

A Summer Project volunteer from New
York. He had just finished the first
orientation session in Oxford, Ohio and was
asked to visit the site of a church bombing
when he arrived in Mississippi. Andrew
Goodman and two others were arrested in
Philadelphia, Mississippi. Upon their
release, the three men went missing. In
early August their bodies were found in an
earthen dam after a FBI confidential
informant told them where to look.

Ruble Griffin

The Assistant Attorney General of
Mississippi who testified on behalf of the
regular Mississippi Democratic Party at the
1964 Democratic National Convention.

Fannie Lou Hamer

A member of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party and sharecropper from
Ruleville, Mississippi. She testified on
behalf of the MFDP at the 1964 Democratic
National Convention.

Aaron Henry

A member of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party and local chapter
President of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People from
Clarksdale, Mississippi. He testified on
behalf of the MFDP at the 1964 Democratic
National Convention.

Eleanor K. Holmes

A member of Joseph Rauh, Jr.’s legal team
for the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party challenge.

Richard Hughes

The Governor and head of the New Jersey
delegation at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

Hubert Humphrey

A U.S. Senator who represented the state of
Minnesota. He became Lyndon Johnson’s
running-mate during the 1964 presidential
campaign.
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Appendix 1: Cast of Characters
H. Miles Jaffe

A member of Joseph Rauh, Jr.’s legal team
for the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party challenge.

Paul B. Johnson

The Governor of Mississippi in 1964 and the
leader of the regular state Democratic Party.

Edwin King

A member of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party and minister at Tougaloo
College in Jackson, Mississippi. He testified
on behalf of the MFDP at the 1964
Democratic National Convention.

Martin Luther King, Jr.

A civil rights activist and leader of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference
who testified on behalf of the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party.

David Lawrence

The Governor and head of the Pennsylvania
delegation at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

James C. Moore

A Reverend affiliated with the National
Council of Churches who read Reverend
Robert Spike’s testimony.

Robert Moses

Director of the Summer Project and civil
rights activist in Mississippi.

Joseph Rauh, Jr.

An attorney for the United Auto Workers of
America and counsel for the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party at the 1964
Democratic National Convention.

Walter Reuther

The President of the United Auto Workers
of America and friend of President Lyndon
Johnson.

Donald Russell

The Democratic Governor of South
Carolina.
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Appendix 1: Cast of Characters
Michael Schwerner

A civil rights activist from New York, he
had come with his wife (Rita) to Mississippi
to participate in the Summer Project. In
June, Michael Schwerner and two others
were arrested in Philadelphia, Mississippi
after visiting the site of a church bombing.
Upon their release, the three men went
missing. In early August their bodies were
found in an earthen dam after a FBI
confidential informant told them where to
look.

Rita Schwerner-Bender

A civil rights activist from New York whose
husband was murder during the Summer
Project, she testified on behalf of the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party at
the 1964 Democratic National Convention.

Robert Spike

The Executive Director of the National
Council of Churches Commission on
Religion and Race who testified on behalf of
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

John C. Stennis

A U.S. Senator who represented the state of
Mississippi in 1964.

Walter Tillow

A civil rights activist who worked with Ella
Baker in the Washington, D.C. offices of the
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.

Oscar Townsend

An attorney in Indianola, Mississippi and
Chairman of the County Democratic
Executive Committee.

Roy Wilkins

A civil rights activist and leader of the
National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People who testified on behalf of
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.
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Appendix 2: Chart of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Arguments

Problems

Blacks and sympathetic
whites face violence and
brutality for their civil rights
activities (especially voter
registration).

The severity
of violence
and brutality
is increasing.

Mississippi blacks do not
have a voice in their state’s
government.

The power structures
in the state support
violent activity
(instead of stopping
it).
The state
voter
registration
laws
prevent
blacks from
voting.

Blacks and
sympathetic
whites are
not allowed
to participate
in the regular
Mississippi
Democratic
Party
activities.

Because they were not allowed to participate in the
democratic process in Mississippi, the MFDP argued that
the nation was not living up to its promises.
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Appendix 2: Chart of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party Arguments

Solution = seat the MFDP at the
1964 DNC.

The MFDP should be seated
because their delegates will be
loyal to the national party and to
President Johnson.

They will support
the National
Democratic Party
platform and its
philosophies.

The MFDP should be seated
because their delegates will
participate in the democratic
process.

They will work
to get Lyndon
Johnson elected.

This action will
change the
situation in
Mississippi
because it will
shift the power
balance.
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This action will
help the nation
to live up to its
promises.

Appendix 3: Chart of the Regular Mississippi Democratic Party Arguments

E.K. Collins: The regular
Mississippi Democratic
Party should be seated at
the 1964 DNC.

The regulars should be
seated because of
historical precedent.
The regulars
should be seated
because they
followed the
proper protocol.

They have
been the
Democratic
Party in
Mississippi
for almost
100 years.

The
citizens of
Mississippi
have the
right to
have their
delegates
recognized
and seated.

The resolution
means that the
Democratic Party’s
nominee for
President and Vice
President will
appear on the
ballot in
Mississippi if the
regulars are seated.

The regular
Mississippi
Democratic
Party is a
creature of
the state’s
laws.

They held precinct
meetings, county
caucuses, district
conventions, and a
state convention.
The regular
Mississippi
Democratic
Party has
existed since
Reconstruction.

The regulars
should be seated
because they
passed a
resolution.

They
selected 44
delegates
and 22
alternates.

Blacks participated
in the regular
Mississippi
Democratic Party.

The do not have
the right to
invalidate
Mississippi laws
and the voice of
its citizens.

The regulars complied with legal
requirements and should be seated.
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Appendix 3: Chart of the Regular Mississippi Democratic Party Arguments

Ruble Griffin: The regular
Mississippi Democratic Party
should be seated.

The state of Mississippi is a
Democratic state.

The regular Mississippi
Democratic Party is the
only lawful Democratic
political party from
Mississippi.

If the regular party is not
seated than the National
Democratic Party will die.

State statute
3107-01:
only one
political
party can use
the
democratic
name.

State statute:
must follow the
proper protocol
to organize a
political party.
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State statute 3129: if
you participate in
one political party,
then you must
remain a participant
in that political party
(to ensure the
integrity of the
system).

Appendix 4: Chart of Mr. Rauh’s Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party

Part I: Addressing Objections

Addressing
objection #2: The
MFDP did not hold
precinct meetings in
all 82 counties in
Mississippi because
of the violence they
faced.

Addressing
objection #1: The
MFDP is not the
same as the KKK.

Resituates the debate by
describing how differently
the regulars talk at the
national convention by
comparison to the way
they talk at home.

Addressing objection #3:
Blacks do not have the right
to vote because the regulars
create and enforce the state
laws.

Addressing objection #4: We
did not concoct these stories
and we were not allowed to
participate in the regular
Mississippi Democratic Party.
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Appendix 4: Chart of Mr. Rauh’s Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party

Part II: Making an Argument

Claim #1: Their party
is not legal.

Claim #2: The laws
in Mississippi are
clear.

Claim #4: History is
repeating itself.

Claim #5:
The MFDP is
a legal
political party.

Claim #7: The regulars
will not support Lyndon
Johnson’s candidacy.

Claim #3: The
regulars are not
loyal to the
National
Democratic
Party.

Claim #6: We
have done the best
we could
(considering the
circumstances).

Claim #8: We did
everything we could and
then some.

Part III: Concluding Statement

Mr. Rauh turns the
Mississippi delegation issue
to the credentials committee.

Then he calls them to
act on the MFDP’s
behalf.
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Appendix 5: Chart of Mr. Collins’ Rebuttal Testimony on Behalf of the Regular
Mississippi Democratic Party
Part I: Addressing an Objection

Addressing Objection #1: If
63,000 blacks are registered
then they are not voting.

Part II: Making an Argument

Argument #1: Mississippi has
never voted Republican.

Argument #2: We are loyal
because we have the highest
number of Congressional Medal
of Honor winners per capita of
any state.

Conclusion: There is no
evidence legal or otherwise
offered by the MFDP only
emotions.
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Appendix 6: Outline of the 1964 Mississippi Delegation Debate


Lawrence gives the order of testimony—the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party (MFDP) will go first followed by the regular Mississippi Democratic Party
(MDP).



Rauh situates MFDP testimony through “the story of terror and tragedy in
Mississippi” (DNC 20).



Rauh describes MFDP as “the loyal, legal, and long-suffering body of
Mississippi” (DNC 21).



Dr. Aaron Henry’s testimony:
1. State injunction against MFDP, which attempted to prevent their
attendance at the Convention.
 But, if jail is the price to pay to benefit: 1) America, 2) National
Party, and 3) Mississippi, “then nothing could be more
redemptive” (DNC 21).
 Since arrival, the injunction was modified.
2. MFDP position = loyalty to National Party and to work for Johnson’s
election.
 Defines what support of the National Party means (supporting its
philosophy, platform, and nominees).
 Claim: supporting the National Party means supporting America
and Mississippi.
3. The image of America is tied to the images of each state (including
Mississippi).
 Need to address the power structures that create Mississippi’s
image.
4. Shifting to murders of Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman, Henry uses
quotes from Governor Johnson and Lieutenant Governor Gartin.
5. Describes power structure as having “an affinity for the bottom” (DNC
23).
 Uses examples of economic and educational picture in the state.
 Continues by describing the justice system.
 Uses quotes from Collins to expand understanding of terror
through church bombings and murder.
 Claim: “on them is the blood and the responsibly for this reign of
terror” (DNC 23).
6. Shifts to description of MFDP members attempting to join the regular
party.
 Attempts to join precinct meetings and the regulars’ tactics used to
deny access.
 Conclusions: 450,000 blacks over 21 would vote for Johnson if
allowed to vote (DNC 25).
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7. The organizing of the MFDP including meetings (precinct, state, etc.) and
who the party is open to (all people).
 Reiterates the MFDP’s support of the National Party, its
philosophy, platform, and candidates.
 Then, contrasts the regulars as “repudiated the National
Democratic Party” (DNC 26).
8. Shifts to the character of the regulars.
 States that many are members of the White Citizens Council, Ku
Klux Klan, and the Society for the Preservation of the White Race
(DNC 26).
 Uses Governor Johnson’s quote to show that the regulars see
themselves as separate from the National Party.
 Explains that Governor Johnson, Senators Stennis and Eastland,
and all congressman are absent from hearing, but that Johnson is
manipulating the “Joe Doakes delegation” (DNC 27).
9. Concluding remarks:
 Equates seating of MFDP to the Boston Tea Party
 Addresses the audience (send telegrams to your state’s democratic
delegates).
 Reminds committee members that “the hopes, the dreams, and the
desires of many Americans will ride on your decision here today”
(DNC 28).
10. Finished by reciting a Langston Hughes poem.


Question #1 from Sherwin Markman (IA): Is the MFDP effort at the Convention
to dramatize the exclusion of blacks from Party affairs?



Response from Aaron Henry: In part, but MFDP has a desire to participate in
National Party.



Question #2 from Markman (IA): Would not the best thing the Convention could
do be to improve the situation of discrimination in Mississippi?



Response from Aaron Henry: Reiteration of MFDP position.



Question #3 from Markman (IA): In the long-run there can only be one party, so
is not the best solution be to open up the regular party?



Response from Aaron Henry: Okay.



Question #4 from Markman (IA): If the convention took steps to open the regular
party would not that be a constructive step?



Response from Aaron Henry: Yes.
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Question #5 from Markman (IA): So, then the issue is not seating at the
convention, but the ending of prejudice within the regular party?



Response from Aaron Henry: Resituates question in the electability of Johnson
for President.



Rauh shifts the Q & A by asking Henry: Is not the MFDP already open to
everyone (and therefore implies seating the MFDP will address all the problems),
which Henry agrees with.



Reverend Edwin King testimony:
1. King creates credibility to speak by defining himself as a: 1) white
Mississippian, 2) native Mississippian, and 3) national committeeman
for the MFDP.
 Explanation of space stating that he is from Vicksburg, his wife
is from Jackson, and they live in Jackson now.
 Uses personal timeline to explain why he lives in Mississippi
(“to work for a free society in Mississippi” (DNC 33)).
2. King explains that there aren’t many white Mississippians working for
civil rights because of their fear.
 He testifies to knowing many who have been forced to leave
the state (“this nation is being populated with refugees from the
closed society in Mississippi” (DNC 33)).
 Those who work for civil rights face more than social
ostracism (losing jobs); they face home and church bombings.
 He adds personal experience.
 Story #1—Canton to Jackson car ride ended in beating, but not
death.
 Addresses power structure, stating that they reported the
incident to the Mississippi State Highway Patrol and county
sheriff both refused to do anything.
 Conclusion: “The Mississippi Democratic Party brags that it
controls the State of Mississippi. It certainly controls the
police of Mississippi” (DNC 34).
3. Transitions from why there are so few whites in the MFDP to the issue
of who represents the National Party.
 Contrasts MDP with the MFDP.
 MDP is illegal, rejecting national affiliation, while controlling
the state.
 MDP refused MFDP participation and is the group who writes
and enforces the voter registration laws.
 MDP aides in “the reign of terror in our state” (DNC 35).
 Uses this statement to shift to the MFDP and explain why they
did not hold precinct meetings/county conventions everywhere
in Mississippi (references murder of Schwerner, Chaney, and
Goodman).
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Story #2—Kennedy bumper sticker to explain the Mississippi
power structure.
4. Returns to over-arching argument (stated by Henry): we need the
Democratic Party in Mississippi and Democrats who are loyal so that
we can maximize cooperation to help Johnson win (DNC 36).
 Uses open/closed metaphor to contrast MFDP to MDP where
MFDP is open to the National Party, etc., while the MDP
embraced “the closed society” philosophy.
 Shifts meaning of open, stating “The regular Mississippi Party
is open only to cooperation with Republicans of Mississippi…”
(DNC 37).
 Contextualizes the MFDP inception in unity of message and
action that is rooted in duties and responsibilities of American
citizenship.


Lawrence asks for questions, seeing none attempts to frame the issue of seating
around “election machinery.”



Rauh disagrees claiming that “it is the very terror that these people are living
through that is the reason that Negroes aren’t voting” (DNC 39).



Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer’s testimony:
1. Story #1—voter registration “to try to become first-class citizens”
(DNC 40).
 Addresses the power structure through the process of literacy
test and pulling over the bus.
 She shares that she was a timekeeper and sharecropper for
eighteen years to explain her dedication and loyalty before
returning to the inherent power structure (the reaction of the
plantation owner to her attempting to register).
2. Topic transition from voter registration to brutality by explaining that
sixteen bullets were fired for her.
 Explains that when you attempt to register to vote your name is
printed in your local newspaper for at least two weeks.
3. Story #2—Winona jail.
 She tells the story shifting between her experiences and “the
other” experiences.
 Does not have to say “this is what the power structure in
Mississippi does” her story shows it very dramatically.
4. Transitions into enthymematic argument by identifying with her
audience through the murder of Medgar Evers.
 Asks rhetorical question that leads the audience to connect the
MFDP seating with the ideals of American democracy.
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E.K. Collins objects to the next MFDP witness because she is not a Mississippian,
she is not in Mississippi, and she is being used to prejudice the committee against
the regulars.



Rauh responds by using a Collins quote that connects to Mrs. Schwerner.



Collins claims Rauh does not say what year the quote was said and continues
objection.



Lawrence states that the committee members are capable of distilling the
testimony to the pertinent issues.



Mrs. Rita Schwerner’s testimony:
1. Begins by tying her identity to her husband’s.
 Explains why they came to Mississippi and her husband’s
role in the formation of the MFDP.
2. Describes her husband’s disappearance.
 Explaining that she was in Oxford, Ohio at the Summer
Project Orientation.
 Returning two-days after their disappearance, she
attempted to get help: 1) Mississippi’s Governor’s Office
and 2) Governor’s Mansion.
3. When the bodies were found (two and a half weeks ago), she
claims the federal not state authorities informed her.
 She explains that she is not been allowed to see any official
report on the condition of the bodies, or any other official
report, and a death certificate has not been issued.



A committee member claims that the committee cannot see the witness because of
the press.



Lawrence tells the witnesses they can stand if they want to.



Reverend Robert Spike’s testimony read by Reverend James C. Moore:
1. Speaking in the absence of Dr. Robert W. Spike.
2. Defines the organization he represents (The National Council of
Churches) as encouraging and supporting civil rights law.
 Explains the organization’s relationship to the Summer
Project.
3. From an outside perspective, Spike suggests a position of
objectivity.
 Barring witness to life in Mississippi including
disenfranchisement and harassment.
 Observed inception of MFDP (precinct meetings and State
convention).

185

4. Claims that the creation of the MFDP is “nothing less than the
most dramatic grassroots development of responsible citizenship in
our time” (DNC 50).
 Claims that the MFDP is the inspired response of people
seeking citizenship.
 That “inspired response” takes the form of a voice
(metaphor) that needs to be legitimized at the hearing so
that it can be heard.


Mr. James Farmers’ testimony:
1. Identifies the MFDP’s historical position to the Underground
Railroad and then shifts it to above ground.
 Railroad seeks to bring/lead people into not out of the
south.
 MFDP is the only way blacks will gain political expression
or representation.
 Seating of the MFDP will not only be real politics, but also
symbolic of the Party’s intentions.
2. Addresses Goldwater’s nomination through the conception of
loyalty, then argues that Johnson will only win if Democrats stand
together and show they are more loyal.
 Regulars won’t; MFDP will.
3. Uses the imagery of “the eyes watching” to add intensity to the
committee’s decision.



Dr. Roy Wilkins’ testimony:
1. Representing the voice of 2,810 delegates from the 55th Annual
NAACP convention that asks for the MFDP seating.
 Resituates issue of representation to suggest that the MFDP
needs to be seated for a brighter national future in
Mississippi and beyond.
 Speaking to the audience, he reminds them that to be
represented the citizens of Mississippi must have a voice.
 He creates a hierarchy: 1) political rule; 2) rule of morality
(the rule of morality is higher than the political rule).
2. Shifts issue by comparing the challenge to the colonists declaration
of their independence from Great Britain.
 Concluding that our 1st loyalty is to America (and her
ideals).



Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s testimony:
1. Claims that Mississippi has gone to more extremes than any other
state to prevent blacks from voting.
 MFDP comes to the National Democratic Party seeking
“desperate moral appeal for recognition and
representation…” (DNC 54).
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Explains MFDP suffering through the conception of
striving for the American dream.
2. Calls into question “the very idea of representative government…”
 Uses argument from space to challenge the expansion of
freedom around the world, while forgetting to secure it at
home.
 MFDP = only democratically constituted delegation from
Mississippi.
3. Defines the debate as a choice.
 Using repetition of “This is the party…” to describe the
regulars as 1) needing federal troops for one black man to
attend a state university, 2) those who registered black
voters at a slow crawl, 3) those who promote violence and
lawlessness, and 4) those pledged to defy the DNC
platform.
 Shifts argument saying that if you value your party, nation,
and future, there is no choice/alternativeÆ must seat the
MFDP.
4. Claims that seating the MFDP has symbolic value.
 Show the world “the intention of this country to bring
freedom and democracy to all people” (DNC 57).


Rauh asks the MFDP to stand and asks for remaining 15 minutes to be used to
rebuttal.



Leventhal says no.



Rauh registers an objection and appeals to the committee for help stating that the
regulars are notorious for saying one thing at DNC’s and another in Mississippi.



Lawrence claims Rauh can apply for rebuttal time if needed.



Green (OR) joins Rauh’s objection stating that the Oregon delegation was told the
same thing.



Leventhal disagrees.



Diggs (MI) makes a motion.



Green (OR) seconds the motion.



Diggs (MI) moves the committee.



Lawrence asks Rauh if he has concluded direct testimony.



Rauh says yes except for fifteen minutes to be used during rebuttal.
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Lawrence claims the committee wants to be fair and agreeable.



Rauh agrees.



Diggs (MI) asks about his motion, but Lawrence claims it has been worked out
and moves to the regulars’ testimony.



Mr. E.K. Collins’ testimony:
1. The regulars come to the convention without malign as the party
that has represented Mississippi for almost 100 years.
 We have supported democratic nominees all but two times.
 It is an honor to be selected to represent the MDP as
recognized and seated party from the state as the DNC.
2. MDP is “a creature of the Constitution of Mississippi and of its
legislature” (DNC 61).
 The statues governing the creation of a political party in
Mississippi are plain and explicit and the MDP was
organized under those statutes.
 The MDP elected an executive committee following the
National Party guidelines through precinct, county, and
district conventions to the state convention.
 Categorically denies that blacks were barred from attending
precinct and county conventions (some were elected at
precinct conventions and they participated fully).
 Collins concludes that “the Democratic Party of Mississippi
has complied with all the legal requirements, and I submit
that the Mississippi Delegation is entitled to be given its
credentials and seated” (DNC 63).
 Speaking directly to the committee, Collins warns them
that they do not have the right to invalidate state statutes or
ignore the voice of the majority of Mississippi citizens.
3. We are not going to engage in debating the testimony of abuse
upon the state of Mississippi.
 We have the delegates elected by the people of Mississippi.
4. Addresses objection that the MDP will not vote or put the
democratic nominees on the ticket.
 We passed a resolution at the state convention guaranteeing
that “the regular National Democratic electors will be
placed on a ballot under the heading of whomever this
Convention selects as the Democratic President and Vice
President, and they will have a chance, the people of the
state of Mississippi, to vote for those people” (DNC 64).
5. The laws in Mississippi are simple and have existed since
reconstruction.
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They explain how the parties will operate, how people are
selected to county and state offices as well as how
delegates are selected to precinct, county, and district
caucuses and the state convention as prescribed by the
National Party.
 The Assistant Attorney General will be the regulars’ only
witness.
 Asks a rhetorical question: will you seat the only lawfully
constituted delegation or throw democracy to the wind?
6. “The attacks upon the people of Mississippi were savagely
conceived without its borders…” (DNC 65).
 We know that the MFDP is supported by known
communists.
 These “attacks” are designed to divide the people of
Mississippi and the nation to discredit the nation in the
world.
 The MFDP is attacking the MDP not because of some
alleged abuse of rights, but the actions “of a group of
dissatisfied, power-hungry soreheads” (DNC 66).
7. The MFDP challenge is not about the abuse or denial of rights, but
to grab power.
 If this convention disregards the state laws and seats the
MFDP, then the convention system is dead.
 In this situation those in charge can just announce who they
want to come to the convention from each state.
 In a party of the people, there will always be disagreement,
but this must occur.
 The states that supposedly support the MFDP have not
“been under a heavy, continuous propaganda barrage, as
has Mississippi…” (DNC 67).
 To deny the MDP seating is “to offer them upon a political
cross, not to save this country but to divide it” (DNC 67).
 If the National Party seats the MFDP causing the MDP to
die, then we can erect a monument at the state capital
stating that people outside the state killed the party of our
fathers at the 1964 DNC.
 Concludes, we are here not to apologize, “but to ask that
we be given a fair hearing on the law and the facts, and not
by some explosive, some story that is concocted simply to
cause an unwarranted action” (DNC 68).


Question #1 from Virna Canson (CA): Is it in the best interest of the Democratic
Party to have representation (the Governor) elected by 20%?



Mr. Collins responds: Many more voted for the Mississippi Governor (guess
400,000).
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Expanding Question #1 from Canson (CA): She asks if the presidential election
is close, is this the type of voter turn-out to be expected from Mississippi? (i.e.
less than half the people registered actually voted in the gubernatorial election).



Mr. Collins responds: It does not matter which party you support, if they are
registered, you cannot make them vote.



Question #2 from Canson (CA): How many regulars are members of the White
Citizens Council, the KKK, or the Society for the Preservation of the White Race?



Collins responds: The KKK and the so-called MFDP are the only two
organizations that keep their rolls secret and operate outside of the law.



Canson redirects the question: Is the majority of your membership members of
one or more of these organizations?



Collins responds: I do not know, but I do not believe so.



Canson redirects the question again: Mr. Collins, are you a member of the KKK?



Collins responds: No, I am not a member of any of those organizations or the
MFDP.



Question #3 from Canson (CA): Would you welcome the MFDP into your
delegation?



Collins responds: No, because it is illegally constituted just like the KKK.



Question #1 from Mr. Rawlings: Asks for a brief (which was filed with the
committee and passed out to the credentials committee).



Question #1 from Mr. Frank Massey (IN): Are there 450,000 blacks in
Mississippi?



Collins responds: Somewhere in that vicinity.



Expanding question from Massey (IN): How many of these blacks are registered
to vote?



Collins responds: There is no color on the poll books.



Redirecting question from Massey (IN): Is 20,000 correct?



Collins responds: Many more than that.
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Question #2 from Massey (IN): Do all blacks of voting age have free access to
MDP?



Collins responds: Absolutely.



Question #1 from Mrs. Joyce Austin (NY): Do I understand your primary law
correctly that only the slate of electors voted by the majority will appear on the
ballot in November making your resolution at your last convention meaningless?



Collins responds: No, because the September primary has already been bypassed.
As a result, “the National Democratic Electors will go on the ballot without a
primary, representing the nominees of this Convention, pledged to them” (DNC
76).



Question #2 from Austin (NY): Was the state convention open to blacks and did
any attend?



Collins responds: They were observers.



Question #3 from Austin (NY): Were there any black delegates?



Collins responds: No, they were elected to the county convention, but not the
state convention. But, they were spectators.



Question #4 from Austin (NY): Is the MDP committed to a segregated society
and does not your platform call for the repeal of the civil rights act?



Collins responds: Yes, there was a resolution passed, but the party has no
platform, and the resolution is a matter for Congress.



Question #1 from Miss Davidson (CO): Do you have a copy of the resolution or
the motion passed terminating the convention? (And could you read it?)



Collins responds: Yes (and reads it).



Question #2 from Davidson (CO): What was the reasoning for terminating the
convention and reconvening in September?



Collins responds: It’s our custom.



Question #1 from Mrs. Barbara Sylvester (SC): Is the MDP contemplating
following Governor Wallace in forming a third Party after the November
election?



Collins responds: No.
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Mr. Ruble Griffin, Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi testimony:
1. I come here as a country lawyer who sympathizes with the
committees decision.
 He defines himself as an employee of the state and of the
State Attorney General, Joe Patterson, a true loyal
Democrat.
 Griffin claims he has never voted any ticket other than the
democratic ticket.
 Describes growing up on a small farm (rags to riches
story)Æ “That is why I am a Democrat” (DNC 81).
2. I hope to show you that the MDP is the only lawfully constituted
Democratic Party in the state of Mississippi.
 Statute provides that when one party registers a name
another party cannot use it.
 The regulars have been in existence since reconstruction.
 Uses the example of two Republican Party’s fighting to
represent the state and the statute was upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
 Other states have a similar statute including Wisconsin,
Minnesota, and Indiana.
3. The Act provides that to register your Party you must furnish the
name of your Executive Committeemen, the Chairman and
Secretary and after the convention you must provide your
Presidential electors and your state Executive Committee.
 But the MFDP only sent a letter to the Secretary of the
State of Mississippi, the Honorable Heber Ladner.
 This letter does not comply with the statute.
 The MFDP was “formed for a purpose of having a group to
represent the State of Mississippi with a National
Democratic Party and for no other purpose” (DNC 86).
 A political party should be more than a club that represents
your state with a National Party, it should get out and offer
candidates in their primaries from constable to governor
(every office).
 Fannie Lou Hamer ran for congressman against Jaime
Whitten and lost 681 votes to 35,218 votes (there are more
qualified blacks in Greenville than she received votesÆ
blacks did not vote for her).
 Victoria Jackson Gray ran for U.S. Senate against John C.
Stennis and lost 4,703 votes to 173,764 and the Circuit
Court of Hinds County (Jackson) that there are more
qualified black voters than Gray receivedÆ blacks did not
vote for her).
4. These people represent no one.
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If they represented a substantial segment of the population
and could prove we are guilty of the things they claim, then
you should seat them.
 But, we are not guilty of those things and they represent no
one.
5. Our statute describes how to organize a party and the four or five
steps necessary.
 It is a similar method to 25 other states including Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, etc.
 It explains the purpose of the convention including
delegates, etc. (DNC 89-90).
 The MFDP only held precinct meetings in 35 of the 82
counties in the state.
 The MFDP did not have a quorum to have a convention.
 The MFDP did not hold the state convention at 10am.
 Instead they held precinct meetings and county conventions
at the same time.
 A quorum at the state convention, according to the statute
equals two-thirds the number of members in the lower
house of the legislature, which is 122—and they didn’t
have that.
 Affidavits: Foster S. Davis, a reporter for the Delta
Democrat Times in Greenville who attended four precinct
conventions of the MFDP claims they “were not held by
secret ballot, but were held by open vote” (DNC 92).
 In addition, Davis claims that at those four precinct
meetings, “there was no attempt to determine whether the
participants therein were qualified electors under the laws
of the state of Mississippi” (DNC 92-3).
 Mr. Oscar Townsend of Indianola, chairmen of the County
Democratic Executive Committee received a letter from
Fannie Lou Hamer on June 18, 1964 claiming that she and
other blacks attended and participated in the MDP precinct
meeting.
 Townsend claims he remembers three or four black women
“appeared as such delegates and participated in the affairs
of the convention by making motions and voting on other
business that properly came before the convention” (DNC
94)
 A telegram came yesterday from Mr. Vince Brocardo who
stated that he and Dr. Henry attended the same precinct
meeting and both were put up as delegates to the county
convention, but Henry just got less votes and so Brocardo
went to the county convention.
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6. Section 3129 of our code claims that you have to be in accord with
the Party’s principles to participate in the Party’s affairs.
 The MFDP people voted in the primary, participated in
precinct meetings, and the leaders ran for office in the
regular Democratic Primary.
 But, then they went back on their pledge to the state law.
 The bottom line: 1) They did not organize properly, 2) they
will not be recognized in Mississippi, 3) they can put no
one’s name of the ballot (i.e. Johnson), and 4) there is an
injunction against them.
7. The injunction has changed slightly.
 When the brief for the hearing was create, the injunction
prohibited “these people” from using the word
“Democratic.”
 However, the injunction has been modified to allow “these
people” to come to Atlantic City.
8. They are not a registered party.
 They cannot be under our state statute which has been
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court twice.
 If they are seated, they cannot put Johnson’s name on the
ballot.
9. Please do not kill our Party.
 The South stands together from the Carolinas to Virginia
all the way to Texas.
 You will gain nothing by seating the MFDP, but you will
lose the MDP.


Mr. Collins concludes the regulars’ argument: adding that in Laurel, Mississippi
(where he resides) that “as long as I have been voting, the Negroes have voted”
(DNC 99).



Lawrence asks the committee if they have any questions for the regulars.



Question #1 from Mr. Jerry Maddux (TN): Did the regulars follow the legal
procedure established by law in selecting convention delegates?



Griffin responds: Yes.



Question #2 from Maddux (TN): Did the MFDP follow the legal procedure
established by law in selecting convention delegates?



Griffin responds: No.



Question #3 from Maddux (TN): Can you assure the committee that if the
regulars are seated, they will support the democratic nominees of this convention
in November?
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Griffin responds: While I am not a delegate, I know many of the regular
delegates and I believe they have come to the convention to participate in good
faith.



Maddux redirects his question (TN): Can you give the committee some
assurances (because of the discussion of the state convention resolution) that the
regular delegates if seated will support the Democratic nominee in November,
“and see that the electoral vote goes to the nominee…” (DNC 101)?



Griffin responds: defers to Collins.



Lawrence: agrees.



Collins responds: By reading a statement that claims that the regular party has
been a true and faithful friend of the National Party and that the delegates hope
that “the convention will produce a platform and nominate a leader our people can
support” (DNC 102).



Question #1 from Mr. Massey (IN): Asks Collins: is the party that exists here
today in existence in 1960?



Collins responds: Yes.



Question #2 from Massey (IN): Did the state convention adjourn so that the
delegates could attend the national convention in California in 1960?



Collins responds: Yes, I was a delegate.



Question #3 from Massey (IN): When you returned to Mississippi, did the state
convention reconvene?



Collins responds: Yes.



Question #4 from Massey (IN): When the state convention reconvened, did not
the regulars refuse to support the Kennedy/Johnson ticket?



Collins responds: By situating the issue in his own experience stating that as a
delegate he supported the Kennedy/Johnson ticket.



Question #5 from Massey (IN): Did not the electors from Mississippi in 1960
refuse to vote for Kennedy and did vote for Senator Byrd?



Collins responds: The electors did and I was not one of them. He reasons that the
Kennedy/Johnson ticket came first on the ballot and they only lost by 8,000 votes,
while the Republicans had three slates on the ballot. Collins concludes that “one
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convention does not hold over to another one, and this is a new convention and a
new day and a new year” (DNC 104).


Question #7 from Massey (IN): Is your state convention now adjourned?



Collins responds: Yes.



Question #8 from Massey (IN): Will the state convention reconvened?



Collins responds: Yes, on September 9th.



Question #1 from Mrs. King (WA): When the MFDP applied to be a political
party in Mississippi they asked for further information on any legal action that
they should take—was that information given to them?



Griffin responds: I do not know of anyone who gave it to them because they sent
a letter to the Secretary of State’s office, “…and when he went to reply to their
letter, to tell them that they had not complied with the law, it was sent back
because the post office box had closed” (DNC 105).



Question #2 from King (WA) directed to Mr. Collins: You stated that the
resolution passed at your state convention was that the delegates were going to
wait to see if the national platform was compatible with the state of Mississippi.



Collins responds: You misunderstood me.



King (WA) redirects: Asking for a clarification of the platform.



Collins responds: That he does not know what platform they will pass.



King (WA) clarifies: Stating “I mean the resolution which was passed” (DNC
106).



Collins responds: The resolution said nothing about the platform.



Eventually Collins is pressed to say: That the Mississippi delegation hopes that
the convention platform “…would be satisfactory to all of the people and
everybody could go out and support them” (DNC 106).



Question #3 from King (WA): How do you reconcile that with the resolution
passed against the civil rights act? If there is a civil rights plank in our platform,
how would Mississippi react?



Collins responds: Stating that he could not answer for the 2,157,000 people in
Mississippi, but many resolutions are passed—some of which he does not agree
with or the committee does not agree with—and they were thrown out.
196



Question #1 from Mr. Kastenmeier (WI): If the committee believes that the
regulars when they reconvene will repudiate Johnson and his running-mate,
should we seat them at the national convention?



Collins responds: We do not repudiate anyone in Mississippi and while we do not
know who the platform is, “…I can guarantee you that the names of the President
and Vice President will be on the ticket under the banner of the National
Democratic name” (DNC 108).



Kastenmeier (WI) redirects: Stating “In 1960, the resolution was as follows: that
we reject and oppose the Platform of both National Parties and their candidates”
(DNC 108).



Collins asks: Mr. Kastenmeier to read it again.



Kastenmeier (WI) restates and adds: “So already the Democratic Party of
Mississippi has opposed and rejected Lyndon Johnson, at least as a Vice
Presidential candidate, in 1960” (DNC 109).



Collins responds: They have not done it in 1964 and 1960 was an awful fight.



Kastenmeier (WI) redirects: If we thought they would in 1964 should we seat
them?



Collins responds: Yes, because the regulars are the only legally constituted
delegation that could be seated and we cannot control the people.



Question #2 from Kastenmeier (WI): Directed to Mr. Griffin (Mr. Joe Patterson
interjects that he is elected as Governor Johnson is and then claims not to be
offended with the association made by Kastenmeier) that Governor Johnson is
quoted as saying in the Washington Post “‘That the Johnson Administration was
shifting, vacillating, crawfish government in Washington’” (DNC 110).



Patterson responds: Asking what year and then proceeds to say that he will
respond for Governor Johnson, but that he cannot speak for him reminding the
committee that both Patterson and Johnson are elected officials. Then Patterson
claims “but I can tell you this, there most assuredly hasn’t been any vote from
Governor Johnson that he would vote for Barry Goldwater” (DNC 111).



Kastenmeier (WI) responds: “At least not yet” (DNC 111).



Patterson responds: In agreement and then states that Governor Johnson has
made no suggestion that he would vote for another ticket and he was present at
the state convention when the resolution was passed guaranteeing that the
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democratic nominees will appear on the ballot under the democratic label—which
he adds means a lot in Mississippi.


Question #1 from Mr. English (NY): Senator Collins will you support the
convention nominees and platform?



Collins responds: If the regulars are seated as the national committeeman, “I will
do whatever is required of me here and work just as hard as I have heretofore as a
Democrat” (DNC 112).



English (NY) redirects: “You would support the platform” (DNC 112)?



Collins responds: “That would be part of the Democratic process” (DNC 112).



Lawrence asks how many minutes the regular still have.



Leventhal says twelve minutes.



Collins concludes: by speaking to the rhetorical situation and the difficulty of
speaking in such a venue. Thanking the committee, he states that the decision is
in their hands and he believes they will be fair.



Leventhal asks the regulars to leave the documents Griffin referred to in his
testimony for the committee.



Collins and Patterson agree to leave documentation.



Lawrence asserts to Rauh that his response will use no new material.



Rauh agrees and adds: “…but there will be argument presented” (DNC 113).



Collins adds: that the regulars reserve their right to rebuttal.



Lawrence agrees.



Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. rebuttal:
1. We have heard the MFDP equated to the KKK.
 Those that have been beaten are like the beaters because
our registration files have been secret.
 We have the list of 63,000 human beings registered to the
MFDP here for the committee.
 We will not give them to the Mississippi people because of
the testimony you heard, “a man’s life is at stake if those
are given” (DNC 114).
2. They claimed we have precinct meetings in only 35 counties.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

Is not it terrible we were scared to hold one in Neshoba
County where those boys were murdered and you heard
from one’s widow today?
 You heard a representative from the National Council of
Churches claim the MFDP was the greatest grassroots
action of modern time.
 We have a party we are proud of with people who came
and registered with us.
Collins claimed he never heard of anyone in Mississippi who was
denied the right to vote.
 Yet only six-percent of blacks are able.
 The only way to change this is to seat the MFDP so that the
right to vote can be real.
 The regulars talk sweet here, but they talk differently in
Mississippi.
 Quotes Governor Johnson and State Senator Collins saying
“‘We will fight segregation no matter what it costs in
human lives’” (DNC 115).
 In Mississippi they say the regular party is independent
from the National Party.
 So, why do the regulars care—they care because seating the
MFDP once will mean: Mississippi will change.
 You have it in your power to help that change.
Rauh reinforces his image of the regulars quoting Governor
Johnson as saying “‘My determination is to do anything I can to
get the Kennedy dynasty out of the White House’” (DNC 116).
 Governor Johnson even called President Kennedy a dim
wit.
 Ross Barnett co-leader of the regular party and co-defender
in a criminal contempt case called Lyndon Johnson “‘a
counterfeit confederate who resigned from the South’”
(DNC 116).
Rauh claims the National Democratic Party is the party of
minorities.
 Identifies minorities of the Party with blacks as the
minorities of Mississippi.
 Quotes Governor Johnson as stating that the NAACP
stands for niggers, alligators, apes, coons, and possums.
 While the committeeman (which is not Collins, but George
Thomas Brady until the regulars are seated) compared
blacks to chimpanzees and caterpillars.
They claimed blacks (“we”) could come to their precinct meetings.
 Affidavits that claim the opposite.
 Fannie Lou Hamer did, but she has a lot of nerve. The
nerve to be beaten, lose her job, and still show up to a
precinct meeting.
199



Uses rhetorical questions to ask the committee if they
believed the regulars when they said the MFDP concocted
their stories.
7. They claimed the MFDP was not a legal party.
 But they did not have a single black person at their state
convention, which makes them illegal and gives grounds
for not being seated.
 “The law is clear that when there are two groups with
substantial membership, and we have it right there, you
have the right to choose those who work for you, or for
your platform” (DNC 118).
 Comparing the two parties, he states: theirs will repeal the
civil rights act; ours will enforce it. Theirs has been given
the chance to support our platform and Johnson as
President, but they will not (i.e. we will).
8. If the regulars are seated, history will repeat itself.
 They will support Goldwater on September 9th.
 They had a meeting; recessed it, went to convention, and
when they return will reject the platform.
9. The MFDP is a legal party.
 Even though there were risks, we built registration, held
precinct meetings, county conventions, a state convention,
and pledge loyalty to the platform.
 But the biggest difference between the two-parties is: we
are for Johnson and they are for Goldwater, not we are
integrated and they are all-white.
 We will work for Johnson (we are willing to be beaten and
die for the privilege), they are not.
 Therefore, there is no legal problem.
 “We did everything humanly possible and even more
because there was a risk” (DNC 121).
10. The decision comes down to some fundamental things.
 Will the National Party stand for the oppressed or the
oppressors?
 Will the National Party stand for loyalty or disloyalty?
 They have had their opportunities and they did not do it.
 The National Party “cannot fight white backlash by
surrendering to it” (DNC 122).
 The MFDP is legally and equitably right.
 Your choice comes down to “whether you vote for the
power structure of Mississippi that is responsible for the
death of those three boys, or whether you vote for the
people for whom those three boys gave their lives” (DNC
122).
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The party needs to stand for principle on this issue,
otherwise not only will we not win in November, we will
not deserve to win.



Lawrence asks Collins if he wishes to reply.



Collins answers yes.



Mr. E.K. Collins rebuttal:
1. He claims that Rauh said there were 63,000 blacks voting in
Mississippi.
 Lawrence interjects that Rauh said there were 63,000
blacks registered.
 Collins the states that “they did not vote for their people
back home” (DNC 123).
2. Mississippi has never voted Republican since it became a state in
1817.
 We always vote the Democratic ticket.
 Two times we did not vote for the national electors (and in
the last election it was by only 8,000 votes).
 I do not represent the interests you claim, “I represent the
people that are maimed and injured” (DNC 124).
 Using the example of helping one black girl, he claims that
the regulars “have fought the battles for those people the
same as we do for anyone else” (DNC 124).
 Yes, some in Mississippi do not support blacks, but by and
large Mississippi people have the biggest hearts.
3. Speaking to the issue of loyalty.
 We have the highest number of Congressional Medal of
Honor winners per capita as compared with any state in the
union during World War II and Korean Conflict.
 There is no legal evidence to refuse to seat the regulars’
only emotions.
 Thanking the committee, Collins ends his rebuttal.



Lawrence moves the committee to the next delegation debate (Oregon).
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